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African communalism, persons, and the case of non-human animals


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Horsthemke, Kai:
African communalism, persons, and the case of non-human animals.
In: Filosofia Theoretica. 7 (2018) 2. - S. 60-78.
ISSN 2408-5987


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“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”, generally regarded as the guiding principle of African humanism, expresses the view that a person is a person through other persons and is closely associated but not identical with African communitarianism, or communalism. Against Ifeanyi Menkiti’s “unrestricted or radical or excessive communitarianism” Kwame Gyekye has proposed a “restricted or moderate communitarianism”. Whereas personhood, for Menkiti, is acquired over time, with increasing moral maturation, seniority and agency, Gyekye considers it to arise automatically with being born human. The problem with Menkiti’s account of personhood is that it is at once too wide and too narrow. On the other hand, it remains unclear to what extent Gyekye’s is a communitarian view – and to what extent it is distinctly ‘African’. I conclude with a critical reflection on the implications of African communalism and personhood for non-human animals.

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Schlagwörter:Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, African communitarianism, non-human animals, personhood
Institutionen der Universität:Philosophisch-Pädagogische Fakultät > Pädagogik > Lehrstuhl für Bildungsphilosophie und Systematische Pädagogik
DOI / URN / ID:10.4314/ft.v7i2.5
Open Access: Freie Zugänglichkeit des Volltexts?:Nein
Verlag:Calabar School of Philosophy (CSP), University of Calabar
Die Zeitschrift ist nachgewiesen in:
Titel an der KU entstanden:Ja
Eingestellt am: 07. Nov 2018 09:05
Letzte Änderung: 07. Nov 2018 09:05
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