Beat the elite or concede defeat? : populist problem (re-)representations of international financial disputes

Kurzfassung/Abstract

Many populist leaders politicise disputes with external financial ‘elites’, but most are forced by economic pressures to fundamentally change their ‘people-versus-elite’ problem representations and ‘concede defeat’. Notable exceptions are Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Argentina’s Cristina Kirchner, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who sooner or later resisted strong push-back and defied the IMF or distressed-debt funds. These instances of prolonged populist defiance differ widely across commonly used structural and agential explanatory factors at international, domestic, and individual levels. To explain how Orbán, Kirchner, and Erdoğan managed to ‘beat the elite’, this paper clusters several root causes into a parsimonious framework of two intervening variables. The temporality of strong ‘elite’ push-back and the openness of advisory systems are theorised as shaping distinct cognitive mechanisms of representational continuity or change, through which ‘people-versus-elite’ input is either preserved until – or discarded before – feeding into decision outputs. As the two-by-two matrix of early/later external shocks and open/closed inner circles explains, Orbán did not move beyond marginal representational adjustments; Kirchner’s contingent representational fluidity benefited from opportune situational developments; and Erdoğan defied significant socio-economic cost with fundamental representational continuity. These insights highlight the potential of studying populism at the intersection of foreign policy analysis and international political economy.