Sprechen und Verstehen bei Heraklit und Parmenides

Kurzfassung/Abstract

Many scholars explain the epistemological value of Heraclitus’ λγος by interpreting it as a rational or mathematical pattern, whose translations refer to the related semantic fijields: e.g. ‘law of thinking’, ‘proportion’, ‘formula of things’. Such meanings are not safely documented earlier than the philosophical language of the fourth century BC. From Homer until the end of the sixth century BC, λγειν means basically ‘to collect’ and ‘to tell’, λγος means ‘collection’ and much more often ‘speech’, whereas ‘speech’ itself represents a ‘collection of utterances (πεα, μθοι)’. Maybe our common sense suggests that no speaking activity can afffect the human understanding as Heraclitus’ λγος does. However, another archaic thinker, Parmenides, argues that ‘names’ and ‘naming’ mislead the opinions of human beings concerning natural phenomena. Furthermore, Heraclitus’ epistemology conforms to the Grundbedeutung of λγος as ‘collection of utterances’ and consists in ‘listening’ (κοειν) and ‘putting together’ (ξυνι ναι), even grasping the secret ‘joint’ (ρμονη) of things. That is why I suggest to interpret λγος according to the archaic, not philosophical meaning of the word, i.e. as ‘speech’.