



Klaus Stüwe
Lisa Hartmann (Hg.)
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Preface

The academic debate on the notion of “identity” has a long tradition and is more relevant today than ever before: How does a person’s identity develop? What role do family, religion and culture play in this process – also against the background of an increased mediatization of society? How do national and cultural identities emerge, and how is identity shaped across national borders – for example, in supranational associations such as the EU? These questions show how multi-faceted the topic is and how important it is to deal with it. This is even more the case when it is done from the perspective of researchers from two countries (South Korea and Germany).

The articles of this book explore the notion of identity on the basis of two countries that share a close relationship, particularly because of their experience of division.

This conference volume is the result of the 12th German-Korean Colloquium, which took place in Eichstätt in October 2019. The academic colloquia have been a central component of the partnership between Sogang University in Seoul and the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt for almost twenty years.

The colloquia and the book would not have been possible without the support and commitment of many people. First, I would like to thank our South Korean friends and all those who contributed a paper to the 2019 colloquium and made it available as an essay for this conference volume.

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to all those who helped realize the conference and the book project. Dr. Lisa Hartmann played a key role in organizing and coordinating the 2019 colloquium and in moving this book forward. She also was responsible for editing and proofreading the articles in this book. She deserves many thanks for her professional work.

Silke Fuder, Tobias Sieblitz and Lukas Bäurle were a reliable and excellent help with the editorial work. Dr. Christoph Schiebel provided support in the editing process. Petra Halsner’s passion in the organization of the colloquium in October 2019, especially her contribution to the musical setting of the “Bavarian Evening” is unforgettable and also much appreciated.

The German-Korean Colloquia are made possible by the financial support of sponsors and donors. I would like to express my sincere thanks for the partnership that has existed for many years with the Center for Catholic Social Science and its director,

Msg. Prof. Peter Schallenberg. The Hanns-Seidel-Foundation and its representative in Seoul, Dr. Bernhard Seliger, have also been long-standing supporters of our German-Korean project.

Finally, I want to thank the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (WBG) for their assistance and for publishing this conference volume.

Eichstätt in August 2022
Klaus Stüwe

Identity

Winfried Bausback: Identity formation as precondition of modern statehood and European integration in an age of worldwide migration and increasing digitalization

I. Introduction

The German-Korean colloquium is dedicated to *identity*. The focus is, thus, on a term that is of central importance for modern statehood.

II. The general concept of identity

What does the concept of identity actually mean? How can it be defined and delimited?

In the discourses of countless scientific disciplines, the concept of identity is used in different ways. With a rather basic definition from the field of educational sciences, the term can be made well usable for the present research question. Thus, it refers to the “totality of peculiarities that may characterize and distinguish a person from other persons” (Seel & Hanke 2014, p. 11), which can undoubtedly be extended to groups of people, objects, or institutions. The term, thus, has both inclusive and exclusive functions. It can be used equally to denote what defines a group in its togetherness and to delineate that and those who do not belong to a group.

In connection with states, their internal organization and external demarcation, with international and supranational organizations, the concept of identity is associated partly with positive and partly with negative connotations. But regardless of this, identity is the central element in the context of state organization and state formation, of international and supranational cooperation, and of international order. For without the definition of the subjects of an ordering system, such a system is inconceivable.

III. Significance of the question of identity in the political debates and developments of the 20th and 21st centuries

In the 20th century, the question of identity also moved to the center of political debates and developments in Western countries. This will be illustrated in more detail using three examples.

1. Identity in the context of the migration movement

In the context of migration movements, we are currently experiencing a strongly polarized discussion in the Western states and especially in Germany. Two extreme positions have gained popularity. On the one hand, an exaggerated nationalism which wants to completely shield influences from outside is growing. Right-wing extremist groups and movements are on the rise in Western countries as a whole. Just by the name *Identitarian Movement* (Identitäre Bewegung) it is made very clear that a particular group in Germany, establishing itself in this right wing, is all about an exaggerated and exclusionary sense and striving of identity (cf. Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern 2020, p. 170).

On the other hand, extreme positions are emerging that reject borders and ultimately statehood per se. The enforcement of European or national immigration laws is generally rejected or questioned. Under the title *No Border, No Nation*, statehood and European supranationality derived from statehood are fundamentally questioned. Thought to the end, *No Border, No Nation* is an anarchistic ideology.

Both ideologies pose a profound threat to the modern democratic and liberal rule of law. The extreme right-wing ideology exaggerates one's own identity as an exclusion factor that divides society internally and can externally become an imperialistic threat to others. On the other hand, *No Border, No Nation* negates the order and peace function of modern statehood. The rejection of any state identity must inevitably lead to disorder and arbitrariness.

The position of the majority in social discourse in Germany and in Europe certainly moves between the two extreme positions. However, the danger of the extreme positions – both the nationalistic isolation and the anarchistic negation of state demarcation and regulation – is overlooked.

2. The question of identity as a central challenge in the context of divided states

But the question of identity has also been a key when it comes to the question of divided states. Whether reunification succeeds or division manifests itself in the long run depends crucially on whether a common identity can be maintained beyond division or not.

In 2019 Germany and Europe celebrated the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain in Europe, which marked the beginning of a development that led to German Reunification in freedom, under the rule of law and in democracy in 1990. Keeping the German Question open for more than four decades – including in legal terms – made reunification possible. Furthermore, reunification was made possible through encounters and the exchange of people's sense of togetherness. From this perspective, Bavaria's *Grundvertragsstreit* and the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, which was based on this dispute resulting in the *Neue Ostpolitik* made a dialectical contribution to this process. With the *Grundvertragsurteil*, which was triggered by Bavaria, the Federal Constitutional Court committed the West German government to the requirement of reunification and to adhere to a single German citizenship. This was not self-evident. In the 1970s and 1980s positions became louder that called the idea of reunification a grand delusion and wanted to manifest a two-state status in the long term (Blumenwitz 1995, p. 348). On the other hand, the contacts between the people in the GDR and in the Federal Republic of Germany that were facilitated and multiplied by the New Eastern Policy – *Change through rapprochement* (Wandel durch Annäherung) – strengthened the feeling of togetherness beyond the division. In this context, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl recalls the importance of family reunification and expanded visitor traffic between the FRG and the GDR as examples. However, the former chancellor also speaks, not without reason, of the fact that the far-flung expectations of Brandt's new Ostpolitik had not been fulfilled (cf. Kohl 1996, p. 21).

Of course, it is an exciting question to which extent parallels exist between German Reunification and a similar development in Korea. In any case, reunification of a divided statehood will only succeed where a common identity is maintained and cultivated.

3. Identity in the context of the crisis of the European Union

The centrality of the question of identity also becomes evident in connection with the crisis of the European Union. With regard to the emergence of nationalist forces, in some member states common values and achievements are called into question, ranging from the *acquis communautaire* to the financial soundness in the context of the European debt crisis up to central elements of the rule of law. The question of how the Union should and can react to such ruptures, challenging the common identity as a Union, is of central

legal and political importance. Moreover, the Brexit also makes it clear that the existence and common identity of the Union is not something that can be taken for granted or guaranteed in the long term, not even today.

The way in which national, European and regional identities can coexist is crucial in this context. I would like to quote the late former Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauß, without going into detail as regards the context of the then ongoing debate. He summed up his political convictions in the words: “Bavaria our homeland, Germany our fatherland and Europe our future” (Schmid 2021). This commitment makes it clear that regional, national and European identities need not and must not be contradictory.

Further examples of the relevance of the concept of identity can easily be found from the 20th century to the present day: The question of nation building in times of decolonization, failed states with their devastating effects on entire regions, dismemberment of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, up to current autonomy movements, for example in the Basque Country and in Scotland.

IV. Identity and modern, liberal and democratic statehood

In order to understand why identity plays such a large role for states and – derived from this – for supranational and international organizations, one only has to look at their nature and content.

1. State and international and supranational organizations from outside

Like any other legal system, the international order with its function of securing peace and prosperity also needs defined legal subjects. All born members of the legal community, the states, are the central bearers of rights and duties. From an outside perspective, they define themselves according to Georg Jellinek’s well-known three-element doctrine: through their national territory, their people and the state authority related to both. Territorial and personal demarcation are indispensable prerequisites for the state power to act both internally and externally, for social systems such as the legal, social and political orders to have clear fields of influence and reference (Vosgerau 2014, p. 394).

The same applies when a supranational organization takes over functions from its member states. In the European Union, for example, within the framework of its constitutional tasks, citizenship of the union takes the place of national citizenship, union territory takes the place of national territory and union power, union law takes the place of state power.

International organizations derive their identity and field of action from the founding states. Here too, however, effectiveness requires a clear definition of those who are members of such organizations, of the area to which the activities of the international organization relate and of the area in which the organization operates.

This externally perceptible identity, the delimitation it provides, is important if the international system – international law as an international legal community and the international community as a partnership of legal entities – is to function. However, the outwardly perceptible identity does not yet say anything about the internal organization of the legal objects.

2. Identity within the liberal and democratic constitutional state

The Republic of Korea and the Federal Republic of Germany see themselves as free, democratic constitutional states. It is well known that it is not easy to translate democracy, the rule of the people, into the reality of life and to describe it in the reality of life. To understand democracy simply as the identity of rulers and the ruled, the governing and the governed, the commanding and the obeying, as Carl Schmitt defines it in his constitutional doctrine, says nothing about how it can be implemented in reality (Bausback 1998, p. 42).

A static understanding of state and democracy cannot depict reality. The state, as the famous constitutional lawyer Rudolf Smend has described it, is not a quiescent whole that allows individual expressions of life, laws, diplomatic acts, judgments and administrative actions to emanate from it. According to Smend, the state is only present in these individual utterances of life if they are confirmations of an overall intellectual context (Smend 1928, p. 18).

The state is, thus, understood as a dialectical connection of effects. Rudolf Smend refers in his doctrine of the state to the Frenchman Ernest Renan, who in 1882 posed the well-known question “Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?” (“What is a nation?”). In this context, the term *nation* stands for the state. And his – equally famous – answer to this is the understanding of the state as “plébiscite de tous les jours” (Renan 1882). The state is understood by Renan and subsequently by Smend as a community founded and held together on the basis of the common experiences and sacrifices one has made for the community and the will to remain together as a community and to cope with the tasks of the future. The existential factor for the state is, therefore, the constant will of the individuals to remain together as a state and a community, as it were in the form of a referendum that takes place constantly in the background and permanently confirms the state and its existence (cf. Bausback 1998, p. 55).

On this basis, the Federal Constitutional Court described democracy very early on as a social process. Elections and votes have a central function in this social process, as they directly express the people's will. But between these elections and votes the constant

interaction process between society and the constitutional state order, between the free formation of will and conviction in society, on the one hand, and the constitutional state formation, on the other hand, is of central importance.

In this context, identity is central in two respects. In relation to elections and votes and the social interaction process, it must be clear who can and should participate and in what way. It, therefore, needs a definition of the members of the state community; it needs the definition of citizenship as a subject position. It also needs a definition of the sphere of action.

But identity is also of central importance for the democratic state in a completely different way. Starting from the understanding of the will of the nation that forms the start, connecting qualities and experiences are needed that make it possible to identify with one's own state, which creates an identity of the state.

V. Identity in connection with the great challenges of our time, digitalization and worldwide migration movements

On the basis of two major themes, it can be deduced that in today's world the accomplishment of major tasks can no longer lie with nation states alone. Supranational organizations as associations of individual states with similar interests and similar identities are of particular importance when it comes to addressing global issues.

1. Digitalization and the rule of law

Digitalization is indispensable for people in many areas of life. It makes us what we are today: a modern information society. At the same time, however, digitalization can also be an existential threat to this modern information society. In 2019 alone the general public has been inundated with news and reports about the critical data security of multinational digital corporations. Illegal appropriation of personal data, security gaps resulting in the disclosure of private data, but also the uncertainty of individuals about the whereabouts or further use of their information characterize a loss of control by digital corporations. The large volume of personal data stored by digital corporations, their high commercial value and the extensive monitoring potential of modern information technology pose a fundamental threat to citizens' privacy. Citizens who, in a functioning democratic constitutional state, can ultimately trust that their legal sphere will be protected by state power and can, therefore, identify with their state, are increasingly losing this trust in the digital world. This is also confirmed by surveys conducted in Germany. Many citizens have lost confidence in large digital corporations

when it comes to protecting their rights. And they rightly doubt that the state can effectively help them protect their rights in this area (Bausback 2019).

Digital corporations appear as a breaking point in the structure of the rule of law by replacing the regulative power of state legislation with self-imposed rules. This is ultimately also reflected in the national and European capacity to act, with regard to tax justice, but also and above all in a functioning cyber security architecture with a focus on data security. Coping with the effects and excesses of digitalization must be tackled where the necessary impact can be achieved by pooling competence and responsibility (Bausback 2019).

This is why it is so elementary for the state to enforce the law in the digital realm more strongly and to regain data security with all its might. The need for law also has a democratic dimension. State and supranational law is an expression of the principle of popular sovereignty. Ultimately, the will of the people is not based on the agreement of the terms and conditions of a digital provider. In representative democracies, the enforcement of the law by the state itself is ultimately democratically legitimized and, above all, controlled (Bausback 2019).

It seems evident that the international and decentralized structure of cyberspace, including large digital corporations, is too complex to solve the problems on a national level alone. The challenges posed by digitalization can therefore be an opportunity for Europe to act as a driving force in restoring regulatory power, order and responsibility (Bausback 2019).

Ultimately, identity is also a question of trust. Can the individual citizen trust that the state has the power to perform its duty of care or to prevail against private companies to use his or her data in accordance with applicable law? By solving this problem, the rule of law can play a part in counteracting extreme polarization of society. From this perspective, the identification of a citizen with the state is a constitutional prerequisite, precisely because the citizen, as the *final decision-maker* in the democratically legitimized power structure, can also have a say. As an anonymous third party, a company can be part of one or more societies, but depending on the rules, it does not see itself as having an equivalent obligation towards its customers as the state has towards its citizens.

2. The state's regulatory power in the context of migration movements

The war in Syria and the tense situation in Afghanistan had a major influence on the migration movement to Europe from autumn 2015 onwards. This so-called migration crisis posed major challenges not only to the European community of states but also to the individual states themselves. In many respects, the consequences also affected the concept of identity. An essential aspect, as described above, was the emergence of the *No Border, No Nation* movement. This extreme ideology postulates unrestricted freedom

of movement, which is to be achieved by abolishing national borders. It seeks to break through the regulatory framework of the state and ultimately the abolition of statehood itself. Such an anarchic view must inevitably lead to the abolition of precisely those identities that make up the system *sui generis* Europe, for example. It is not without reason that the Motto of the European Union reads *United in diversity* (Europäische Union 2021), as it refers to the multitude of different European identities that, nevertheless, find innumerable points of contact among themselves. *No Border, No Nation* ultimately means the replacement of diverse identities with an artificial, collective identity. It is, therefore, not an alternative. This is underpinned by two essential theses.

A state, but also a supranational association such as the European community of states, cannot do without the enforcement of immigration rules. This is particularly clear from the point of view of social systems. These systems refer to a group of persons that is unambiguous and attributable to their membership of an identity system. In addition, states are primarily accountable to their own population, just as states – depending on their systemic characteristics – also have a duty of care for their citizens. A softening or even abolition of immigration rules ultimately leads to a loss of identity of the reference system.

The diversity of identities in the global community of states is evident. Nevertheless, or precisely because of it, differences and discrepancies, even incompatibility on certain issues, are inevitable. All the more so, the openness of an identity system, such as Germany, is an important achievement of humanist tradition and antagonism to an ideology of isolation and exclusion. Thus, the *Grundgesetz* is deliberately designed to be compatible with international law and the law of nations. In this sense, no active guidance and action is necessary, since openness is inherent in the self-understanding of the German state and its identity. With this openness, German identity, just like European identity, allows for cross-fertilization by other cultures and identities, “which binds itself voluntarily in law and inserts itself into a cooperative order of free and peaceful states” (Di Fabio 2005, p. 237).

Humaneness is an essential part of the identity of the European and Western community of states. In view of the migration crisis, these challenges can only be overcome through the joint efforts of states that share their own goals and thus their own identities. This is another reason why the European Union stands by its responsibility and seeks to provide help at the international level with humanity and order.

VI. Conclusion: Current political challenges are also questions of identity

In summary, it can be said that identity has been a central element of statehood and international order. Only through identity is it possible to define individual states or the European Union as a supranational organization. People's identification with their state and with the European Union also presupposes the development of a common identity of the state or the European Union. Especially in view of the global developments of digitalization and the migration movement, the importance of such an identity is not decreasing but increasing. Against the background of these developments, the ability to act and the acceptance of state and supranational sovereignty also depend on how people identify themselves with their state or with the European Union.

It is important that the identity of both states and supranational organizations, demarcation, on the one hand, and openness, on the other, be balanced. Neither is an exaggerated, closed identity a path that promises long-term success. Increasing one's own identity into an exaggerated nationalism must ultimately lead the state to decline.

Ideologies that lead to the abandonment of identity demarcation are just as dangerous, however. This, too, ultimately leads to the failure of a state or supranational organization. Particularly in view of the global challenges, we need an understanding of the state that cultivates its own identity in the sense of constitutional patriotism and also asserts it internally and defends it externally.

However, this identity must also be formulated in such an open way that it enables cooperation and exchange with other states. Openness of the constitution to international and cross-border cooperation, openness to European integration, as part of constitutional identity, are conditions of success of the free democratic constitutional state, especially in view of the challenges described above.

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Friedrich Kießling: Nationalism and Identity in Modern European History. Scope and Limits of a Modern Concept of Order

I would like to start with what we may call the friendly face of national consciousness, the friendly face of national feelings and of national identity: When the 2012 European Football Championship was held in Poland and the Ukraine, the Irish national team had qualified for the final tournament for the first time in over twenty years. Thousands of Irish soccer fans accompanied the team to Central and Eastern Europe and celebrated their squad tirelessly and perfectly peacefully throughout the tournament for this long-awaited success.

The attitude of the Irish fans was especially remarkable not only because about 20 000 of them came all the way from Ireland to Poland and the Ukraine, where the championship took place, but also because they were singing and dancing all the time despite of the disastrous results for the Irish footballers (e.g. Wilson 2012). The Irish national team played three matches and lost all of them. At the end, the goal difference was one to nine. They scored once and conceded nine goals in three games. Nevertheless, the fans were singing, dancing and even celebrating their own team constantly.

Football supporters singing, celebrating despite of the defeat of their own national team – this might be the friendly face of modern national feelings. But as all of us know, there are, of course, other dimensions of nationalism, of national identity – resulting sometimes in discrimination, in war, or even in mass murder. And occasionally, it is also clear that football supporters behave less friendly than the Irish fans did in Poland and the Ukraine. Therefore, from time to time as a historian I cannot help thinking that the invention (and it is an invention) of national consciousness and of nationalism is one of the most successful and at the same time one of the worst and most dangerous inventions in the history of mankind.

However, the existence of a concept of nationality or even nationalism on the one hand and a national identity on the other hand are not the same thing. Regarding Modern European History, ranging from about 1800 to the present day, it is certainly clear that the concept of nationality as well as nationalistic ideas existed from the beginning of Modern European History. But the question whether, when and to what extent we can also speak of a widespread national identity in modern times is a far more complex question. Was there a national identity for example in Italy in 1800, in Britain in 1850 or in Russia in 1900?

It is this question of when and to what extent not only the concept of ‘nation’ or ‘nationalism’ existed but of when and to what extent we can also speak of a general

national identity that historians have been asking constantly in recent works on national consciousness and nationalism. And therefore, it is this question I would like to address in this chapter, too. Once again, it is pretty clear that national identities exist today (the 20 000 Irish football supporters in Poland and the Ukraine are an example) but for many other periods in Modern History the existence of a widespread national feeling is anything but obvious.

In order to discuss this issue, I would like to proceed in five steps: First, I would like to outline how historians look at the phenomenon of national consciousness and national identities these days. The second part draws attention to the temporal and regional limits of the nation-state principle. In a third step, I would like to ask for alternatives to a widespread national identity in the 19th and early 20th century. In my fourth step, very briefly, I will address the problem of the so-called methodological nationalism, a problem that has occupied researchers in recent years very often. And finally, there will be a short conclusion and at least one important hint how recent findings on the history of national identities could be relevant to our understanding of Modern European History as a whole.

I. National Consciousness and National Identity in Historical Research

Since a couple of decades, there is a consensus among historians that national consciousness, national identities, as well as the 'nation' itself are basically social constructions. National consciousness and nations in general are anything but anthropological constants. They have not always been around; they were invented at some point in history. The probably best known and most influential book about this invention of nationalism is Benedict Andersons "Imagined Communities", first published in 1983. The works by Ernest Gellner, above all his book "Nations and Nationalism", also published in 1983 (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983), are hardly less important.

Therefore, the starting point of most historians are still considerations like the following: If you had asked someone in the European Middle Ages to which nation he or she belongs to you would not have received an answer or at least not an answer corresponding to the modern meaning of 'nation'. Of course, the Latin word *natio* existed and was used in certain contexts. However, the discussion about 'nation' in the modern meaning of the term began sometime in the late early modern period. Prior to this development it mainly remained a debate among a small elite, among writers, intellectuals, and maybe some politicians. It was not a debate that reached 'the people' or the population in general (Amstrong 1982; Stauber 1996; regarding the discussion about an earlier start cf.: Jensen 2016).

This changed at some point in the course of the 18th and the 19th century. Then, more and more people were starting to understand themselves as French, Italians or Poles.

The 'nation' was no longer just a topic of the history of ideas or of intellectual history, it became an aspect of the history of mentalities, of the history not only of the few but of the many. It became an issue that affected European societies as a whole. But why did this change occur and how have historians tried to explain it?

In order to explain why something that has been unknown to most people started to determine identities and average life, historians often refer to an interplay of at least four reasons (in addition to Anderson and Gellner e.g.: Langewiesche 2000; Kunze 2005, pp. 49–87).

The first reason is the decline of traditional systems of political or social order, systems respectively concepts of order (for the terminology cf.: Raphael 2018) which had previously determined belongings and identities and which fell into crisis in the decades around 1800. The beginning loss of credibility which religion and the Church underwent during the European Enlightenment is probably most prominent, that is the beginning secularization at least in western and central European societies since the 18th century. Another example is the delegitimization of monarchies and dynasties also taking place during the late 18th and the beginning 19th century. For both developments, of course, the French Revolution became very important. Traditional systems of order lost their importance and the 'nation' gradually managed to fill this vacuum (Bell 2001).

A second reason is the simultaneous communications and transport revolution since the early 19th century. Here, for example, Benedict Anderson's works are extremely important for many historians: The nation, they believe, is above all a space of common communication, a community of communication (see also Kunze 2005, pp. 51–54). And because of the revolution of communication and transport systems since the early 19th century, more and more people took part in joint communication over longer distances. The number of newspapers increased and the number of people who could read them likewise etc. Therefore, there are technical preconditions for the nation becoming the center of a new "imagined community" as Benedict Anderson put it in his famous phrase.

The third reason for the rise of the concept of the nation is that the 'nation' could be linked to existing traditions. The idea was in many ways 'connectable'. Such existing traditions include language but also similar habits or a similarly perceived past of a certain group of people. The latter, for example, made the idea of a long common 'national' history or of a certain existing 'national culture' plausible. The Thirty Years' War from 1618 to 1648 was not a 'German' war, it was a European war. But it affected many places in Germany and could therefore be plausibly attributed to a long common German history. Gothic art was not a 'German' architectural style, it was a European one. But in many places in the later German Empire there were Gothic churches and cathedrals. Thus, so for many, it could plausibly be constructed as a German architectural style. And similar things could be done in the field of literature, painting and so on. What is important for historical interpretations is that these constructions of a common national history or of a common national culture were constantly renewed and reinforced in newspapers, books, later, in schools but also through symbols or national festivals (Langewiesche 1996). Eventually, those interpretations of a growing construction of common traditions ran deep. For example, people in Bavarian Eichstätt

believed that they have more in common with people in Hamburg or Kiel than with somebody from a small town in southern France, or with someone from a small town in Austria or the later Czech Republic.

Finally (and fourth), the formation of political groups, later, on political parties, which advocated the creation of a uniform, homogeneous nation-state, was important for the rise of the 'nation'. In this way, the idea was introduced into the political sphere. It became part of political communication in parliament or newspapers. Eventually, the nation as a unified, homogeneous and sovereign state had become the pivotal point of the 'imagined community'. The idea was constantly activated in politics, in personal life or even in the public festival culture and was so successful that, eventually, alternative political orders were hardly thinkable. The one and unified nation rather appeared "as a timeless, natural source of identification" (Sheehan 1996, p. 33).

At this point, another influential concept must be introduced. In several essays, the American historian Charles S. Maier has pointed out a special connection between ruling and the (nation-)state as the hallmark of modern political ordering (Maier 2000; Maier 2006; see also: Jureit 2012). At the heart of Maier's argument is the concept of territoriality. According to Maier, modern territoriality – understood as the strategy "to control people and things by controlling area" (Maier 2006, p. 34) – is characterized by the fact that different spaces are to be brought into congruence. Political space is supposed to be in line with social space, economic space, mental space and so on.

Such a homogeneous territory is produced by a central state, which strengthens itself at the expense of, for example, regional institutions and is secured inwardly and outwardly by military capacities. Maier assumes that the decisive actors in this process are professional elites from the economic, political or cultural spheres, which differ from the old agrarian elites. Among the preconditions for this development, Maier – like Anderson or Langewiesche – counts the emergence of a modern, industrial infrastructure.

What emerges eventually – this seems particularly important in our context – is the congruence of an identity space with a political space (which Maier calls "decision space", Maier 2000, e.g. p. 816). In addition – and I consider this also as one of the most important fundamental imaginations of the 'space' in the era of modern nationalism – there is the idea of the national space as a source of new political resources and new political energy. Through its total control (i.e. through territorialisation) space can be 'awakened'. It becomes a powerful instrument both internally and externally. As a result, for Maier, the convergence of the "decision space" and the collectively conceived "identity space" explains the specific dynamics of modern nation-states (Maier 2000, p. 818).

However, a decisive question from a historical point of view remains, which is when these developments actually took place? Additionally, not only when they took place but also where? And with that I come to the second point of this chapter.

II. The Question of the Temporal and Regional Limits of the Nation-State Principle

Unsurprisingly, there has been a vast mass of historical literature dealing with these questions. And obviously, the results differ, above all depending on which society or which region is studied.

For Germany, most historians believe that we can speak of a real German national identity from the 1890s onwards. Before that point, regional identities probably remained more important than a German one (Confino 1997; Green 2001). In France it may be a little bit earlier. Maybe there it was during the 1870s and 1880s when a national identity became a widespread feeling (Weber 1977). In other European regions, however, it was much later (with a European perspective: Hirschhausen & Leonhard 2001). The problems Austrian officials were confronted with when trying to quantify the size of the 'nationalities' in their country have become a famous example in historical literature (Göderle 2016; Brix 1982). For them, it soon became apparent that in surveys and censuses the question of one's own nationality was pointless in some regions even in the late 19th century. People simply did not know what to do with a question about their nationality. Therefore, the Austrian and Hungarian officials asked about the language in order to find out the size of nationalities. But even that only worked in part because people used different languages in different contexts. In some regions, therefore, nationality was deduced from religions respectively denominations. All this remained a problem until the last census in Austria-Hungary that took place in 1910. According to some contemporary experts, nationality could not be found out by asking individuals; it had to be attributed analytically (Göderle 2016, e.g. pp 266–275).

The difficulties of the Austrian and Hungarian authorities in identifying nationalities on their territory points to the fact that in the 19th century, it was entirely possible to belong to more than one 'nation'. An example from the region here is the almost simultaneous founding of the 'Germanic National Museum' in Nuremberg in 1852 and the founding of the 'Bavarian National Museum' in Munich three years later. Of course, both 'national' museums were located in the Kingdom of Bavaria. A few years earlier, during the Revolution of 1848, there was, as is well known, both a German National Assembly in Frankfurt, which represented all German countries (and also Bohemia), and a Prussian Parliament, which was also called National Assembly covering (as a revolutionary parliament) the Prussian territories and referring to the Prussian rather than the German nation.

The most famous example of multiple national affiliations in the 19th century, however, is not the German example but the broad contemporary discussion about the existence of a British or just a Scottish, a Welsh or an English national identity. Again, what is important here is that this was already a contemporary debate (Ward 2004; Lindfield 2015). So, if the question of when, where and to what extent national identity

can be spoken of in the 19th century is not so easy to answer, what alternatives can we think of? What other collective identities existed?

III. Alternative concepts of order

Before presenting some alternative collective identities, it should be briefly noted that the national concept of order itself was not without competition in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was challenged for example not only by older, often regional or still dynastic claims to political power but also by early international concepts (Geyer & Paulmann 2001; Herren-Oesch 2009). The heyday of the nation-state idea also coincided with a rise in the importance of international contacts and interdependencies. Both the communications and transportation revolutions of the 19th century may have been 'national' in character at first, but they quickly developed international dimensions and, above all, created the need for trans- and supranational regulations. The age of nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries became the first age of internationalism as well. Although a strong concept of sovereignty was hardly contested in 'high politics', as regards the solutions of minor issues, dozens of intergovernmental arbitration treaties were in force even before World War I, settling all kinds of legal or economic conflicts intergovernmentally in large numbers and usually rather quietly.

The relationship between territoriality and modern administration in the colonial world also turned out to be much more complicated than we had been aware of for a long time (Cooper 2005; Pesek 2005; Burroughs 1999). Although the Berlin Congo Conference of 1885 established the principle of effective control as the decisive criterion for legitimate colonial rule, colonial practice was quite different. Moreover, in general the imperial state seemed to be able to live quite well with vast zones of less 'dense' rule. This is demonstrated by the exercise of 'indirect rule' which was frequently applied especially in British colonies and led to very different scales of colonial territorial penetration. Another example is the legal system in the German colonies, which, for example, not only tolerated the indigenous legal system in areas like the Islamic regions of Tanzania but required German colonial officials (many of them former Prussian District Administrators, 'Landräte') to ensure that Islamic law was correctly applied among Africans.

While some of this may be due to the chronic weakness of imperial rule, which was always an administration characterized by a shortage of resources, this tolerance of the modern European nation-states toward variances in their own colonial power (their own 'territorialisation') remains rather remarkable. Although there are good arguments that even for European core states in the imperial arena the modern territorial principle was only partly the main political concept (with, however, particularly brutal consequences for example in German Southwest Africa or the Kenyan highlands colonized by the British), within Europe, too, the modern concept of national territorialisation was never without alternatives.

Thus, in order to find alternative concepts of orders, one does not even have to think of socialist theories, which argued decisively non-territorially, but socially and internationally; in bourgeois internationalism too, in the European unity movement and even in geopolitical concepts, concepts of order remained or were present which conceived the political space beyond the new model of a homogeneous national territory. From the perspective of those in power, things may look different, but here, too, ideas of restrictions on sovereignty have multiplied in modern international law since the end of the First World War — whether through the agreed restrictions on the *ius ad bellum* or through the minority regime of the League of Nations. As Madelaine Herren has shown, in the case of minor states or systemic outsiders an increased interest in the containment of state sovereignty through international law existed even before 1914 (Herren-Oesch 2000).

The limits of state control over its own territory even in the golden age of the modern nation-state are vividly illustrated by the example of the international media market in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As early as 1870, the major news agencies had formed a worldwide cartel that lasted until the early 1930s, dividing the world among themselves by region. The governments in Paris, London, Berlin and later in Washington tried to influence their ‘own’ news agencies in accordance with their political goals. But this was only partially successful at best. The worldwide market (and the maintenance of the cartel and its rules) economically was far too important for the agencies to expose themselves to the accusation of (too) great national control (Winseck & Pike 2007).

The First World War, at the latest, made clear how big the importance of non-territorialized, or at least not conventionally territorialized, global information networks was in the meantime. In the interwar period, the state's efforts to gain access to the global communications networks were correspondingly massive. But even now, the ‘stubbornness’ of international media markets persisted, and the success of national governments in their control efforts remained low. In fact, the relationship between modern communication and territorialisation continued to be ambivalent. On the one hand, telegraphy, telephone and radio supported the political integration of a country's own territory. On the other hand, all three technical innovations quickly became inter- and transnational instruments. Broadcasting in particular thus stands for a further consolidation of the national space right into the respective living room but on the other hand also for a medium for which national borders simply no longer played any role. So, it was not to be long before it was used by governments beyond their own territory as a propaganda weapon in order to influence foreign societies (Kaufmann 1996; Headrick 1991; Hugill 1999).

All these examples show that even in the 19th and 20th centuries, the concept of the homogenous nation-state, oriented on the model of the politically, socially, economically and even mentally and medially controlled territory was always limited respectively challenged. This applies to concrete political practices as well as to the conceptual dimension of modern nation-states (and, for example, modern diaspora experiences or concepts of more than one ‘Heimat’ in migration groups have not yet even been mentioned!). Such phenomena are undoubtedly part of the antecedents of the current

crisis of the territorialized nation-state, which did not begin with a supposed globalization push during the 1970s but which, seen from today's perspective, seems to have been anticipated in many ways by the experiences described.

What is true for politics, the economy or the media is equally true for the dimension of identities. I think, and research shows this very clearly, that here religion respectively denominations should not be underestimated as sources of collective identities even in the 'national' age of the 19th and 20th century. One only has to bear in mind that above all in many small towns or in the countryside the biggest political demonstrations of the 19th century did not take place during the great political revolutions. They did not take place in 1789, in 1830 or in 1848. Much larger political meetings or protests occurred during the so-called Kulturkampf. Apparently, in many places this conflict between the Church and the modern state mobilized the people much more than any other event (Ayako Bennette 2012; for the broader picture e.g.: Blaschke 2000).

Apart from religious, confessional, from local or regional identities which continued to exist even after the invention of the modern nation-state, social identities, too, should not be underestimated. A good example of this are many military letters written by German soldiers from occupied Polish or Russian territories during the First World War. As recent works have shown, the views of German soldiers in occupied Polish or Russian territories were often not as strongly determined by a national or a nationalistic point of view. Instead, in many cases, the perspective was more or less a social one. In describing the foreign countries, the soldiers wrote about the contrast between rich and poor or about the contrast between cities, towns and the countryside. Often, the lesson the soldiers drew was that the class distinctions were not completely different to the situation at home in Germany. By the way, this changed during the Second World War. Then, the descriptions that could be found in military letters written by German soldiers actually focused much more on national differences. (Ebert 2015; Didczuneit et al. 2011).

Therefore (and to summarize at this point), it can be said that the emergence of national identities was a very long process. And this process was by no means completed at the beginning of the 20th century. Additionally, even afterwards we should not presume the dominance of national identities too quickly. Instead, we have to assume overlapping identities. People still have several or multiple identities. Or to put it in other words: The 'long 19th century', often described as a national age, was probably not as national as many historians thought.

IV. Methodological Nationalism in Historical Sciences

But if recent research is right that the national age was not as national in Europe as we were used to think, why did historians believe in the dominance of national thinking and of national identities for so long?

The answer is often seen in a methodological problem. For a long time, historians simply assumed that the nation-state and national developments must be the main starting point for their research. They examined their objects from the outset as national phenomena. This was true for political issues as well as for social or economic topics. As a consequence, developments that were not national were not even reflected. This problem could be called the methodological nationalism in historical research (for historiography cf.: Angster 2018; more generally: Wimmer & Schiller 2002).

One example of developments that did not fit into the national scheme and were, therefore, overlooked by researchers is the history of passport obligations in the decades before World War One. Instead of what could be guessed from the perspective of the nation-state, passport obligations were not intensified in the decades around 1900 but rather softened. The reason was the increase in rail traffic across borders, which made it simply impractical to check thousands of identity cards. It was not until after the First World War that an opposing development started again (cf.: Fahrmeier 2007).

Another example is the history of industrialization in the 19th century. Here, research is increasingly abandoning a national perspective. Especially the beginning of European industrialization was very much a regional or an international affair. As so often, in this case the national perspective makes little sense. Therefore, in many works, industrialization is no longer understood as for example British history but as the history of certain regions in the north of England or in London. Early industrialization in Belgium is mainly explained by the close ties to certain regions in England rather than a national Belgian history. Nor is it seen as an international development. It is mainly seen as an inter-regional history or a trans-regional history (Pollard 1980; Hahn 1998, pp. 98–107).

These problems of methodological nationalism also affected the history of collective identities in modern European history, which too often was presented as a mounting predominance of the national consciousness.

V. Conclusion

Although the concept of the nation existed long before, scholars of Modern and Contemporary History assume that a national identity of broader population groups can only be spoken of in the course of the 19th century. A mixture of several factors led to this widespread emergence of the new nation-state principle. Around 1800, the idea of a homogeneous nation-state came up against what we might call a legitimization vacuum

that had been increasingly opened up by the crisis of monarchical-dynastic rule and the beginning secularization in the 18th century. In addition, there were technical-communicative developments, such as the massive improvement of infrastructure since the late 18th century, both in transport and news transmission, and related social processes, such as increased literacy or growing mobility in everyday life. Finally, the formation of political groups, later parties, with a national agenda was important. In the end, the 'nation' as a uniform, homogeneous and maximum sovereign territorial state had become the center of a new 'imagined community'.

However, even in its heyday, the nation-state principle was always challenged by other concepts of order. These included continuing local, regional, religious or dynastic orientations as well as new social, economic or international models. For a long time, historians who were themselves predominantly caught up in national paths of thinking paid little attention to such contexts and affiliations. Nevertheless, even at the beginning of the 20th century, the nation-state principle was anything but unchallenged, both politically and in terms of identities.

Charles S. Maier once described modern history as the age of a new form of territoriality, in which the idea of the nation-state played the decisive role. By the modern form of territoriality Maier understood the attempt undertaken above all by the modern nation-state to exercise effective control over a strictly defined area, a territory. In addition, for Maier, effective control meant that the modern nation-state not only wanted to exercise political but also economic, social, legal, religious etc. control. The political space of the nation-state should match with the social space, the legal space or the economic space. Finally, and this is also part of the modern idea of the 'nation' in Maier's understanding, the political space should also match with the identity space. I quote Charles S. Maier: "In the modern national-state identity space and decision space [which is political space here] coexisted like magnetic fields and electrical fields (...) movement through one generating energy in the other." (Maier 2006, p. 48).

Maier's idea has become quite popular among historians. And of course, the impact of the concept of the 'nation' as the main model for the modern political and social order should, of course, not be underestimated. However, looking not only at the concept of nationality but also at the existence of national identities the history of the 'national age' in Europe might be shorter than often assumed. Furthermore, even during the climax of the 'national age' sometime in the 20th century, I think, historians should continue to be open for the existence of alternative identities beyond national identity.

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Klaus Stüwe: The Development of an EU-Identity: Concepts and Limits of European Identity Formation

I. Introduction

Cultural scientists and geographers, law scholars, historians, philosophers and increasingly also political scientists have intensively studied the subject of “European Identity” and made their proposals on the definition of the nature of Europe and the EU (Delanty 2007, pp. 127–142; Fligstein 2008; Cram 2012, pp. 71–86; Saurugger & Thatcher 2019, pp. 461–476). However, all those attempts come together in only one single point: they differ, sometimes considerably, in the question of what a European identity refers to.

Some emphasize *cultural aspects*. For German philosopher Karl Jaspers, for example, Europe is characterized through the intellectual and artistic achievements of “Homer, Aischylos, Sophocles, (...) Dante, Shakespeare, Goethe, (...) Bach, Mozart, Beethoven” (Jaspers 1947, pp. 9–10). The French philosopher Jean-François Mattei emphasized another aspect. According to him, Europe is the “culture of opening”, characterized by the primacy of “the idea”: Philosophy, the pursuit of knowledge, school and university, art and creativity, and finally self-reflection and self-criticism form the foundation for the development of Europe. (Mattéi 2011).

Another variation of this cultural point of view sees *Christianity* as the foundation of European identity. The former President of the Council of the Evangelical Church of Germany, Wolfgang Huber, for example saw in Europe a “Christian Community of values” (Huber 2002, pp. 61–72). On the other hand, the *Enlightenment* was also regarded as the core of European identity. The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche described “good Europeanism” as the ability of a European “to overcome atavistic attacks of fatherland-ism and attachment to the soil, and to return to reason, that is to say, to being ‘good Europeans’ (...)” (Nietzsche 1886, Rn. 241).

Others concentrated on *political values*. For example, former German Federal President Roman Herzog put it this way: “The European community of values is a community of freedom, democracy, human rights, a socially committed market economy and cultural diversity” (Herzog 1998).

Still others completely reject the concept of a European identity. As Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian prime minister and the Member of the EU Parliament, wrote: “‘Identity’ is a term on which it is impossible to build a peaceful and prosperous society. More

generally, 'identity' is a symptom of our inability to accept the world as it is. The future of Europe does not lie in a search for identity" (Verhofstadt 2010).

But what is identity? Is a common identity for citizens of the EU necessary? What makes people identify with Europe, and what are the concepts and what are the limits of European identity formation?

Identity is a concept that is borrowed from psychology and refers to the way in which individuals define themselves as separate and distinct, based on their beliefs, behaviors, and attitudes. Many factors influence the formation of identity: It is a phenomenon that comprises cognitive as well as evaluative and affective aspects. Cultural norms, social values, and political institutions can play a role. Identity has a personal as well as a social dimension. According to social psychologists, personal identity "refers to self-categories which define the individual as a unique person in terms of their individual differences from other (ingroup) persons. Social identity refers to social categorizations of self and others, self-categories which define the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities with members of certain social categories in contrast to other social categories" (Turner & Co. 1994, pp. 454-463). In other words, social identity is the shared sense of belonging to a group. It refers to the "interaction processes in which persons identify others and are identified by them, and that these processes become the basis of self-identification as well" (Kohli 2000, pp. 113-137; for a differentiation between personal and social identity cf. Deschamps & Devos 1998, regarding the relationship between social identity and personal identity, pp. 1-12).

However, identity can also be destructive. According to the social identity theory of Henri Tajfel and John Turner, in our search for identity we are constantly tempted to increase our self-image by discriminating and holding prejudice views against other groups (Tajfel & Turner 1986, pp. 7-24). We divide the world into "them" and "us". There is an "in-group" and an "out-group". Prejudiced views between cultures, however, may result in nationalism and racism. This is the other side of the notion of identity. It is no coincidence that right-wing populist movements frequently use the term identity: With a distinction between the "true people" and the "corrupt elite" (cf. Mudde & Kaltwasser 2000; Taggart 2000; Laclau 2005) right-wing identity politics has recently been quite successful in elections in many countries.

II. The relevance of a common European identity

"European identity" has been the object of intellectual debate ever since the beginning of European integration in the 1950s (Kohli 2000, pp. 113-137; Cerutti 2001, pp. 1-31). Already early theorists of European integration have pointed to the importance of mutual trust, loyalty and a common "we-feeling" among ordinary citizens for achieving further steps in European integration (Bergbauer 2018, p. 1).

At the government level, the importance of a European identity was first recognized in 1973 when the heads of state and government of the European Communities adopted

a declaration on European identity to strengthen cohesion among member states and affirm Europe's place in the world (Bergbauer 2018, p. 1). It defined as fundamental elements of European identity "the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice (...) and of respect for human rights" (Bulletin of the European Communities 1973: 118). Interestingly enough, the Declaration made no clear distinction between Europe as a whole and the European Communities as a political entity.

It was inevitable, that questions of identity received renewed interest after the Treaty on the European Union, also known as Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. In the post-Maastricht era, European integration took on a new quality. EU powers were gradually extended to policy areas that had once been the core of *national* sovereignty, for example the control over national borders or a national currency. Majority voting became the ordinary voting procedure in the EU Council, with the potential to force national governments to implement EU legislation they initially opposed. And – even more important – EU policies had increasingly redistributive consequences, redirecting financial resources from rich regions to poorer ones.

As a result, sources from which the EU previously derived legitimacy, notably common gains in economic welfare and securing peace in Europe, appeared no longer sufficient. Instead, the legitimacy of the EU was now increasingly seen to depend on the development of a strong European identity among the public in the EU member states.

Another impetus for the development of a collective European identity was given when Central and Eastern European Countries were admitted to the EU after 2004. This enlargement increased the cultural heterogeneity of the Union even more and raised new questions whether the different social and political experiences of old and new member states would be an obstacle to a common European identity.

The financial and economic crisis after 2008 fueled the discourse on a common European identity again. To avoid the financial collapse of some EU countries and to save the common currency, the Eurogroup agreed on extensive financial rescue mechanisms. Member states facing insolvency had to accept interventions by EU institutions and implement austerity measures in exchange for financial aid. For the creditor states, on the other hand, the rescue packages implied considerable risks for their national budgets. In this situation, sentiments of distrust and opposition came up on both sides, culminating in the question – as Claus Offe put it –: "Why should 'we' pay for 'them'?" (Offe 2013, p. 599).

Another test for a collective European identity was the refugee crisis of 2015. Since then, the conflict over the right migration policy has deeply divided the EU. While border states such as Greece and Italy bear the major burden of receiving refugees, others such as Hungary and Poland refuse to take migrants in. There can be no doubt that a common refugee policy of the EU member states, a common control of the external borders and a fair distribution of migrants can only succeed in the long run if they are supported by a collective European identity.

No event in the past 50 years has united Europeans more than the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The overwhelming majority of EU citizens interpreted this not only as

a violation of a country's sovereignty, but also as an attack on common European values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. As the President of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen put it before the European Parliament: "The fate of Ukraine is at stake, but so is our own fate" (Leyen 2022). Already in 2014, the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine had noted the "importance Ukraine attaches to its European identity", and the broad feeling of solidarity that many EU citizens developed after the Russian attack was undoubtedly also based on the fact that they felt connected to the Ukrainians.

European challenges of this scale are hard to meet unless there is a sense of moral obligation and solidarity between the citizens of the EU. Solidarity, however, depends on a shared identity, a feeling of belonging together which serves as a source of loyalty. But what does an EU identity refer to?

If one tries to filter out a common ground from the countless, interdisciplinary discourses on a European identity, one aspect stands out: There is a distinction between a *cultural* Europe, on the one hand, and a *political* EU, on the other hand. Those advocating a *political* EU refer to political values like democracy and the rule of law. Those advocating a *cultural* Europe refer to a broader concept of Europe as historically and culturally embedded entity.

With the EU's enlargement, the boundaries of cultural and political Europe increasingly overlapped, leading inevitably to tensions between the two concepts. This was visible in the public discourses about Turkish EU membership that dominated political debate between 2005 and 2015. Those in favor of Turkish membership defined the EU in largely political terms as a post-national entity. From that perspective, as long as Turkey implemented human rights, democratic rule, and market economy, there couldn't be objections against its EU membership. In contrast, many opponents of a Turkish EU-membership invoked *cultural* visions of Europe focusing on religion and Christianity as distinct civilizations.

This cleavage between a political and a cultural perception of EU identity still persists. It resonates in the political programs of political parties as well as in the differences of opinion between various member states of the EU concerning their migration policy.

III. Some Data in European Identity

To what degree do the people in the EU member states consider themselves citizens of the EU? This question has been part of the Eurobarometer survey for many years. The Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission since 1973 (European Parliament n.d.).

When it comes to the topic of EU identity, according to the 2020 survey, more than half of EU citizens identify with being European. This opinion is held by 56 % of respondents at EU level, whereas just 14 % indicate not identifying with being

European. 28 percent are noncommittal (Special Eurobarometer 508 2020, p. 74). Citizens' identification with the EU has increased steadily since 2010.

These results seem to be very positive. But a closer look into the survey reveals that the identification with the EU is not as strong as the numbers may indicate at first sight.

Firstly, the aggregated data conceal remarkable differences in responses between member states. The citizens of some nations have a stronger belief in a European identity than the citizens of other member nations. A higher-than-average proportion of respondents indicate identifying with being European in Hungary (76 %), Slovakia (75 %), Malta (72 %), Cyprus and Poland (both 67 %), Romania and Czechia (both 66 %), Spain and Slovenia (65 %), Italy (64 %), and Lithuania, Latvia, and Austria (all 63 %). At the other end of the scale, respondents in Greece (26 %), France and Croatia (both 23 %), Estonia (21 %), and The Netherlands (18 %) are most likely to say they do not identify with being European.

Secondly, a socio-demographic analysis shows that there are also differences in some socio-demographic categories. Gender, life satisfaction, political affiliation has little influence on the likelihood of people identifying with being European. However, younger people are slightly less likely to identify with being European: 54 % of those aged 15–24 identify with being European compared to 59 % of respondents aged 55 and over. People who have enjoyed an education until or beyond the age of 20, and those left school between the age of 16 or 19 are slightly more likely (59 % and 58 % respectively) to identify with being European and those who left at 15 or younger (52 %). People who never or almost never have trouble paying bills are much more likely (60 %) to identify with being European than those who have trouble paying bills most of the time (43 %). Respondents who consider themselves as belonging to the upper class are more likely (64 %) to identify with being European than respondents of the upper middle class and middle class (both 60 %), the working class (54 %), and the lower middle class (52 %). People in rural villages are slightly less likely (55 %) to identify with being European than those living in big cities (60 %). Respondents who indicate being satisfied with their lives are much more likely (60 %) to agree with the proposed statement than those who don't (47 %). And respondents who agree that their voice counts in the EU are more likely (66 %) to identify with being European than those who don't agree (51 %). Respondents who have a positive image of the EU are also more likely (70 %) to identify with being European than those who have a neutral image (50 %), and those who have a negative view (35 %) (all figures: Special Eurobarometer 508 2020, p. 74).

In other words: Those who are less educated, less satisfied with their lives or struggle to pay their bills are much less attached to the EU than the people who are better off. The future of the EU will definitely depend on whether it will be possible to strengthen identification with it among the weaker social classes and across *all* EU countries as well.

What provides a basis for an EU identification? This remains an open empirical question. Some scholars have argued that it is common values that unite Europeans. In a 2011 study, Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann found that Europeans predominantly see democratic values at the base of an EU identity. The Eurobarometer survey of 2019 seemed to confirm that. There were three values that occupied first place

in each of the EU Member States, and these are the same three values that are most closely associated with the European Union at European level. “Peace” stood out as the value best representing the European Union (39 %), followed by “human rights” (33 %) in second place, ahead of “democracy” (32 %) in third position (Standard Eurobarometer 92 2019).

Other scholars like Sylke Nissen (Nissen 2004, pp. 21–29) have pointed out, that identification with Europe requires not only common values but also a benefit-oriented component that manifests itself materially. This identification can arise from the fact that citizens see advantages in their country’s EU membership either for their country or for themselves. This thesis can be supported by survey data, too: According to the 2020 Eurobarometer survey, reflecting their views on membership of the EU being a good thing, more than seven in ten EU citizens (72 %) thought that, on balance, their country has benefited from being part of the EU. Around one in four (24 %) said their country has not benefited from membership.

In every member state, more than half of respondents say that their country has benefited from being a member of the EU, and this applies to nine in ten respondents or more in Ireland (95 %), Portugal and Lithuania (both 90 %). This proportion falls to 52 % in Italy and 55 % in Austria, and these countries also have the highest proportions that think their country has not benefited from EU membership (42 % and 39 % respectively) (Eurobarometer 94.2 2020, p. 76).

IV. Concepts of EU identity formation

Any political system is only accepted by its citizens if they identify with it. If the citizens don’t consider its decisions to be legitimate, the political system has only a precarious existence. According to political system’s theory, support and acceptance of a political order by the citizens is an essential factor for its stability (Easton 1965). A collective identity is therefore critical for the long-term integration of the EU.

The EU is aware of this and actively promotes an EU identity. As mentioned above, the phrase “European identity” emerged for the first time in the 1973 Copenhagen declaration about a European identity. It reappeared in the preamble of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. For several decades now, the EU has been pursuing identity-creating politics. According to Political Scientist André Zimmermann, the EU has even become the *main actor* in the discourse on European identity.

But how can a sense of identification with Europe and fellow Europeans, be fostered? Ettore Recchi (Recchi 2012) has presented two contrasting models for the formation of a European identity: A “*Culturalist*” model in which an orientation to Europe derives fundamentally from core, established European values and their expression in public practices, most notably in governance and the operation of the legal system. This viewpoint emphasizes the essentialism of Europe and promotes mechanisms in which

identification with Europe takes place ‘top down’ or in which identity is internalized and comes about through the exposure to influential discourses and symbols.

In this culturalist concept, the active role of agents such as EU institutions to construct a European identity is emphasized. EU actors and others seeing themselves as Europeans deliberately promote European identity (Laffan 2004, pp. 75–96). Some examples can highlight that. Symbolic initiatives, like the creation of the ‘European Cities of Culture’ (ECC) are an attempt at awakening European consciousness (Sassatelli 2002, pp. 435–451). EU education policy, for example, aims at forming a sense of European identity in European schools. Flying the European flag alongside national flags also serves to construct the EU as an imagined community. The visibility of the EU increased even more with a common European passport design, the end of border controls and a common currency.

The Euro, the common currency, is one of the most visible “identity markers” (Risse 2010) that shapes the EU as a social entity and helps building an imagined community (Negri & Co. 2020, pp. 114–132). On the front of Euro banknotes, windows and doorways are shown. According to the Website of the European Central Bank, they symbolize the “European spirit of openness and cooperation” (European Central Bank 2022). The bridges on the back symbolize communication between the people of Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world”. The banknotes show architectural styles from various periods in Europe’s history, but do not show any actual existing monuments or bridges.

These symbols and actions are processes of deliberate identity promotion by European institutions that aim at persuading Europeans of their commonness. A second concept of identity formation is the “*Structuralist*” model in which an orientation to Europe derives fundamentally from association with other Europeans. This viewpoint emphasizes the importance of social interaction. It supports mechanisms in which identification with Europe takes place ‘from the bottom up’. Identity arises from interacting with others and coming to the realization that one has much in common with them. Student exchange programs like Erasmus are aiming in that direction as well as city twinning, sports events, cross-cultural creative projects or language courses abroad. The findings of Theresa Kuhn (Kuhn 2015) confirm that people who regularly interact across borders in the EU are indeed more likely to support EU membership and to identify themselves as European.

Ettore Recchi rightly remarked that, until recently, the *culturalist model* has been dominant in studies on European identity formation. However, the structuralist concept should get more attention, too. On the one hand, much of what is – in the structuralist approach – having the most positive effects upon the growth of an identification with the EU for the majority of the population – like soccer and other popular sports, pop music, relationships with someone from far away – is beyond the EU’s immediate control. It is more like grassroot-process with many actors involved. However, as Kuhn found out, the number of people who actually have the opportunity to engage in transnational interactions is rather small and these transactions are socially stratified.

On the other hand, in some areas the EU institutions themselves can support the structuralist model. For example, the deregulation of air travel coupled with the Schengen agreement brought about an era of cheap air fares and travel within Europe. That has made direct experience of other European countries “a matter of routine rather than privilege” (European Commission 2012, p. 37). Another example is the European currency itself. The Euro zone may have been created to help make Europe a world economic power, but another important effect of its existence is that a Polish grandmother on a pilgrimage to the Holy Father in Rome can walk into an Italian grocery store and make direct comparisons with the goods and prices back home in Krakov.

An experience like this will probably create a stronger feeling of a collective European identity than constant reflections on common cultural or political values. However, there are limits that influence the formation of a European identity.

V. Limits for the Formation of an EU identity

1. The special institutional character of the EU

It is true that the EU is different. It is neither a confederation nor a federal state, but rather supra-national union of states which includes communalized policies and community institutions, in which the member states have transferred important powers to the EU, some even including their currency. The German Federal Constitutional Court, in its famous Maastricht Treaty Decision of 1991, coined a new term for this political structure, calling it an “association of states”.

But the political structure of the EU is very complex. The relationships between the actors – member states as well as EU institutions – are characterized by mutual dependencies and interdependencies. Although over time communitised policies have increased, the important decisions still are made by means of negotiated solutions. As could be seen in the process of finding a European Commission after the elections of 2019, consensus-oriented decision-making dominates. There is no clear separation of powers between the Union and the Member States. For that reason, a clear attribution of expectations and responsibilities is hardly possible. In particular, the policy interdependence between European and national level allows the governments of the member states, to attribute the benefits of integration to themselves, even though they are successes at the European level. For the same reason, it is also easy to shift the responsibility for the “failure” of national policies to the European level. The EU will be held liable for things for which it is not the Union but the national level that is responsible.

The EU is also subject to a constant change: Since 1957, European primary law has been amended several times, most recently by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007. Through

various rounds of enlargement, the EU has grown from six members in 1957 to 28 members. Currently, after the Brexit, the EU has 27 member states.

This uniqueness of the EU as an association of states of its own kind, its open and dynamic character of multi-level governance, is on the one hand positive, as a flexible response to external challenges in such an environment is much easier. The advantage, however, turns out to be a major disadvantage when it comes to the question of identification. Identity needs a fixed and imaginable frame to which it can refer to. The Union lacks, however, the clearly defined and permanent fixed identification object. Also, the high degree of systemic complexity makes identification with the EU difficult.

2. The bonds to the nation are still strong

Even more than 65 years after the beginning of the European unification process, surveys show that the nation continues to have a strong binding force for many if not most EU citizens. There are two reasons for this.

First, the nation state has remained the key actor within the Union. Since the EU is an association of sovereign states, the principle of the Member States being “masters of the Treaties”, guarantees a strong position of the member states within the institutional system of the EU. The division of powers between the member states and the EU also plays a considerable role in the persistence of strong national identities. Important policy areas like foreign policy, defense policy and welfare policy have remained within the competence of the individual states. In these areas the nation state is still much more visible than the EU. This is also the case for the education sector. In modern societies, however, identity-building policies take place primarily through education and training policies. National identity is conveyed primarily in these areas.

A second reason is that still most of the Europeans feel very much attached to their country. The nation may be a social construct that was invented 200 years ago, but it is still a strong point of reference and identification for most people. This must not be underestimated. Eurobarometer data shows that the attachment to the nation is much stronger than that to Europe: “The percentage of respondents, who are very attached to their country, lies between 51 % and 57 % during 2004 and 2019, whereas the corresponding figure for the European attachment is only between 13 % and 22 %” (Hadler & Co. 2020, pp. 3–13).

Particularly in the age of globalization, there has been an increased retreat to the idea of nation. The rise of rightwing-populist movements in many EU countries, the election of national-conservative governments, and the successful Brexit referendum in UK are current manifestations of this fact. Today, one of the biggest threats to European integration and indeed to the European project more globally is that of the awakening of populist forces.

3. A European public sphere is still underdeveloped

Much has already been said about the EU's democratic deficit (Bang & Co. 2015, pp. 196–216). Many EU citizens consider the Union to be insufficiently legitimate (Risse 2001, pp. 198–216). Since the early 1990s there have been repeated calls for the EU to get closer to its citizens and to give people more opportunities to participate in European policies. To date, however, despite several reforms, this has not been sufficiently successful.

Closely linked to the institutional democratic deficit is the lack of a public sphere in the EU. According to Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere is a kind of mediator between the society and the state (Habermas & Co. 1974, pp. 49–55). Citizens must be able to express or publish their ideas on matters that affect everyone. This, says Habermas, is a characteristic of democracy, for only in a democracy is access to information guaranteed as a matter of right, and citizens are allowed to express their opinions without barriers.

Such a public sphere doesn't really exist in the EU. Europeans read different newspapers and watch different television channels, usually in different languages. There are virtually no pan-European media. Even during election campaigns in the run-up to the European Parliament elections there is practically no exchange of political preferences between EU citizens. There is little political communication between Germans and Portuguese or between Romanians and Irish.

However, the development of a European public sphere is crucial for the emergence of a European identity. Given the strong attachment of most Europeans to their nation, it doesn't make much sense to search for a European public sphere outside of and separate from national public spheres. Such an idea would be unrealistic. But when European issues are regularly dealt with by the various national media, a European public sphere can gradually evolve.

Some may argue that identity is a pre-condition for the emergence of a public sphere. But the opposite is true. A sense of community ought not to be treated as a pre-requisite of a communicative discourse. Rather, it emerges in the course of a debate in the public sphere, in the process of arguing and debating.

VI. Conclusion

Questions of identity have returned to the center of political debates in Europe (Saurugger & Thatcher 2019, pp. 461–476). Does an EU identity exist? Today's discourse on Europe is far away from such fundamental considerations. Recent discussions were dominated by the Brexit, the refugee crisis, austerity policy, trade disputes with the USA, and the Russian aggression. The EU is constantly being challenged from right-wing nationalists and populist parties, and from governments of some member states that openly question the authority of EU institutions. It is also challenged from abroad, as it was the case when U.S. President Trump considered the EU an economic enemy. The

war in Ukraine has brought the peoples of the EU closer together again, but external threats alone are not enough to create a long-term European identity.

Therefore, it remains important to reflect upon how an EU identity can be determined. Based on the findings described above, there are *three elements* that could be the basis of a stronger identification of EU citizens with the EU.

The *first* element are indeed common *political* values. As can be seen in the Eurobarometer surveys, most Europeans have an idea for which political values the EU stands for. It is true: Most European political values are the same as those held by people in many other democratic countries, including Korea: democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and others. But in some particular aspects, European values are somewhat different. For example, they are more social. Americans are more suspicious of the state, of trade unions, of taxation and of socio-economic justice. In Europe, however, solidarity as an important principle (Sangiovanni 2013, pp. 213–241). European values are also more secular and liberal: some Americans have a different take on issues such as the death penalty, gun control, abortion and embryo research. And finally, Europeans tend to support the idea of a rules-based system of global governance, and strong international institutions. Many Americans, in contrast, do not want any constraint on their freedom on the international arena (Grant 2007).

A *second* element that can be the basis of an identification of Europeans with the EU is a rather utilitarian argument. As revealed by the Eurobarometer surveys, identification with the EU also arises from the fact that citizens see advantages in their country's EU membership for themselves. Identity has a benefit-oriented component that manifests itself materially. The political systems theory would underline this argument. Support for and identification with a political system is always related to its performance and its output. However, many Europeans still do not fully appreciate that the EU has delivered over half a century of peace, stability and prosperity. The ability to live, work and travel freely, cheap telephone calls, cleaner air, and many other material benefits can be ascribed to the EU. The reality in the EU is better than the perception.

And last but not least, a *third* element must be interaction and communication among European citizens. Today, mobility and communication are easier and cheaper than ever before. Therefore, there are grounds for optimism: Nothing creates a stronger feeling of a collective European identity than meeting other Europeans and coming to the realization that one has a lot in common with them. In a democratic environment, the formation of an EU identity cannot be a paternalistic, top-down oriented education program. Identity grows bottom up (Beck 2007).

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Arnd Küppers: The Current European Discourse on Cultural Identity – An Attempt at Analysis and Ethical Evaluation

On October 7, 2017, about 150 000 Poles gathered at their country's external borders of to pray the rosary. In so doing, they wanted to remind Poland and entire Europe of its Christian identity. The expressed goal of this event was the re-Christianization of Europe. In times of increased immigration of Muslims to Europe, this was at least an ambiguous message. Not only critical commentators saw it that way. One of the organizers of the event himself, the film director Maciej Bodasiński, made the link by explaining: "There is a danger that is hardly imaginable: In this spiritually so weak Europe, a new civilization is coming on an unprecedented scale for many centuries. This threatens our civilization. Because spiritually much stronger people take up space and already dominate in some places" (Kellermann 2017).

This example perfectly illustrates the background, setting and character of the current discussion on Europe's identity. It is inevitably linked to the issue of immigration. The immigration of millions of people with a different cultural background, especially Muslims from the Middle East and Northern Africa, is literally changing the face of the European countries. European societies are becoming culturally diverse, turning into multicultural societies. And the current controversy on European cultural identity is actually a controversy on immigration and thus on multiculturalism.

I. Migration, multiculturalism and identity politics: from the left to the right

But as Francis Fukuyama writes, multiculturalism is not any more a merely descriptive term meaning nothing else than cultural pluralism, living in an ethnically and thus culturally diverse society. Rather, today it "became the label for a political program that sought to value each separate culture and each lived experience equally, and, in particular, those that had been invisible or undervalued in the past. While classical liberalism sought to protect the autonomy of equal individuals, the new ideology of multiculturalism promoted equal respect of cultures, even if those cultures abridged the autonomy of the individuals who participated in them" (Fukuyama 2018, p. 111). In this respect, multiculturalism is, of course, one of the central issues of identity politics.

For Fukuyama, “there is nothing wrong with identity politics as such”. Rather, he emphasizes, “it is a natural and inevitable response to injustice” (Fukuyama 2018, p. 115). But he believes that it brought not only advantages but also severe disadvantages, when the political left in the United States and Europe shifted their agenda from classical welfare politics to identity politics. Fukuyama lists a whole series of drawbacks. That is actually not the topic of this essay, but it is important to mention a certain point: In Fukuyama’s opinion, “the final, and perhaps most significant, problem with identity politics as currently practiced on the left is that it has stimulated the rise of identity politics on the right” (Fukuyama 2018, pp. 117–118).

1. Donald Trump and right-wing identity politics

It is hard to deny that he is right about that. And, of course, in the US he faces the best example of this thesis every day. For there is no doubt that Donald Trump would not have been elected President of the United States without his strong stand against immigration, multiculturalism and the whole field of leftist identity politics. By attacking political correctness frontally in many ways, Fukuyama writes, “Trump has played a critical role in moving the focus of identity politics from the left, where it was born, to the right, where it is now taking root” (Fukuyama 2018, p. 119). The Stanford political scientist also offers an explanation of the success of this identity politics in reverse: “Identity politics on the left tended to legitimate only certain identities while ignoring or denigrating others, such as European (i.e. white) ethnicity, Christian religiosity, rural residence, belief in traditional family values, and related categories. Many of Donald Trump’s working-class supporters feel they have been disregarded by the national elites” (Fukuyama 2018, p. 119).

2. Victor Orbán’s concept of illiberal Christian democracy for Europe

Indeed, Trump is a kind of archetype of the right-wing populist leader who can also be found in Europe. And Fukuyama is also right when he states that the refugee crisis of 2015/16 has been a catalyst for the rise of populist parties in Europe. One of the most successful populist leaders in Europe is Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán. In July 2018 he delivered a revealing speech at the 29. Bálványos Summer University in Baile Tusnad, Romania. On this occasion Orbán “formulated five tenets for the project of building up Central Europe”. Three of these five tenets are targeted directly against leftist identity politics. “The first is that every European country has the right to defend its Christian culture, and the right to reject the ideology of multiculturalism”. Orbán’s “second tenet is that every country has the right to defend the traditional family model”.

And a third tenet emphasizes the right of every European country “to defend its borders, and (...) to reject immigration” (Orbán 2018). Orbán sees himself in a European cultural struggle.

For Orbán, preventing immigration, especially immigration of Muslims, and fighting against multiculturalism are of the highest priority and, in general, these issues are most important on the agenda of right-wing identity politics. But what is really remarkable about Orbán is how cleverly he indeed links these political goals with cultural issues. He insinuates that Europe is facing a clash of cultures and he sees himself in another kind of cultural struggle against the leftist liberal elites in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and other Western Europe capitals. What is more, he addresses this agenda in his political parole of ‘Christian democracy’ in contrast to liberal democracy. In his already mentioned speech in Baile Tuszad he said: “Let us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Liberal democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal. And we can specifically say this in connection with a few important issues – say, three great issues. Liberal democracy is in favor of multiculturalism, while Christian democracy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Liberal democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal democracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democracy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, this is an illiberal concept” (Orbán 2018).

3. Douglas Murray: intellectual support of anti-multiculturalism

In public discourse, the vast majority of Western European intellectuals are on the side of multiculturalism. But meanwhile, this situation is changing, too. One of the most popular intellectuals who is critical of the leftist liberal standpoint on immigration and multiculturalism is Douglas Murray, co-editor of the British conservative political magazine *The Spectator*. In 2017 he published his book *The strange death of Europe*, which became a no. 1 bestseller in the UK and was highly recommended by other conservatives like Roger Scruton or Michael Gove. Murray’s book starts with the following sentences: “Europe is committing suicide. Or at least its leaders have decided to commit suicide. Whether the European people choose to go along with this is, naturally, another matter”. Later on, he explains more precisely: “I mean that the civilization we know as Europe is in the process of committing suicide” (Murray 2017, p. 1). And further on he unfolds his thesis as follows: “The culture produced by the tributaries of Judaeo-Christian culture, the Ancient Greeks and Romans, and the discoveries of the Enlightenment has not been levelled by nothing. But the final act has come about because of two simultaneous concatenations from which it is now all but impossible to recover. The first is the mass movement of peoples into Europe” (Murray 2017, p. 2). But what distinguishes Murray from stupid right-wing extremists and

racists, is that he does not blame these immigrants for the demise of European culture, but the Europeans themselves: “Which brings me to the second concatenation. For even the mass movement of millions of people into Europe would not sound such a final note for the continent, were it not for the fact that (coincidentally or otherwise) at the same time Europe lost faith in its beliefs, traditions and legitimacy” (Murray 2017, p. 3).

II. Europe’s cultural heritage and identity

Here, undoubtedly Murray has a point. Whether it suits you or not, in times of globalization and migration, the question of Europe’s cultural identity has powerfully returned to political discourse. But most of Western politicians and intellectuals do not seem to really know how to deal with that. There is no reason to doubt that Orbán is true when he says: “Whenever I speak of Christian Europe in the European Council, the others look at me as if I was from the Middle Ages” (Prömper 2016). Indeed, in recent decades Europe has consistently avoided questions about its Judeo-Christian heritage and its significance for the present. This has become particularly clear in the debates of the European Constitutional Convention, which in 2002 and 2003 drew up the draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union, which later failed in referenda against it in France and the Netherlands. With regard to the preamble of the draft Constitution, the Convention could neither agree on a reference to God nor on a reference to the Christian heritage of Europe. Instead, in the end there was – more in the style of a veil than in that of a confession – only the dull reference to the “cultural, religious and humanistic traditions of Europe” (*Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, p. 3).

1. Habermas’ notion of post-secular society

The helplessness and speechlessness of large parts of the European elites in the current identity debate, which is fueled – and, unfortunately, all too often dominated – by the extreme political right results not least from this denial of an intellectually honest confrontation with the Christian roots of the continent. There was no lack of warning voices – and not only from the churches. Especially impressive was the speech which Jürgen Habermas delivered in 2001, on the occasion of his award of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. In this speech, given just a few weeks after the Al Qaida terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, Habermas referred to the “the still-unresolved dialectic inherent in our own Western process of secularization”. Facing the unreflected ideal of a secular multiculturalism, he urged us to contemplate “what secularization means in our own post-secular society” (Habermas 2001).

Two years earlier, Habermas had already expressed himself even more clearly, when he said in an interview: “For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic

egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk” (Habermas 2002, p. 149).

This quote is highly remarkable. For Habermas not only emphasizes the Judeo-Christian roots of European Western modernism, but he also expresses his conviction of the lasting cultural and political significance of this heritage. This means nothing less than the revision of a thesis which Habermas himself advocated in recent years and which is still widespread among European intellectuals: that in the course of enlightenment and development to modernity there is an erosion and finally a loss of significance of religion and religiosity. Habermas has strongly been contradicting this notion now for 20 years; he considers it “idle postmodern talk”. Fighting secularists are, therefore, dissatisfied with him. At the same time Habermas speaks of the “critical reappropriation and reinterpretation” of the Christian heritage, which has taken place time and again in the history of Europe and which is also necessary today, under completely new conditions. To the extent that criticism and transformation of religion are an integral part of this model, religious fundamentalists, of course, are not satisfied with Habermas, either.

2. Rémi Brague’s concept of Europe’s eccentric culture

Europe has existed in this mode of appropriation and interpretation from the beginning, even more so: Europe has become what it is on this path. The French philosopher Rémi Brague speaks of the “eccentric identity” of Europe. By this, he means that Europe did not derive its self-concept from its own center, but by referring to and building on something outside its own. The beginning of this Europe lies in the Roman Empire. The exterior, the former, on which Rome was culturally based, was Greek antiquity. The Romans had their own beginnings in the dark; no one wrote them down. But that was an absurd thing: the leading power of the world at that time had no place in this world’s history. Thus, the Romans created this place by combining their own history and culture with the Greek one. The poet Virgil, a contemporary of Caesar’s, has set a monument to this Roman self-image with his writing *Aeneid*. In the style of Homeric epics, he unfolded the legend of Prince Aeneas, who rescued himself from the falling Troy and moved from Asia Minor to Latium. It was there that his son Ascanius, also called Julus, founded the city Alba Longa, the legendary mother city of Rome. That was critical appropriation and new interpretation par excellence. And this cultural self-image was not exclusively ‘Roman’. “Nothing prevents one from recognizing its reflection in the medieval and

renewed prolongation of Roman legend in European claims to a Trojan origin” (Brague 2002, p. 34).

Christianity also builds its identity on something that lies before it and to which it remains inseparably connected: Judaism. The relationship of Christianity to Judaism is very similar to the relationship of the Romans to the Greeks. Or as Brague says, in short: “Our Greeks are the Jews” (Brague 2002, p. 54). Nevertheless, or rather because of that, the relationship between Christianity and Judaism has been and still is complex and not without conflicts. “The Christians know – even if they are constantly in danger of forgetting, as they have done on several occasions – that they are grafted onto the Jewish people and onto their experience of God” (Brague 2002, p. 54). It is therefore entirely correct to speak not only of the ‘Christian culture’, but of the ‘Judeo-Christian culture’ of Europe.

A. Christianity: less the content than the form of European culture

The history of European art and culture bears ample witness to the fact that the Church, which saw itself as the heir of the Roman Empire, not only took in and passed on its Jewish roots, but also its Hellenistic heritage. This is palpable with hands in Rome on St. Peter’s Square with the obelisk in its center. According to legend the original gilt ball on the obelisk held the ashes of Caesar and in the cross on its top a relic of the True Cross of Christ was enclosed. This legend is a fitting symbol of how Christianity has also absorbed and, thus, preserved the pagan culture of Europe.

Brague, therefore, believes: “Christianity is, in relation to European culture, less its content than its form” (Brague 2002, p. 177). And he adds: “If this is the case, an effort in favor of Christianity has nothing of the partisan or the self-interested. For with it, the whole of European culture finds itself defended” (Brague 2002, p. 178). This is an important insight with regard to the current discourse on European cultural identity. We must make this clear, in particular, to those who see Europe’s identity threatened by today’s social plurality and cultural diversity. For Christianity itself is an integral part of the eccentric culture of Europe, on the basis of which this diversity was able to grow in the first place. To recognize this and to be able to counter the ‘saviors of the West’, one must first show the willingness to deal with the cultural foundations and the history of this European identity. That is exactly what is lacking all too often.

In the Gospel of John Jesus says to Pontius Pilate: “My kingdom is not of this world” (John 18:36) – a sentence that expresses that Christianity is not a political religion in the narrow sense, that means, it is not directed towards the establishment of worldly dominion, but towards the salvation of souls. But precisely this Christian rejection of the omnipresent combination of secular rule and religion in antiquity had an enormous indirect significance for the political history of the European West. Even the Fathers of the Church made this dialectic the subject of theological and socio-ethical reflection. In Irenaeus of Lyon’s famous *Adversus haereses* we find the thought “that Christ brought

new, but that he brought everything as if new” (Brague 2002, p. 55). Paulinus of Aquileia, a companion of Charlemagne, brought this point of view to the point as follows: “Perfectio non in annis, sed in animis” (Paulinus von Aquileia 1864, p. 246A) – progress takes place not in the years, but in the souls.

B. Christian identity in times of postmodern plurality and diversity

This too must be retorted to those who see growing plurality as a threat to European identity. To quote Rémi Brague once again: “Christ did not come to construct a civilization, but to save the men of all civilizations. What is called ‘Christian civilization’ is no other than the ensemble of collateral effects which faith in Christ has produced on the civilizations it has encountered along the way. When His resurrection is believed in, and the possibility of the resurrection of every man in Him, everything is seen in a different way, and one acts in consequence of that, in all spheres. But a great deal of time is needed to become aware of this and make it concrete. For that reason, we are, perhaps, only at the beginning of Christianity” (Brague 2004).

In other words, Christians are distinguished – or should be distinguished – by the way they look at the world and how they meet their fellow human beings. They should do this in the light of the redemption in Christ and by following him in the spirit of love. This, as Brague rightly points out, is a very ambitious idea. If one takes it seriously, then one would have to see that Europe’s Christian identity is not endangered by the immigration of a few hundred thousand Muslims, but when the Europeans close their eyes to the misery in the world and when they let people die at their borders.

III. Shared identity and togetherness in diverse societies

This is not to deny that immigration does not lead to certain cultural conflicts. These conflicts always have two sides. First, the side of the majority society, i.e. the autochthonous Europeans. We Europeans consider ourselves modern, enlightened and, of course, tolerant. And in fact, tolerance is part of our Christian-humanistic culture. But in view of immigration and multiculturalism, we are not so tolerant after all. And that is why we have to do two things. First, we will have to look into the question of why it is that tolerance often fails in face of diversity.

1. The self-image of European nations

The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum sees the reason for this in the understanding of the nation that has developed historically in Europe. “Ever since the rise of the modern state, European nations have understood the root of nationhood to lie first and foremost in characteristics that are difficult if not impossible for new immigrants to share. Strongly influenced by romanticism, these nations have seen blood, soil, ethnolinguistic peoplehood, and religion as necessary or at least central elements of a national identity. Thus, people who have a different geographical origin, or a different holy land, or a different mother tongue, or a different appearance and way of dressing, never quite seem to belong, however long they have resided in a country” (Nussbaum 2012, p. 13).

Traditional immigration countries such as the US, where most people are descended from ancestors who themselves came to the country as migrants at some point, have a different concept of the nation, which is based less on ethnic or cultural homogeneity than on common ideals and goals. These countries see themselves less as a cultural community and more as a political community. Nussbaum advises Europe to develop its self-image in this direction to arrive at a culture of tolerance in an immigration society, in a multicultural society.

Of course, Nussbaum published her book years before Trump was elected. And Trump’s presidency clearly shows that traditional immigration countries are not immune to the threat of conflict over diversity and immigration. In fact, there are studies that provide some evidence that increasing diversity may lead to a decline in social trust in communities. One of these is a study provided by the highly respected sociologist Robert Putnam. He and his research team have shown, based on data from a nationwide survey in the USA, that the residents of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods have a greater tendency to withdraw from social life and to distrust their neighbours (Putnam 2007).

2. Failed guest worker policies and the lack of integration of immigrants

But, as already said, all conflicts always have two sides. In this case, the second side is immigrants and their cultural self-image. This refers not only to new immigrants but even to the descendants of former immigrants, who live in Europe, often in second or third generation. In Germany this involves e.g. a large number of people who themselves or their ancestors have immigrated from Turkey. A lot of them are descended from parents who were recruited by the German government as so-called ‘Gastarbeiter’ (‘guest workers’) in the sixties of the last century. This guestworkers policy was exclusively focused on the labour market effects of immigration and not concerned about the integration of migrants in society. This approach was based on the assumption

that the guest workers would later return to their home countries – but that was found to be wrong: They did not return home, but settled down, got married, had children, and they and their families became part of the German host society. Many immigrants also adopted German citizenship and most of their children did so anyway. But all too often these people did not become full members of the German community. And nowadays we all pay the price of the lack of integration of these people.

There are 2.5 to 3 million ethnic Turks living in Germany. That is about 3.7 to 4.2 percent of the total German population. And almost half of them are German national citizens. And, with regard to this group of people, there are undoubtedly problems as to integration. According to a survey conducted in 2016 among people living in Germany with Turkish roots, almost half of those interviewed agreed that Islamic commandments were more important to them than German laws (Pollack 2016, p. 14).

3. The need for a new shared identity

Thus minorities – and this applies not only to the Turkish minority – have a widespread tendency, just like the majority society, to define themselves more by membership of the respective ethnic, cultural or religious community than by citizenship. Both tendencies are, of course, interrelated, as Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist with Syrian roots, warned more than ten years ago. In an interview with the Spiegel-magazine he said: “The situation is this: young Muslims want to be ‘members of the club’, part of German society. But they are rejected. And parallel societies provide warmth. It is a vicious circle” (Tibi 2006).

Hence, what is needed is, as Putnam writes, “to work toward bridging, as well as bonding” (Putnam 2007, p. 165). That means above all a more inclusive concept of shared identity. And it is precisely with this intention that Tibi said even in 2004, that Europe needs a “leading culture” (Leitkultur). This idea “is based on the foundation of a democratic community whose members are bound together through a collective identity as citizens of that community. Such a collective identity – in the sense of the French Citoyenite – stands above religious identity”. In this context, Tibi also promotes his idea of a European Islam, a Euro-Islam. And he rejects the naive leftist idea of multiculturalism. “Multiculturalism means that one person can live according to (ultra-orthodox) Sharia law and the other according to the constitution – and that actually has failed. (...) The better concept would be cultural pluralism. Unlike multiculturalism, cultural pluralism doesn’t just mean diversity but also togetherness – primarily the understanding of the rules of the game – the Europeans value structures” (Tibi 2004).

IV. Conclusion

After all, the key question is: Will we succeed in developing and bringing to life an idea of inclusive identity in a plural, also culturally plural and hybrid society? The basis for this is mutual trust and social recognition, without which there can be no togetherness. And it is on this foundation that common values and goals can grow. This is the real challenge that will determine the success or failure of European immigration history. It is a challenge for society as a whole, for Muslims and non-Muslims, for minorities and the majority society. European culture, shaped by Christianity and the Enlightenment, has a good basis for meeting this challenge. Trying to show that has been the intention of this paper.

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Personality and Identity

Won-Sun Kim: Identity and Its Awareness in Life: Perspectives from Life Science

I. Introduction

On 11th April 2019, the Korean Constitutional Court ruled that the abortion ban in the Republic of Korea (ROK) was unconstitutional (Ko et al. 2019). The court concluded that Article 270 of the Criminal Code of ROK, which stated that a physician should be imprisoned for up to two years for the offense, infringed upon the woman's right to a free choice. The court ruled that the current criminalization of abortion had to be amended by Dec. 31, 2020, after which the ban would be stripped of its legal force. In conjunction with its ruling, the court decided that abortion should be allowed before the 22nd week of pregnancy, after which the fetus could survive on its own, outside the womb.

The incident above may clearly show the status of understanding of life by law officials in Korea. Therefore, it is very important to define and to share a common agreement on the issue of what life is. As far as this paper is concerned, I will narrowly focus on how life is conceived from the natural scientific viewpoint and whether one can consider awareness as a basic criterion of life.

II. Developing Humans in Pregnancy

According to the ROK constitutional court, to be entitled as a human being, it should have the ability to survive on its own, outside the mother's womb. To justify its criteria, we need to check how human beings develop from the beginning. Let us briefly look at how human beings develop from the tiny single cell which is called a fertilized egg. After fertilization, the egg undergoes simple cell division for about a week and forms a ball of cells called a blastocyst. During the cell division (termed 'cleavage') period, the blastocyst slowly moving along the oviduct and finally arrives at the uterus, where it is implanted. After implantation, the blastocyst turns into three laminar embryonic structures through the process known as gastrulation and shows a transient structure, viz. the primitive streak. The gastrulation stage is followed by the neurulation stage, at which the basic frame of the central nervous system including brain and spinal cord is established. Soon after main internal and external structures such as circulatory, digestive, respiratory, excretory systems and skeletal and muscular structures in the

trunk and arms and legs form. From the conception or fertilization, terminologies as germinal (~ two weeks), embryonic (three–eight weeks), and fetal (nine weeks to birth) periods are coined to distinguish early human beings for the convenience of description in the area of scientific research or clinical purpose.

It is well-known that the embryonic heart starts to develop as early as between four to five weeks after conception, and so do the limbs. Overall, the basic plan of organ formation is virtually completed during the embryonic period. This is why major organ systems are most vulnerable to various types of teratogens at this period. The following growth phase of organ development makes external morphology of growing fetal period human more human-like. In the process of human development, it does always have seven characteristics of life including responsiveness to the environment, growth and change, ability to reproduce, metabolic activity and respiration, homeostasis, cellular construction architecture, and passing traits onto offspring. Of course, external details of these features keep changing according to the developmental plan, but basic underlying seven life characteristics are retained regardless of developmental timing.

At this point it is curious why the court ruled that abortion can be allowed before the 22 weeks of pregnancy. What is the scientific basis? According to the record, Lyla Stensrud in San Antonio, Texas, US, became the youngest premature baby in the world. She was born at 21 weeks four days. That record seems to be the rationale for that ruling. Nowadays, one can hardly predict the progress of reproductive medical technology. Technological advancement in the reproductive clinical field is astonishingly fast, and it would not be a surprise to see far younger premature babies survive in a specially designed womb-like incubator with sufficient supply of nutrients and minerals in the near future. In that respect, experimental success of rearing a single mouse embryo in a microfluidic system until a far-advanced period of development and then implanting it into a foster mother until full-term birth by Séverine Le Gac's group at Max-Planck Institute for Molecular Biomedicine, Münster, Germany, demonstrates that the technology for human-application is not merely a fantasy (Esteves et al. 2013). In short, the gap between in-utero and out-utero developmental environments seems to be narrowing. Therefore, 22 weeks after conception cannot be justified in order to determine the reasonable time criteria to judge whether an embryo or a fetus is a human being.

Let us look at the biological status of a given species, for example, frog. Is it scientifically sound to treat embryonic, fetal and larval forms of creature separately from its adult form? Up to this point, the scientific name of the common Korean frog and its tadpole is *Pelophylax nigromaculatus*. Even though a tadpole needs to grow further to reach adult state in a frog's life cycle, the genetic characteristics of tadpoles are the same as that of an adult frog. This is why they share the same biological scientific name, *Pelophylax nigromaculatus*. Actually, a one cell-stage fertilized egg can be treated just as a different type of frog through its orthodox life cycle in a biological sense. Therefore, it seems useless to dispute whether one can consider fertilized eggs or tadpoles a basically living creature. No-one objects their identity as living creatures. They are only different externally, but, in the real sense, they are the same.

In the biological contexts, life is defined as “life, living matter and, as such, matter that shows certain attributes that include responsiveness, growth, metabolism, energy transformation, and reproduction” (Sagan, D et al. 2022) or “the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body”, “a principle or force that is considered to underlie the distinctive quality of animate beings”, “an organismic state characterized by capacity for metabolism, growth, reaction to stimuli, and reproduction.” (Merriam-Webster n.d.). In other words, life can be defined as a combinatorial unique feature of organism that cannot be separated. Cells are basic building blocks of biological organisms, and they are the first level of hierarchy that constitutes higher organismal structures, i.e. tissues, organs, and organ systems. However, one should not underestimate the role of cells in organisms simply because it is a tiny structure. As Nobel Laurate Barbara McClintock noted “every component of the organism is as much of an organism as every other part” (Keller 1983). Actually, it does contain all sorts of biological life characteristics.

III. What is an Organism?

An organism may be small, unicellular or multicellular. What is more, organisms have a fixed life span, and their life cycle is comprised of birth, growth, maturity, old age and death. They are always derived from pre-existing ones through the mechanism of reproduction, and the offspring resembles the parents very closely. Thermodynamically, they tend to decrease entropy in order to maintain well-ordered structural components. To this end, they require continuous supply of free energy from outside. Without that, death becomes their fate. Organisms never fail to curtail communication with their surroundings as well as inside and adapt themselves through modification. That is the fundamental deriving inertia of evolution.

Traditionary, classification keys to identify and distinguish species are mainly based on morphological characteristics and reproductive isolation in the biological or functional sense. Nowadays, molecular information and criteria such as DNA base sequence or amino acid sequence of protein and their three-dimensional structures provide much more accurate clues to identify and classify species. DNA fingerprinting is a popular method of identification. Recently, it becomes feasible to trace an individual's genetic history through analyzing epigenetic markers, so that identification and classification of a given organism become relatively less complicated and straightforward. Aside from the identification itself, it is noteworthy every single individual is unique on earth and should be appreciated for its presence in the universe.

IV. Is an Organism a Real Independent Creature?

Quite a number of interesting organisms are present in nature, and a slime mold, *Dictiostellium discoideum*, should be considered as one of the good examples in the peculiar life cycle. If the environmental conditions are favorable, it thrives as a free living singular independent amoeba, but if environmental conditions become harsh such as scarce food sources, they aggregate and form a multicellular slug and finally turn into a fruiting body to produce spores. Therefore, its life cycle is composed of alternative singular and multicellular phases. Environmental cue or signal influence decides whether this tiny creature adopts single or multicellular state. In the process of assemblage and differentiation, they communicate with their neighboring cells as is routine in multicellular organisms. Nevertheless, at singular state, they are completely independent living creatures by themselves. This situation raises the very intricate question of what the definition of real independent life means. It may imply that a clear cut of real independent life on earth is an illusion.

Let us turn our attention to another example of independency of life related to humans themselves. According to a recent estimate, there are ten billion cells in an adult human body and 13 billion bacterial cells reside in it (Sender et al. 2016). Therefore, purely in the sense of numbers, bacteria overwhelm the so-called host human body. In other words, from the bacterial perspective, one can view the situation as the polar opposite of the conventional understanding of the host-and-parasite relationship. So, it is not surprising to see the holobiont that is made up with two interacting organisms which has hologenome. The term holobiont may reflect or depict a real world of life, and it would be absurd to distinguish what cannot be separable in the real world of life. In some sense, the concept of superorganism can be considered to be in line with the holobiont notion. The Gaia hypothesis proposed by James Lovelock states that “the life on Earth functions as a single organism which actually defines and maintains environmental conditions necessary for its survival” and “Life is a property of an ecological system rather than a single organism or species.” (Wikipedia n.d.). The hypothesis widens our narrow view of life and opens new horizons to seek harmony in the interweaved organisms and environment.

V. Awareness and Identity of Life

In the biological context, general definition of life is as follows. Encyclopedia Britannica states that life; “life, living matter and, as such, matter that shows certain attributes that include responsiveness, growth, metabolism, energy transformation, and reproduction.” (Sagan, D et al. 2022). Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines life as “the quality that distinguishes a vital and functional being from a dead body, (...) a principle or force that is considered to underlie the distinctive quality of animate beings, (...) an organismic state characterized by capacity for metabolism, growth, reaction to stimuli, and

reproduction” (Merriam-Webster n.d.). On those attributes, ‘reaction to stimuli’ is closely related to ‘awareness’. It is a managing process of information impinging to organism continuously from the outside as well as from the inside. If information is not handled adequately, life might be in peril. How organisms handle various information is one of the key topics in the field of present life science research. Any creature whether it is a microorganism, a plant, or an animal senses and responds to the impinging signals regardless of awareness itself. From the *homo sapiens*’s point of view, it might be uneasy to accept that those nonhuman life forms have a high level of awareness abilities that are translated into various types of biological activities. However, their way of information processing does not have to be the same or similar to humans, and therefore it can be totally different from a human’s way.

A number of cases are reported that cognitive activity is observed in many nonhuman animals (Griggs 2010). A nine-year-old border collie, Chaser, is reported to distinguish ten thousand English words with Spanish accent. Another dog, Rico, can distinguish 200 words, and a third dog, Bethy, is known to learn 340 words not only by repeated training but by fast mapping. Fast mapping is a cognitive psychological term used for the hypothesized mental process by which a new concept is learned based only on minimal exposure to a given unit of information. Beyond mammals, crows are well-known to have an astonishing ability to solve various difficult tasks in test situations (Jelbert et al. 2014). They have shown to have problem-solving abilities in food retrieving tasks in various situations even using simple tools such as twigs. When intellectual abilities are not taken into account, it is hard to explain various surprisingly adept problem-solving abilities. In those animals, path-finding tasks demonstrate that they do have high levels of cognition abilities. Similar behavioral abilities are known to be present in other animals including dolphins, elephants etc. Therefore, it is not surprising to get to the generalization that high level of brain activity is not uniquely restricted to human, and so cognition cannot be used for the criteria to judge whether nonhuman objects are to considered a fully independent and/or recognizable living identity.

VI. Consciousness vs Self-Awareness

Among the high level of brain activities, consciousness and self-awareness constitute the most advanced criteria. Consciousness is a state of being aware of one’s environment and body and lifestyle, whereas self-awareness is a state of the recognition of that awareness, the capacity for introspection and the ability to recognize oneself as an individual separately from the environment and other individuals. Self-awareness can be grouped into two broad categories including internal self-awareness and external self-awareness.

Primates, dolphins and killer whales, sea lions, elephants, and magpies are known to have self-awareness behavior. The Mirror test (MSR) is the most frequently employed method to determine whether the questioning subject has self-awareness traits. MSR

has been developed by Gordon Gallup Jr. in 1970 (DeGrazia 2009). It gauges self-awareness by determining whether an animal can recognize its own reflection in a mirror as an image of itself. The test is accomplished by secretly marking the animal with an odorless dye, and observing whether the animal reacts in a manner consistent with it being aware that the dye is located on its own body. Such behavior might include turning and adjusting of the body in order to better view the marking in the mirror, or poking at the marking on its own body with a finger while viewing the mirror. Primates except gorillas passed the test, and human children usually pass this test after they are at least one and a half to two years old.

Self-awareness can be distinguished as DeGrazia suggested into three types, (1) bodily self-awareness; difference from the surroundings, (2) social self-awareness; a role in highly social animals, (3) introspective awareness; feelings, desires, beliefs (DeGrazia 2009). Recently, an interesting new suggestion on self-awareness was proposed: De Waal suggested that self-awareness is a gradual characteristic. Among animals, that property does not show any sign of dichotomic boundary.

In addition, human self-awareness develops slowly after birth through stage one to stage three. The first stage spans several months after birth and the property has been established for basic ground with the accumulation of experience. The next stage is the 'reflective self-awareness' that last until 18 months at which period further experience and accompanying action develop. The final stage is the 'objective self-awareness' state at that time one is aware of oneself as a human person.

VII. Summary

Life on Earth is so delicately and beautifully interwoven, and it may be futile to appreciate its identity as an independent and separable physical being in the real living world. As regards the matter of human life, it begins from the moment of fertilization. The fragile life should be recognized and protected as a unique identity itself as a human being. From the subjective point of a living creature, awareness might be considered a universal property of life. We need to be more open to hear the whisper from minute but valuable another member of myself from living world.

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Kim Yonghae: Identity and Person

The concept of identity comes from the late Latin *identitas*, which means 'equality' or 'sameness'. The etymological origin of the Latin word is the third person pronoun *idem*, which corresponds to 'the same' in English. Based on the Latin etymology, identity has only the meaning of 'sameness' and 'equality', but 'identity' has a further meaning that is rooted in the meaning of the Greek word for *identitas tautotes* which comes from '*autos*', and which includes the meanings of both the Latin words *ipse* (self) and the word *idem* (same). As understood through Latin and Greek etymology, the English word 'identity' thus includes the meanings of both 'sameness' and 'self' (Yang 2006, p. 70). Therefore, the concept of identity means 'my own original identity' and refers to something that remains as me despite my various personality traits and other characteristics as well as internal and external changes over time. In other words, identity means the sameness that remains despite change and accidental circumstances. According to one's own understanding of what or who I am, one can define one's identity as 'I-myself' or 'my sameness'. We commonly refer to many conceptual kinds of identity: identity of consciousness, social identity, personal identity (psychologically), self-identity, and identity of person (ontologically). This means that the understanding of the 'I' who lives here and now is diverse.

Finding the right concept of I-identity among the various understandings of who I am is an ontological and anthropological problem, as well as an ethical problem connected with issues of value and obligation. This is because the understanding of the self-identity of 'I' and 'you' determines how to deal with the other person. For example, infants, mentally disabled persons, and persons in a vegetative state may or may not have 'self-identity'; and how to treat them depends on what we think 'self-identity' is. Recently, moreover, many politicians have insisted that national interest plays the most important role for national identity; but we need first to study 'self-identity' in order to clarify in what sense we can recognize group identity in a similar way as 'self-identity'. In this short paper, I look at the concept of self-identity in various ways and seek an answer to what the original self is, based on the standard of human dignity and human rights.

I. Subjective Consciousness and Self-Identity

Modern philosophy regards self-identity as the identity of subjective consciousness, with subject-centered reason as the starting point. Hegel had an awareness that his time was a new age, distinct from his predecessor's. In Kant's philosophy, Hegel discovered the principle of subjectivity as the essential characteristics of this new era of 'modernity'. He regarded this principle as having unprecedented power, as the center of the real

world, a power of subjective freedom and reflection based on reason, but which on the negative side, endangers religion, which had worked as a unifying force until then. But Hegel thought that the principle of subjectivity is not powerful enough to replicate the unifying power of religion. The arrogant culture of reflective knowledge that sprung from the reason-based Enlightenment “divided religion and itself in two, paralleling religion by itself or itself by religion” (Hegel 1986, p. 23). The fall of religion brought about by the Enlightenment led to the division of faith and knowledge that Enlightenment could not overcome by its own power of reason. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel described this division as “the world of the alienated mind from I-myself” (Hegel 1986, p. 362). He says that “[t]he more education grows, the more manifold the development of the manifestations of life becomes as a force of division; the greater the power of division becomes, the more meaningless the aspirations of life to foster harmony that religions once had becomes” (Hegel 1986, p. 22). Hegel tried to solve the crisis of life’s dualization through the dialectic inherent in the Enlightenment’s critical principle of the confrontation of nature and spirit, emotion and reason, mind and reason, theoretical and practical reason, judgment and imagination, self and non-self, finite and infinite, and knowledge and faith (Hegel 1986, p. 32).

In *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas argues that the question of the philosophy of consciousness when reduced to Hegel’s principle of subjectivity as the basis of the modern era needs to be overcome by the inter-subjectivity of discourse philosophy. Habermas insists that the reconciliation of the fragmented aggregate that Hegel had described is not to be derived from the principle of subjectivity, which presupposes an autonomy. For the dynamism of destiny springs from a balance of living relationships and the mutual recognitions that are not possible with only autonomous, subjective reflection. Hegel’s reconciliatory momentum, namely the restoration of the divided totality that the Enlightenment gave rise to, is acquired not by reflective activity within self-consciousness or in the cognitive subject, but from the recovery of the alienated identity in which one is separated from the ordinary life of interrelationships. Hegel realized that it is possible to recover the alienated identity that was brought about by Enlightenment through interrelationships, but he did not succeed in doing. For to do so would contradict his principle of subjectivity as the basis of modern times. Habermas argues that Hegel should have been able to transform the self-reflective concept of reason promoted in subjective philosophy and achieve communication but failed to do so. Reason is intrinsically oriented toward universality, but the use of the subjective consciousness as a starting point of reasoned activity creates a tendency to place top priority on the individual’s own survival and gradually makes utilitarian rationality the core of self-identity.

Horkheimer and Adorno have warned of the dark sides of reasoned enlightenment as based on the principle of modern subjectivity. Reinterpreting Homer’s *Odyssey*, they argue that the history of enlightenment is a series of processes in which the age of oral myths, was succeeded by a new hermeneutic age of myth and finally the modern age of autonomous subjectivity. They think that enlightenment stabilizes people at each stage of history by giving meaning and order to the frighteningly uncertain world with certain

ritual-like practices which embody two opposing feelings. One, which has real power, is a sense of regenerating social integration, as Durkheim has shown, into the source. The other, which is hypothetical, is a feeling that it is virtually impossible to return to the source because members of societal groups deviate from their source as they establish their group self-identity. At all stages in the history of enlightenment, practices look back to sacred origins and seek liberation from bridling mythic forces to achieve successful new enlightenment. In fact, however, this demythologizing movement proves to be an occasion for the prolongation of solidarity with the mythic origins. It amounts to another kind of bridle, not at all complete liberation from mythic forces.

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment* Horkheimer and Adorno show how the rationalism of modern philosophy as based on the principle of subjectivity is an instrumental form of reason springing from the impulse of self-preservation that has driven the process of enlightenment since its beginning. They oppose such instrumental reason with 'remembrance (Eingedenken)', which detects the movement of counterrevolutionary nature. They think that, driven as it is by the impulse of self-preservation, enlightenment actually impairs reason. For the impulse of self-preservation demands reason only in the form of purpose-oriented natural, instinctual control, that is, instrumental reason. Adorno and Horkheimer also show that with the collapse of the religious-metaphysical world, reason is now in exile from the stabilizing realm of morality and law. All previous normative measures have lost their credibility before the only remaining authority of science (Habermas 1985, pp. 136). Such theories of Horkheimer and Adorno's criticisms have produced no truth; they only engender further doubts about reason itself (Habermas 1985, p. 140). It is the last revelation of ideological criticism applied to oneself that reason is assimilated to power as a tool and gives up its critical power (Habermas 1985, p. 144). Criticism of instrumental reason can only be prosecuted by combining only the inexplicable because of defect of reason itself, but it has not opened any prospects for the reason to escape from the myth of purpose-oriented rationality which is transformed into physical violence (Habermas 1985, p. 138). The interpretation of Enlightenment that reason reduced to an instrumental reason while the individual perceives out of his subjectivity, centered on the subjectivity, and pursues freedom, and the self-limitation of this critical interpretation, that is, the closedness of the monologue and the independent reason, cannot guarantee the integration of humanity.

II. Inter-Subjectivity and Self-Identity

Influenced by Dewey's Experimental Pragmatism¹, the American social psychologist George Herbert Mead proposed that an individual's mind was a type of behavioral response that occurred through interactions with others in a social context. It cannot exist without interaction. "We must regard mind, then, as arising and developing within the of social processes, within empirical matrix of social interactions. (...) The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are made possible only for a group of interacting individuals: only for individual organisms which are members of a society; not for the individual organism in isolation from other individual organisms" (Mead 1934, p. 133). The social process involved in the emergence of the mind is one of conversation through gestures. According to Mead's concept this conversation, there is a gesture in response to one organism's environment, followed by the gesture of another organism's response to it. In this process of organism in action, each organism expresses an adapted response that involves three interrelated elements called a "triple matrix" (Mead 1934, p. 42). The concept of 'meaning' which emerges from the interactive process and is not an idea or psychological concept that lies outside the interaction is important in the discussion on the triple matrix. "Meaning is thus not to be conceived, fundamentally, as a state of consciousness, or as a set of organized relation existing or subsisting mentally outside the field of experience into which they enter; on the contrary, it should be conceived objectively, as having its existence entirely within this field itself" (Mead 1934, p. 78).

The emergence of the mind is a precondition of self-generation and self-identity. According to Mead, self is the ability of a subject to reflect on how to act not only on him/herself, but also on other subjects. The self is based on the ability of the organism to take on the role of the other as it creates self-images and observes them. This ability to see oneself is a form of learned behavior obtained through interaction with the other. "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his relation to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process" (Mead 1934, p. 135). For Mead, the self emerges in the process of an individual's reading the gestures of others or taking their attitudes and drawing a generalized image of others' attitudes in certain situations. This vague image acts as a behavioral stimulus that causes a certain response in the individual, giving rise to one's own self-image. This response, in turn, gives rise to a further response on the part of the other side and a release of gestures that enable one to acquire roles, eliciting new self-

¹ Experimental pragmatism is a philosophical school that seeks to provide objectively argued certainty based on both communal scientific inquiry and self-correction. Centered on the University of Chicago at the beginning of the 20th century, Peirce, James, and Dewey described it as a model for philosophical inquiry that positively embraces technological science as body of experimental human tools, techniques and traditions.

images and new behavioral stimuli, acquiring a new self-identity. Like the mind, the self, thus, emerges from the three-way matrix between persons who interact and adapt their responses to one another (Mead 1934, pp. 135–152). Mead uses the concept of ‘me’ as the self-identity that arises from the sum of the generalized other.

In line with Mead’s ideas, H. Dubiel maintains that the subject’s “I” is but the authority of spontaneity and creativity and cannot be explained only by internal activity and experience (Dubiel 1976, p. 149). Similarly, A. Strauss stresses that in Mead’s social psychology the identity of a person is essentially constructed in the social realm. The self-assessment of person is not complete independent of the other partners with whom we are integrated. Personal identity is not a string of self-reflections in a multifaceted mirror; it must be constructed through this interactive process. Through such a foundation of the self, however, it is clear how dangerous, highly demanding, and highly risky the stabilization and transformation of one’s identity are (Dubiel 1976, p. 149).

For his part, E. Goffman distinguishes two identities – ‘social identity’ and ‘personal identity’ – from ‘I-Identity’ (*Ich-Identitaet*). ‘Social identity’ is required of the individual according to the amount of institutionalized expectations one has within one’s social role. Personal identity, on the other hand, arises from the specific combination of information about one’s own life-history, first and foremost, from the organic specificity of one’s personality and one’s individual displacement. ‘Personal identity’ is simply the subject of ethical and legal calculations. Goffman sets these two identities in contrast with the self-identity that only the subject can experience. He stresses, moreover, the difficulty of correctly dealing with self-identity in total institutions (prisons, armies, psychiatric wards), which seek to substitute objectively valid norms for subjective needs and dismantle self-identity into social identity (Dubiel 1976, p. 150).

Habermas introduced the ‘self: *Ich-Identitaet*’ developed in American social psychology into the German sphere and conceptualized it as the ability to balance both ‘social identity’ and ‘personal identity’. He defined what he calls ‘self-structure’ in line with role-theory with the help of Goffmann’s concepts of ‘personal identity’ and ‘social identity’. ‘Personal identity’ represents the irreplaceable unity of one’s life-history, while ‘social identity’ expresses itself in the individual’s affiliation with various kinds of relationship groups. The former ensures the consistency of lifelong vertical associations, while the latter ensures the satisfaction of the different demands made by the role systems to which the person belongs. Hence for Habermas, ‘self-identity’ is the balance between social and personal identity. This equilibrium is established and maintained through an interaction technique described as ‘antinomy’. On the one hand, personhood achieves social identity as it attempts to match one’s own inner actions with standardized expectations in what he calls ‘phantom-normalcy’. On the other hand, it attempts to give signals to show that it does not give up its need for its own individual irreplaceability (‘phantom-uniqueness’). In conclusion, Habermas maintains that ‘self-identity’ is nothing more than the ability to establish balance in the two attempts (Dubiel 1976, p. 150). Habermas’ approach has the advantage in that for him self-identity implies the dynamics of socio-psychological interactions, but with the stipulation that the self remains a subject of truth-recognition and freedom in the reflective power of its

representative images. In the present world of capitalist colonization, there is the question of where self-identity can obtain the power to direct reason to pursue mutual understanding and consensus through language.

III. Identity of Persons and Self-Identity

There is a situation in which self-identity as an ability to balance social and personal identity, as described above in Habermas, cannot contain dignity of each individual and the idea of human rights. Should people who are not yet conscious, not anymore conscious or incapable of mutually subjective communication, such as unborn babies, infants, schizophrenics, and vegetative state humans, have no self-identity? Here we need to summon the concept of 'person' which has been emphasized in the metaphysical tradition. Self-identity in this concept of person arises from the mutual recognition of human beings because the differences of persons are distinguished by the numerical identity, not by the qualitative nature or ability of the subject. In the sixth century, Boethius defined "person as an individual substance with rational nature (Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia)" (Boethius 1914, p. 74). This definition has been validly quoted not only in the Middle Ages but also in modern times. After Boethius 'Person' became a dignified name, a concept with implication of value, and after Kant it became a central concept in basing human rights. Recently, however, it has been argued that not all human beings are personal, not at all stages of human life personal, and not all captures of human consciousness are personal. According to Derek Parfit, infants, people with severe mental disabilities, people with dementia, as well as sleeping and potential unconscious people are not persons. He argues that there is no basis to allow these people such as claims for life. If allowed, Peter Singer, advocate of animal rights, claims it is an immoral partisan, or "speciesism" (Spaemann 1996²). In the following, I will research the limitation of subjective consciousness and self-identity, and the other possibility, namely identity of person, mainly focusing on Robert Spaemann's book *Personen*.

According to Spaemann, subjectivity is merely an abstraction of the characteristic moments of reflection in person. Persons reflect upon themselves as subjects and become through this activity greater than subjectivity. Non-human animals simply have a 'subjective' experience. Animals live entirely in their own inner world. Persons, on the other hand, go beyond this limit because they know the difference between the outside and the inside. Persons know the difference between outside and inside on the basis of time. Time causes these differences to occur within subjectivity itself and constitutes the self-relationship of persons. Descartes' "I think" sentence is powerful and immediately self-evident, but only at present time. On the other hand, the past "I thought" and the future "I will think" never happen directly to us. These are given only as the present

² For details see the preface in Spaemann 1996.

reveals the “Ekstasen”, the present preserving of the past and the present preempting of the future (Spaemann 1996, pp. 112). It means that memory is only mediated knowledge that can deceive us. Nevertheless, it is me who senses, experiences, and thinks through the medium of memory. For Descartes, everything remembered is not *cogitatio*, but *cogitatum*, namely not the subject of consciousness, but object of consciousness. The reality remembered here is inherently suspicious and is guaranteed only by the consistent faithfulness of God. Subjectivity is inherently present, which is the only reason for being directly convinced of yourself. Because Descartes’ focus was subjectivity and not personality, he was not aware of the fact that *Cogitatio* itself was always converted to *Cogitatum*. Furthermore, the remembered object does not belong to the realm of the ‘outer world’, even though it is a mediated and uncertain reality. Descartes was convinced of the consciousness of subjectivity as being present and direct (*cogitatio*) but did not realize that the present consciousness remained as object of consciousness (*cogitatum*) in memory. Locke proposed to define the identity of person through continuity of memory. Only what I remember belongs to myself and I am responsible only for it (Locke 1975, p. 335). Spaemann criticizes that Locke falls in self-contradiction with this proposal. For he returns the trans-timely identity to the directness of experience, that is, the directness of memory, but memory presupposes the conversion of inherent subjectivity to the outside, and what is restoring and combining myself of the past is not but the new directive. The tooth pain I remember is not my pain now, even though it was my pain and I remember it now. The identity of consciousness is not the same as consciousness of identity that Locke thought. Memory is not a knowledge but an opinion that I think. Because of that, the reliability of my memory can often be corrected through the memory of others (Spaemann 1996, pp.168). Recognizing that my memory can be corrected through someone else’s memory means that my identity includes not only the present consciousness of self but also the external point of view (social memory) beyond the identity of self (self-memory). For others, the criterion of my identity is an external criterion, the identity of my body that disappears over time as a continuing existence in space. In the case of schizophrenia, if the external perspective is not important to identity, when treatment is attempted, we do not have the right to say that this person is psychotic and that something is in fantasy (Spaemann 1996, p.44). Human beings tell themselves about others and tell others about themselves. The external perspective is important for the internal perspective and transforms this. The inter-subjectivity of the persons is in line with what Mead and Habermas emphasized above. Person is thus a *subsistentia* (*hyperstasis*) that maintains a unity of memory and external perspectives, as well as the current consciousness of subjectivity.

For Spaemann, persons are beings who clearly reflect the difference between ‘for me’ and ‘itself’. It means that the persons are beings that are focusing ‘for me’ and at the same time, transcend themselves aiming for ‘itself’. But persons can also consciously turn this transcendence and choose consciously self-deception and pleasure, self-satisfaction, instead of the joy of “something”. No-one can, of course, continue to exist without giving up his humanity with this choice (Spaemann 1996, p. 84). Real joy of

persons arises when persons are convinced that this is a genuine expression of person and that this is not a simulation but a genuine one. Spaemann explains 'unique love' to explain this. "Love transcends itself (*amor extasim facit*). Love is directed to the other person, not to an intentional object of which ontological status is floating in the air. The other person is not given directly as an intentional object, but as a selfhood beyond all possible given" (Spaemann 1996, p. 85). The intentional objects here are defined by their essence, so their identity is a qualitative identity. But love is directed to the other in numerical identity. For Spaemann, personality of human being does not lie in one's qualities, namely, qualitative identity, but in homeostasis as the basis of qualitative accident. Only those people who do not have the "reasons" of love in the quality of their love, love. But nevertheless, if changes of special quality are so fundamental, it becomes as though the loving person is invisible. The reason why you become so blind can be in your loved ones. Nevertheless, while you loved, the following was self-evident: If love truly comes from the loved one's reality, there can be no end in nature. If love eventually ends, we experience that love did not actually come from the existence of the other. The mystery is so united in the ecstasy with God and enters eternity (Spaemann 1996, p. 86). Hence, Spaemann's personal identity means a 'relational existence' that communicates with one's own and the other's person, and, furthermore, with the eternal and absolute God, the reality itself. This personality reminds of the *imago dei*, and the power by which a person operates relationships is mutual recognition, trust, and faith. The basic form of absolute real experience that Spaemann thinks is the other's gaze that intersects my gaze. I am looked in. And if this gaze is not objectified, surveyed, underestimated, or simply attracted to curiosity, but meets a unique gaze in the interrelationship, what we call person is constructed in experiences of both human beings. For person exists only in plural (Spaemann 1996, p. 86). Of course, the gaze of the other can also be manipulated. The other is not given in forced directness. One requires the opportunity of freedom to think of the other as a real self rather than a fictitious one. The fundamental act of freedom is achieved by giving up the grasp of power inherent in the tendency of all living things. Positively speaking of this, abandonment is 'leaving as it is (Seinlassen)'. Leaving as it is is a transcendent act, a unique sign of personality. Persons make the other person's existence real and their own being actual to the other (Spaemann 1996, p. 87).

According to Spaemann, a person is not self-consciousness, but rather possesses it, and it is revealed only when you give up this consciousness, the unsubstantial subjectivity. Persons, on the one hand, have distinctly numerable identities, but, on the other hand, they cannot be defined by any qualitative attribute, so their identity can never be described. We try to substantialize the identity that distinguish itself from all the abstract and qualitative things and call this entity 'self'. But if self is an entity belonging to the brain-associated cause, then this entity is in some way qualitatively defined and eventually emerges from human nature. However, human beings are 'someone', not 'something', which is beyond the sum of the parts that make up one's own organs and the nature given to them (Spaemann 1996, p. 115). 'Self' is not the core of numerical identity; it is just an empty concept. This concept does not allow individual

subjects to be distinguished from each other, nor does it allow them to think of the subject as being different from the vanishing atom, or as anything different from the event of momentary consciousness. Likewise, self-identity that Habermas thinks of as a power that balances the social and personal identity, is nothing but a moment of consciousness. "Because the subject is not always out of this process, namely, not at the point of view of the whole process from beginning to end, but somewhere in this process. Outside of this process, there is the point of view that everyone else sees. It is only after I have taken this point that I avoid the abstract notion of myself as unsubstantial subjectivity, and the person manifests itself in the field of sight, better to say, the human being is revealed as a person" (Spaemann 1996, p. 115).

IV. Outgoing Words

We have examined above the identity of subjective consciousness, self-identity as the power of inter-subjectivity, and the identity of persons. The identity of subjective consciousness in modern philosophy is insufficient to promote the integration of fragmented humanity, and the self-identity developed in modern sociology as the ability to balance social and personal identity seems to support the inter-subjectivity as well as the integration of humanity. But its power seems not to be sufficiently ontologically justified. The identity of the person developed from the traditional ontology enables oneself social, decentralized, and to leave as it is, based on mutual recognition to overcome the lack of subjective consciousness and the lack of the ability of self-identity and to move toward fullness of reality. We can admit that it is right and corresponds to the idea of human dignity and the spirit of human rights when we understand and interpret I-identity as the identity of person. The concept of a person's identity can recognize the value of I-identity to infants, fetuses as well as unconscious vegetative humans and humans with weak mental abilities or schizophrenia. One of the remaining questions to us is whether the identity of the person can be applied analogously to the nation, state and social community. Personal relationships are possible only among people who recognize each other as "someone" rather than "something" and respect and trust each other "as it is". It is true that the value of a person's identity is not directly given to group identity that exists as 'something' in group consciousness, but indirectly so far as the group identity serves individual persons in group. Cultural and political institutions, such as state and social community, exist for the sake of persons, but are not ends in themselves. Persons, on the other hand, exist by themselves (self-purpose) and do not exist for the institutions. Establishing group identity analogically and virtually is necessary for the common good of persons as rational social beings, but only so far as they are wary of and exclude fascism or totalitarianism. For the spirit of persons and human rights excel any system in the state or society.

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Kyu Young Lee: Recognition and Change of National Identity among North Korean Defectors

I. Introduction

1. Integration rather than reunification

Korean reunification should be oriented on social integration based on emotions and values rather than on institutional reunification. Systemic integration means the integration of economic relations, power structure, and institutions. Social integration symbolizes psychological unity among the inhabitants, not physical and systemic integration. It is necessary to strengthen mutual bonding and interdependency based on social inequality, discrimination, and heterogeneity. The primary aim is to build an ethnic community. Its premise is a status wherein the constituents overcome heterogeneity and feel homogeneity by securing unity in the fields of economy, society, culture, etc. To build a uniformed identity after Korean reunification, the definition and characteristics of identity need analyzing based on a correct understanding of North Korean identity.

2. Social integration and overcoming prejudices

Social integration is not a matter of system between systems, rather it is the responsibility of forming homogeneity among the people. If political and legal integration may be aimed at the short-term, social integration is a long-term process. Generating homogeneous identity is a solution to conflicts of mutual distrust and aftereffect. Although psychological conflicts occur by a difference in cognition, values, and habits, the major cause is prejudice. Therefore, the North and the South must start resolving enmity and prejudice toward one another that was created by the ideology of division. So North Korea's group identity needs to be objectively understood and analyzed. Factors that make social integration difficult are social verticality, emergency

defense, and inconsistency between the ‘system’ and the ‘lifeworld’ (Luhmann 1991, pp. 22).

The social verticality factor positions North Korean people in the periphery of society. North Korean people are pressured to adjust to South Korea’s core values so they can ‘take off to modernity’. Ignoring mutual sovereignty may cause North Korean people to resist. There are differences in values among North and South Koreans due to protracted segregation. Therefore, the act of self-defense and emergency defense is inevitable in the environment of rapid systemic change after reunification. Paradoxically, this may lead the defectors to desire the North Korean system again. The lifeworld is socially, culturally, and historically formed. It changes very slowly. In this sense, the lifeworld that was engraved in the current communist system cannot coexist with market economy and democracy after reunification. In other words, it implies the so-called emergence of ‘the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneity’ (Bloch 1990, pp. 97–116). Settling of a new system needs a formation of unofficial social and cultural infrastructure. However, this formation process is impossible to be done in a short period. In the changed circumstances, the previous attitude, practice and value scale do not disappear and continuously operate. The ‘Hysteresis-effect’ disrupts short-term anabolism (Jeon 2000, pp. 115–129). Therefore, there may be some inconsistency in the North Korean region between the system and the lifeworld.

Table 1: North Korean defectors’ current status on entry to South Korea (by December of 2019

Classification	~’98	~’01	’00	’03	’04	’05	’06	’07	’08	’09	’10
Men	831	565	510	474	626	424	515	573	608	662	591
Women	116	478	632	811	1,272	960	1,513	1,981	2,195	2,252	1,811
Total	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402
Women’s ratio	12 %	46 %	55 %	63 %	67 %	69 %	75 %	78 %	78 %	77 %	75 %

Classification	’11	’12	’13	’14	’15	’16	’17	’18	~12.19. (Tentative)	total
Men	795	404	369	305	251	302	188	168	202	9,363
Women	1,911	1,098	1,145	1,092	1,024	1,116	939	969	845	24,160
Total	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,275	1,418	1,127	1,137	1,047	33,523
Women’s ratio	70 %	72 %	76 %	78 %	80 %	79 %	83 %	85 %	81 %	72.1 %

Source: “North Korean defectors’ current status on entry to South Korea,” 2020, <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/NKDefectorsPolicy/status/lately/> (Search date: March 30, 2020)

North Korean defectors have reached 33 000 in number as of December 2019 since passing 10 000 around February 2007. It is estimated that the actual population is between 25 000 and 27 000. Considering the total North Korean population is 25 million, it is estimated that 1 % is in China, 0.1 % in South Korea, and 0.01 % in Europe, the United States, or elsewhere in the world. They are attempting to primarily enter South Korea exploring various passages (MoU 2020).

North Korean defectors have steadily increased since the food shortage in the mid-90s. From 100 in 1991 and 1000 in 2002, the total number passed 2000 in 2006. In 2007, the total number has increased up to 10 000 in February 2007, then passed 20 000 in November 2010. It had been only 947 up to 1998, then it had steadily increased during the following three years. 1,043 people have entered between 1999 and 2001. It had steadily been increasing since 2005, but the number of entries started to decrease since 2012. 1,127 people have entered in 2017.

Since 2000 North Korean defectors' entry attempts to South Korea have increased in search of a better life. They were feeling the limits of staying overseas for four to five years with the danger of repatriation. It shows that increased South Korean government's support for the North Korean defectors who have entered the South Korean missions overseas and support for the already entered defectors had a positive effect.

The entry ratio of women was only 7 % before 1989, then it increased to 35 % in 1997, and 42 % in 2000. It surpassed the ratio of men in 2002. The South Korean government receives all overseas staying North Korean defectors if they desire entry to South Korea for sake of humanitarianism and brotherhood according to the domestic law, the UN convention, and international law.

II. Concept and distinctiveness of North Korean defectors

1. Who are North Korean defectors?

There are various terms for the defectors from North Korea: 'North Korean defectors', 'North Korean refugees', 'North Korean migrants', 'North Korean immigrants' etc. A North Korean defector is defined as someone who did not acquire citizenship from a foreign country after defecting North Korea and has immediate family, spouse, job, etc. in North Korea, i.e. North Korean people who desire to leave North Korea and resettle at a new place but have not been able to yet. It is a person whose background is in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) which is an antagonistic country under division (Kim 2016, p. 136). They share the same traditional national homogeneity with Koreans. However, they grew up and lived in a different social system. They have

become 'constituents of the Republic of Korea' after defecting and having stopovers in 3rd countries. They have a common characteristic of migrants needing to resettle in an unfamiliar society. On the other hand, they do not recognize themselves as migrants, because they are members of the same nationality and automatically receive South Korean citizenship according to the related law. They are placed in a dualistic social status of having the background of an antagonistic nation as well as a citizen of the Republic of Korea according to the constitution.

2. Difficulties with the dualistic social status: grave effect on social resettlement and labor activity

The dualistic social status in the defectors is closely related to the psychological misfit from lack of assimilation and respect from the society after they automatically acquire citizenship, aside from other causes of conflict. The main causes that hinder social resettlement are *psychological characteristics of the North Korean background* and *South Korean people's social prejudice*. North Korean defectors demand to be treated the same as others with South Korean background. They recognized that they chose the South Korean system and abandoned the North Korean system by choosing freedom through a crisis of death. They argue for compensation from the South Korean government and society. Their entry stemmed from political and economic dissatisfaction and resistance to the North Korean system, even the cause of defection was a financial hardship. Up to the early 2000s, there was a lack of face-to-face contact with the North Korean defectors. Therefore, it was recognized that they were compatriots who need help, but the negative recognition started to spread with the increasing number of North Korean defectors and negative incidents delivered in the media. So North Korean defectors are not recognized as having the same personality, rather they are seen as victims of food shortage and dictatorship. The complex feelings toward them are sympathy, simple curiosity, exclusive suspicion, etc. They are just 'people from an unknown society'.

North Korean defectors have a dualistic attitude from the background of a citizen of the DPRK as well as receiving citizenship of the Republic of Korea. They have the standpoint of demanding *compensation and support* as well as *fair treatment as a citizen of the Republic of Korea* for choosing the South Korean system. Due to the dualistic status of North Korean defectors having the background of the citizen of the DPRK as well as receiving citizenship of the Republic of Korea upon entry, they do not hold self-respect for having lived as North Korean citizens and having been yoked to being misunderstood of their defection and not receiving equal treatment like South Korean. They are not aware of the fact that their assimilation process is similar to that of other foreign migrants because of the traditional nationalism and the constitutional rule. North Korean defectors are neither 'citizen' nor 'migrant' within Korean society. They refuse to define themselves as the same group as migrants. Korean language and lineage are the most important factors to distinguish between the two groups.

3. The distinctiveness of North Korean defectors: differences from Korean Chinese and Southeast Asian migrants

North Korean defectors strongly believe that they should enjoy equal rights as South Korean people on top of receiving South Korean citizenship and settlement assistant fund. A significant number of North Korean defectors have recognized Korean Chinese negatively while they were staying in China for a certain period (from being treated unfairly).

North Korean defectors have a relatively easier process of finding jobs than Chinese or Southeast Asian people due to the government's hiring support policy. However, employers avoid hiring them without assistant funding. North Koreans are recognized to have weaker employment competitiveness in comparison with Korean Chinese that share the same language and traditional cultural homogeneity. In terms of gender, men, who have been socialized in North Korean society, where patriarchal masculine military culture is prevalent, have more difficulty seeking employment than any other migrant.

North Korean defectors are relatively inferior in the job market to the Korean Chinese ethnicity. Korean Chinese have experienced a capitalist economy and earned survival ability after the Chinese reformation. North Korean defectors have only worked as commanded by the nation and received a governmental allocation. However, Korean Chinese have experienced many social changes and learned to adapt after capitalist economic development has proceeded. It is recognized that they have a better ability to survive in a competitive society. Although Korean Chinese have the same ethnic origin, they need to work harder because they do not receive any support from the government: They need to be hired somewhere and earn money because they need to return to China one day. They work harder and have a more abundant social experience. On the other hand, North Korean defectors are less competitive because they have government support and cannot go back to their hometown. Furthermore, they have strong pride and suffer a loss of self-esteem from hiring and work experience. It is difficult for them to be treated with the attitude of blatant contempt from South Korean people while they hold the same citizenship.

North Korean defectors have the same status, both in legal rights and responsibility, as citizens of the Republic of Korea after entry and signing the family relations certificate. Because Koreans have lived under different ideologies and in different systems for 60 years, heterogeneity has to exist between the people who grew up in South Korea (South Korean people) and North Korean defectors. Such heterogeneity surfaces as the number of the defectors increase and may spread as a social issue. Considering the trend that South Korean society is becoming a migrant-receiving nation from a sending nation, problems of complex conflicts among South Korean people, North Korean defectors, and migrants can unravel in the future (Kwon 2011, p. 130). North Korean defectors are an absolute minority in number, they are in an inferior position to many South Korean people in social power, wealth, status, etc. They belong to a minority group relatively. Many of them are unemployed due to job adaptation problems and

mostly work in manual work or service sectors. They have unstable work experience as they are hired as temporary or non-full-time workers. Simultaneously, they experience apathy, ignorance, disdainful and hostile attitudes from South Korean people just as other migrants (Kwon 2011, p. 130).

A migrant is a person who has left one's residence or the country in search of a better life. A migrant can return to one's home country whenever one desires. A refugee is an immigrant who is impoverished or in trouble due to war or catastrophe (UNHCR 2016; UNHCR 2018). Recently, they mainly are group asylum seekers related to ethnic and ideologically political reasons. North Korean defectors do not correspond to 'the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951' (UNHCR 2011). Instead, they are mandate refugees, which means an individual who has received refugee status by the UNHCR (The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugee) while living in one's home country or a third country (Bianchini 2010, pp. 367-378).

III. Identity and factors on North Korean defectors' identity formation

1. Identity and its Formation Factors

The word 'identity' is originated from a Latin word, 'identitas'. It means *equivalence* or *sameness*. Also, it is originated from a Greek word, 'tautotes'. It is originated from a word, 'autos', that is expressed together with idem: same which also means *self* or *being*. The word 'identity' connotes two meanings, *sameness* and *self*. Identity as *sameness* is a property to maintain self while sustaining one's inherent property. It means equivalence. Identity as *self* means self and being. It continually pursues distinction and difference between self and others. It implies the property to desire endless reflection on the question of 'who am I?'. Human identity internalizes the interaction between an individual and society for the individual to create special meanings and act upon them (Shin & Choi 2007, pp. 1-29). It is formed through a specific experience within a social relationship or political environment and cultural experience. It is formed while individuals recognize who they are in the relationship or the experience and learning their existence and place in society.

National identity is "the feeling that an individual has toward the country one was born in or given citizenship (or toward citizens), therefore, psychological feeling of belonging from being a member, unity, homogeneity, solidarity, loyalty, attachment, etc." (Kim & Yoo 2014, p. 47). It is also a self-awareness that makes its people have a sense of belonging as members of the same political community (Jang 2010, p. 107). Nation identity is a feeling that a citizen of a country has as one of a social and group identity. It is a psychological feeling of belonging, unity, homogeneity, solidarity, loyalty,

attachment, etc. (You 2006; Jang 2010, p. 107; Evans & Kelley 2002, pp. 303–338; Hjerm 1998, pp. 335–347).

Identities can be formed in different categories such as race, rank, age, occupation, ethnicity, nationality, etc. Social identity matures as a group identity (Cerulo 1997, pp. 385–409). The two types of social identity are individual identity and group identity. Individual identity is meanings formed by individuals toward other people, social facts, and objects'. Its variability is high and continuity is short. Group identity is social awareness among constituents of a group and their sense of belonging. Although variability and circumstantial factors are low, sustainability and consistency are high. Therefore, it plays an important role in securing the stability of the collective aggregate (Smith 1992, pp. 1–23). North Korea's 'good' identity was formed by the 'evil' of the other, the United States. North Korea substituted the political conflict with the US with the moral clash of 'good' and 'evil'. As a foreign power, the US is an important standard for North Korea to define the boundary of the other. The United States, as an unethical other, is objectified as an inadequate invader as well as in morality and humanism (Park 2014).

2. Factors on North Korean defectors' identity formation

(1) *Age*: The group of the elder people has received an outright ideology education since childhood in North Korea. They have witnessed that the socialist system could not feed the people and only coerced justification since the Arduous March. They may have felt a high level of betrayal. Fundamentally, they have a thankful mind toward the South Korean government. It is possible that the younger group spent childhood and adolescence around the beginning stage of the Arduous March. It is possible that they do not have or only vaguely have a psychological sense of belonging to a country throughout their lifetime. They tend to have a practical mindset based on realistic circumstances instead of being bound to a sense of belonging to a country or a certain ideology.

(2) *Intention to permanently settle in South Korea*: It is a factor that passively affects national identity, therefore a concept of belonging and mutual growth like the two sides of a coin. If willing, the national sense of belonging might be high.

(3) *Scale of utilizing public welfare services*: People who have experienced relatively more variety of welfare services have a higher sense of belonging as South Korean citizens. Advertisement and encouragement are important to increase this factor.

(4) *Reliability of social relationships*: Reliability is a level of the degree one can trust and depend on others. It is a need for true psychological settlement beyond physical settlement in South Korean society. They need to formulate trustworthy human relationships. A reliable social relationship has consistency, responsibility, and sustainability.

(5) *Experience of discrimination*: Some variables negatively affect national identity. The autonomously strengthening nature of in-group unity by South Korean people prescripts the North Korean defectors out-group. It is difficult to have an identity as a true South Korean citizen if they have been substantially excluded and discriminated against by indigenous South Korean people even though they have given the South Korean citizen's status officially. Discrimination works as a barricade or wall by distinguishing North Korean defectors from South Korean people.

IV. Discussions on the (national) identity of North Korean defectors

1. Characteristics: 'Ex-istenz', 'In-istenz', and 'Inter-istenz'

The scope of the task for the Republic of Korea has expanded beyond its duty toward unification and now extends as well to the social integration within the Korean Peninsula after unification. This broadened scope is attributed to the increasing national and social need for the development of policies as well as the values of social integration vis-à-vis their complex identities (Kim 2014, pp. 37-69; Oh 2016, pp. 5-41; Lee 2014, pp. 121-150; Jung 2017, pp. 355-387).

Their identities as citizens from being a 'citizen of the DPRK' and a 'citizen of the ROK' have the dual nature of individuals possessing the nationality of a 'ROK citizen', and at the same time, a minority of incoming 'migrants'. It is the values that bind 'multiple characters' and 'duality' together, as well as the nature of a 'person from the border', a 'foreigner', and an 'Inter-istenz'. They carry both the characteristics of a 'person from the border' domestically and a 'minority' as an immigrant, at the same time, in this hostile division within the Korean Peninsula. They possess both distinctness that distinguishes them from immigrants from other countries, as well as the universality of an immigrant. They have very fluid and unstable tendencies. It is much stronger than fixed and stable characteristics that vary depending on where an individual is situated, rather than permanent or substantive.

The two patterns of existence – 'Ex-istenz' and 'In-istenz' – are not isolated from each other, but rather co-exist with one another. The patterns of existence between the external space and the internal space must be viewed as 'Inter-istenz'. On the one hand, the weight of multiple characters that accompanies the three-layered aspect of existence can bring the North Korean defectors back to the time and place of their established identities. On the other hand, it can also lead to the establishment of the time and place of a new identity from their established identities. We can then guide them through this. A diagnostic approach to the three-layered torn identity of North Korean defectors may

provide an opportunity to identify the initial steps toward identity stitching for North Korean defectors and enrich their status (Lee 2014, p. 140).

2. A change from old identity to new identity

Identity can be classified as *changing identity* and *unchanging identity* (Park 2013, pp. 455–456). Changing identity is a type of identity that can be changed through interaction with all the boundary elements surrounding me. A progressive personality that forms or changes as it moves along or interacts with the boundary in a relationship (Park 2013, pp. 455–456). For North Korean defectors, their identities may change due to external factors as they cross many borders and boundaries after fleeing from the DPRK.

The identity of North Korean defectors is studied in various ways and periods. Commonly, their ‘experiences in North Korea, in a third country and South Korea’ are important factors in the formation of identity. By linking location and identity, the influence of physical, institutional, and psychological environments on identity changes (Jeon 2011, p. 29; Lee 2014, pp. 138–141; Kim & Yoo 2014, p. 63). In other words, the experience and duration of stay in a third country, experiencing discrimination in the ROK, the duration of residence in the South, etc. From the moment an individual crosses the border between North Korea and China, a distinction is made from that individual’s indigenous identity from the North and from that point on, experiences the chaos of a changing identity. This experience consists of a paradigm for survival in the process of passing through third and fourth countries, which involves confusion amidst the influx of information across space, along with numerous political, economic, cultural, and social boundaries. This change of identity persists in the present, in the future, and will continue. Constant confusion of identity is experienced between the ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’ of information due to the confusion of self-identity.

3. The Identity of North Korean Defectors ‘in the DPRK’

A. The Necessity of a Historical Review on the Formation and Changes of Collectivism in the DPRK

Three main factors are to be mentioned with reference to formation of collectivism in the DPRK, namely, social change during the Japanese colonial period, Kim Il-Sung’s anti-imperialistic/anti-feudalistic revolutionary process as well as the social composition of collectivism, and the establishment of a collective development strategy through the Korean War (Lee 2006, pp. 227–237).

First, the formation of collective identity in North Korea after the liberation from the Japanese colonialism had been affected mainly by the Soviet-backed Kim Il-Sung and his partisan forces. The trial to form the new collective identity had been developed in a way that denies the past as well as through the enormous Soviet influence on international politics at that time. It was also a new ideological beginning which would mark a sharp break with the past, i.e. an introduction of the social stratum which did not exist in the previous political and social order and the application of new standards to citizenship. Furthermore, the formation of collective identity was accompanied by radical changes in the distribution of political and social forces. By so doing, the newly established regime was able to become stable and lay the foundations for the institutionalization of collective identity in reality.

Second, for North Korean residents the experience of economic difficulties in the mid-1990s was so bitter as to devise various strategies for their self-survival. It has resulted in a huge and dramatic change in a view of state, collective awareness and values of residents in the process of overcoming difficulties aimed at survival. In particular, a self-sustaining market has persisted since the 2000s. Increased human and cultural contact with the outside world, including China, brought significant changes in the areas of national, party and individual leader, the market economy, reform and openness, and thoughts on South Korea. While maintaining a collective identity, individual identity was expanded, too.

Third, collective identity was formed around Kim Il-Sung's 'Monolithic Ideology System' (*the Juche Ideology System*) (hereafter, 'the Juche Ideology System'). Its purposes are to overcome unfavorable conditions domestically and abroad as well as the hereditary succession across three generations, and to preserve the regime. The Juche Ideology System is officially the most important value system in the DPRK and the focal point, which runs across all sectors, including politics, economy, society, culture, and all such other areas within North Korea. It was developed in the Plenum of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee (1958–1960) after the purge of Kim Il-Sung's political opponents and contributed to the solid communist regime with Kim Il-Sung at the top. On April 14, 1974, the 'Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Juche Ideology System' were proclaimed. With a full revision of the principles in 2013, they were renamed as 'Ten Principles of Establishing the Worker's Party's Monolithic Leadership System'. (hereafter, Ten Principles). The Ten Principles act as the governing norm that systematically guarantees Kim Jong Un's sole dictatorship at a higher level than the Constitution or the regulations put forth by the ruling Workers' Party (Oh 2013, pp. 12–14).

B. Kim Il-Sung's Juche Ideology System as a Collective Identity

Collective identity is formed by 'specific knowledge', a 'certain power system', and 'distinction with others' (Gordon 1980, pp. 109–133). 'Specific knowledge' pertains to the Juche Ideology System. The Juche Ideology System can be summarized as the endless loyalty and trust in the North Korean regime and its leader. The mechanism was established to maintain the heir to Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong Un's, hold to power. The principal set of norms governs the daily lives of North Koreans. The main content is endless trust in the leader, loyalty, and obedience. In North Korea, the leader possesses the image of having the absolute power to complete a communist society and liberate the people. Kim Il-Sung's Juche Ideology System had not only a *normative* (or *compulsory*) character but also a *voluntary* character. The normative character is formed by 'systemic superiority' and 'systemic supremacy', reinforced by strong totalitarianism, which further leads to compulsory character. The voluntary character involves 'loyalty' and 'trust'. Since the surge of economic difficulties, the voluntary character of 'loyalty' and 'trust' formed during the establishment of the socialist system has weakened, and the normative character of 'systemic superiority' and 'systemic supremacy' still remains strong (Lee 2012, pp. 135–171).

Furthermore, the collective identity of North Korean Defectors is featured by the collective identity internalizing Kim Il-Sung's Juche Ideology System, the system of loyalty in inverse proportion to one's educational background, the system of superiority in proportion to age, the system of trust that favors women to men, and continuous loyalty, which is formed based on trust in the North Korean regime (Lee 2016, pp. 289–297).

4. The Migration of North Korean Defectors 'in a third country'

The change in identity of North Korean defectors should be understood at a different level than that of other marriage migrants and migrant workers. In other words, it must be viewed in terms of '*migration of identity*', instead of '*identity of migrants*'. Identity of migrants is the change of identity made through the interaction of political, economic, and question societies in the process of settlement or stay in a migrant country, i.e. the change of identity in various boundaries and spaces within a country. Migration of identity is a unique migration phenomenon in which changes in identity due to external factors (such as social alienation, confusion due to external information, survival, etc.) allow migration across multiple national boundaries and spaces. The external factors, legal or illegal, are the only means of inducing confusion or change in identity.

The primary motive for the defection is the yearning for a better living environment, information on foreign countries from overseas migrant brokers, failure to adjust in

South Korean society, identity laundering, etc. There are various agents that change their identity such as North Korean defectors who have already situated themselves in the South, including those living in third and fourth countries, defectors and commercial brokers and various political measures, like South Korea's political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological conflict/support policies.


There are two types of migrants. One type is illegal immigrants, illegal aliens, North Korean defectors, refugees, immigrants. The other type is South Korean defectors, which pertains to those people who escape from South Korea again. They were first unveiled in 2008, when within nine months, twenty-eight North Korean defectors, referred to as 'disguised asylum seekers', have been caught seeking asylum in advanced countries after acquiring their nationality. This raised the question of fairness of opportunity, inequality of income and social stability; the result of inequality within South Korean society, rather than the self-indulgence of North Korean defectors. Analysts generally relate this phenomenon to a re-immigration scheme to get refugee benefits anew by applying for refugee status in the West under the guise of refugees, allegedly due to the difficulties in settling down in South Korea and discrimination within South Korean society.

After their defection from North Korea, a sense of identity confusion builds up due to transnational experience, as they go through the bitterness of loss and separation, the threat of psychological pain and stability as an illegal immigrant, the paradigm of survival in the midst of the dark. They might face day-to-day discrimination and exploitation, human trafficking and fraudulent marriage, etc. The migration movement of North Korean defectors and their choice of country for migration are forced to them by others. The migration of identity by others, coupled with the migration of identity for survival, enables the international migration of North Korean defectors.

5. Experiences 'in South Korea': the Arduous Settlement Process for North Korean Defectors

A radical change in identity (or personal status) of North Korean defectors is inevitable by their arrival in South Korea and thereafter. They should face the difficulties caused by diverse social alienations from eight months to ten years or even longer: from 'the people (public individuals)' through illegal aliens, refugees, immigrants to 'citizens' (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The Migratory Routes of North Korean Defectors after Escaping from North Korea



Source: Oh 2011, p. 87

The process of resettlement for North Korean defectors pertains to the difficult process of exterminating these individuals from their preexisting internal space to the external space, on one hand, and at the same time, the process of integrating them from the external space to the new internal space, on the other hand. To scrutinize the process of integration into the new internal space, it is necessary to understand the problem domain called community adaptation (Lee 2014, p. 143). For the purpose of the integration of North Korean defectors into the new internal space, it is necessary to understand the internal space prior to the move toward the external space, the process of extermination into the external space, and the process of reintegration into the new internal space.

Those people who have an address, direct line, home, spouse, work, etc. north of the Military Demarcation Line belong to North Korean Defectors. These individuals led a steady and stable life in North Korea and have maintained the complex fundamental connections they had there. As such, although they have left the North spatially, mental, emotional and economic links with the North have persisted. Individuals who are out of North Korea are the people who have left the space he/she has been living in, and therefore, they are no longer staying in North Korea. 'Individuals who were not able to acquire a foreign nationality' experience a new situation wherein an individual has already been exterminated to the external space, but has yet to find himself/herself situated into the new internal space. In other words, instead of an individual who has already been integrated into the new internal space at present, they only possess the characteristics of an individual integrated into the internal space.

Table 2: Discourses and Characteristics of Social Alienation of Identities among North Korean Defectors

Year	Legislation	Implementation Period	Title	Dominant means and Discourses
1962	Special Act on the Protection of the People of National Merit and the Returnees to the South	1962-1977 (Level of veterans)	Returnees to the South, People of National Merit	An instrument and a propaganda to demonstrate the superiority of South Korea in its competition with the regime A dominant discourse on anti-communism and nationalism
1978	Special Compensation Act for the Returnees to the South	1978-1989 (Level of system propaganda)	Returnees to the South	A dominant discourse on how anti-communist sentiments has led to the existence of North Korean defectors
1990	Law on the Protection of Korean Residents in North Korea who defected to South Korea	1990-1996 (Social welfare)	Korean compatriots, recipients of Livelihood Security	End of the Cold War Meaninglessness of inter-Korean system competition
1997	Law on the Protection and Settlement Support of North Korean Refugees	1997~present (Social integration and preparation for unification)	North Korean defectors, settlers, refugees	From nationalism to humanitarianism

Source: Oh, 2018, p. 13

As Table 2 shows, South Korean Government promoted diverse policies on North Korean Defectors (Table 2). Although they had succeeded in entering South Korea, lots of difficult things to adapt themselves to South Korean society were waiting for them. They vaguely realize their position within South Korean society for the first time when they avail for the basic livelihood security program, become considered as second-class citizens, or when they settle in an old rental house. The socially alienated identities among the second-class citizens in various settlement processes in the South Korean society, as well as the causes that aggravate unequal opportunities. At the same time,

numerous invisible ‘borders’ within South Korean society add to their identity confusion. In a capitalist society, economic boundaries reduce them to a minority, and before establishing their own identities in the new space, they are ironically separated from social boundaries and are brought into a state of confusion. Most of them are ‘recipients of livelihood security’, who are in need of one-sided help from a majority of South Korean taxpayers, ‘low-skilled laborers’ lacking technological skills, and ‘migrants’ who do not understand well the culture of South Korean society. “The North Korean society kills people politically, but the South Korean society kills people economically. But now that I’ve experienced it, it’s harder to be killed economically. I can’t find way. Now, I want to go to Gangwon Province and broadcast to North Korea: Please don’t defect...” (Kim & Yoo 2014, p. 55) (Table 3).

Table 3: Categories of Formation of the National Identity of North Korean Defectors

Category	Sub-category	Concept
Motivation for Defection	Economic Difficulties	Nothing to eat. Ten years of hardship, escape to China in order to make money.
	Hope for Freedom	Freedom of economic activity, freedom of the body, freedom of choice of occupation
	A yearning for a developed civilization	Children’s education, a yearning for the Chinese border that is alight with bright lights.
	Reunion with lost family members	To meet their relatives living abroad, to reunite with their families.
	Connections and a change in the circle of connections	The disappearance of obligations to support one’s family, encouragement to make acquaintances
Factors Affecting National Identity Conflicts	Experience living in a third country	Duration of stay in China, encounter with Chinese public security officers, marriage in China
	Experience living in North Korea	Experience career limits based on status, forced labor, monitoring by and friction with North Korean authorities
	Demographic variables	Gender, age, marital status, family relationship, educational background, social status, occupation, residence, personal orientation
Confusion in National Identity	Awareness of status as refugees or displaced people	A stateless sorrow; a sense of deprivation of being “chased out” from one’s hometown; a sense of sorrow over renunciation of privilege.
	Awareness of status as a wanderer	Recognizing the need for a nation, survival is urgent, and personal relationships such as ‘husband’ are more important to the formation of an identity than the state and other relationships
Experiences within the Korean Society	Job and work barriers	Discrimination in the job market, completion of employment education, wage discrimination, labor-management culture shock, recognition at work
	Cultural conflict	Language, culture shock to gender equality, culture of consumption, culture of charity, changes in familial life

	Institutional support	Civil rights grants, welfare benefits by the state
	Time variable	Cheonan Warship incident in 2010, 2002 Football World Cup Game
Personal Adaptation Strategy in South Korea	Utilization of networks	Personal networks such as marriage, as well as the utilization of South Korean and North Korean defectors' networks.
	Job-hunting and working strategy	Active/passive job-hunting, active/passive work
	Concealment and utilization of one's (place of) origin	Letting people know that they are North Koreans, asking for help, hiding the fact that they are North Koreans
	Learning of South Korean culture	Studying South Korean culture such as dramas, accents and linguistics
	Abandonment of adaptation	Seclusion, easily retire, abandonment of employment
The Formation of a New National Identity	A South Korean whose hometown is North Korea	Proud of North Korea's cultural customs. He/she thinks he is doing well in South Korea, too. The lingering affection for North Korea. A positive sense of belongingness in both North and South Korea.
	A South Korean national from North Korea	He/she feels discriminated against as someone from North Korea. Marginalized person, social alienation
	South Korean nationals from North Korea	Responds by saying he/she is (South) Korean. No affections for the North. Possesses a nationality, but is discriminated against. Social alienation
	Individualists who escaped from their country	The perception of national identity itself is weak. Happy to be able to maintain a weak national identity. Identity found in personal relationships such as home.

Source: Jeon, Yu & Lee 2011, pp. 9–10.

In the process, it is difficult to find a job comparable to one's previous occupation and academic background. They receive low wages with lower status in the new society. They can only enter the lowest level of labor economy. The government's job support policy and job placement are limited only to the most common labor economies. North Korean defectors complain that South Korea's high entry barriers make it impossible for them, socially, to have the best prospects.


They experience inequality of occupation and opportunities, as well as discrimination and prejudice within South Korean society. They compare other developed countries with the identity of the Korean government and its self-established identity on safety based on its North Korea policy, social welfare services. They remember South Korea as a society of exploitation and discrimination that is never friendly to North Korean defectors. Even in foreign countries, North Korean defectors perceive the relationship between South Koreans and them as that of the employer and the employed. Mainly seen as restaurant kitchen staff, support, or a labor force fitting for the 3D sectors. In short, they feel the anxiety of survival, political instability, threats to safety, social discontent,

economic hardship, exclusion as a minority, awareness of their position society as part of the second-class citizens. Currently, North Korean defectors live in about 21 foreign countries (Kang 2018, pp. 11–12; Oh 2019, pp. 263–300).

V. Conclusion and implications

From the moment North Korean defectors cross the border, they experience chaos in defining their national identity. This is due to the discrepancy between the identity they had in North Korea and their current status. In the process of defection, they start sensing themselves as ‘refugees or displaced people’, or even the sense of being a ‘wanderer’. They face the need to establish a new national identity upon entering South Korea. There are four types of national identity among North Korean defectors who have entered South Korea: They are categorized as ‘South Koreans whose hometown is North Korea’, ‘South Korean nationals from North Korea’, ‘South Korean nationals who escaped from the North’, and ‘individualists who escaped from their country’. For them, many types of conflicts arise complicatedly from within, including their identity as a citizen within the South Korean society, identity as a North Korean, identity as the same (Korean) people, identity as a stranger, etc. North Korean defectors inevitably suffer from national identity confusion during the process of defection, and they form a complex myriad of identities upon entering the South (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The Building Processes and Classification of the National Identity of North Korean Defectors



Source: Jeon, Yu & Lee 2011, p. 29

Overcoming prejudice is one of the fundamental premises of successful social integration. Prejudice is a thought that is not fair and skewed. It affects people's routine decision making or activity, especially in forming self-identity and conduct to respect others. It also leads to a negative evaluation of others before experience or adequate evidence (Allport 1993, pp. 30–32). Cognitive origins of prejudice are categorization, social identity, in-group formation, out-group homogeneity, etc. (Hai Sook Kim 1999, pp. 3–12). So, the process of overcoming prejudice on North Korea is very crucial. Smooth social integration eliminates prejudice and discrimination existing within South Korea. It is possible through South Korean people's psychological integration and requires anti-prejudice education. The Korean War and the competition between two different systems after the division is the origins of the prejudice formation between the North and the South Korean people. Direct and indirect conflicts caused heterogeneity between the systems and there to remain existential distrust and enmity. Social identity formation roots in the group category and objectification. Some form of socialization at home, school, media based on the opposing relations create the identity of 'us and them'. Unification education based on anti-nationalistic prejudice is necessary.

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Chihun Kim: Becoming a Jesuit University in a Secular Age

Since the Enlightenment, one of the most remarkable changes in Western society has been the declining influence of the church. The church had exerted her authority in various areas of society, but the people began to separate themselves from such power. There are a number of elements which bring about that change: developments of rationality, science, technology, and the economy. Immanuel Kant's well-known maxim "Sapere aude!" demonstrates the iconic spirit of the development. In the past, the church imposed strict censorship on the publications, but the philosopher reminds the society of "a freedom to make public use of one's reason" (Kant 1993, p. 3). In other words, he invites the people "to have courage to exercise their own understanding" in public life (Kant 1993, p. 3). The truth was defined by the church, but now an individual can be entitled to judge whether the truth is acceptable or not.

The phenomena can be described as secularization. Though this term was first coined by Max Weber, it was not popularized by him. It was picked up and rediscovered later by other scholars in various ways. In 1967, arguing that the term, secularization, is imbued with "the confusing connotations and the multitude of phenomena", Shiner suggests that we may "drop the word entirely" (Shiner 1967, p. 219). Yet the issue of secularization became the dominant ideology by the early 1970s. During that time, the primary advocates of the notion were Thomas Luckmann, Bryan Wilson, Karel Dobbelaere, and Peter Berger. Interestingly, all of them are Europeans (Swatos 1999, p. 210). Then two decades later the validity and reliability of secularization was widely discussed by P. E. Hammond (1985), J. K. Hadden (1987), F. J. Lechner (1991).

The notion of secularization is a complicated and controversial one because of its specific uses in different places, scholars, and disciplines. Most of all, the idea of secularization may refer to the separation between the state and the church. In that sense, secularization had begun during the French Revolution before Weber's term of secularization came to be coined. In France the church and the state were intertwined with each other in an essential way before the Revolution. That kind of situation was not unique in France, but most of the European social structure was very similar to that of France. "The functioning of medieval European society", as Ralf Dahrendorf argues, "would evidently be strongly endangered if in an experiment of imagination, we removed all religious institutions from this society" (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 202). In other words, the church was so deeply involved in education, health, the economy, the law, welfare, and politics that the social system was characterized by a condition of superimposition in terms of the relationship between the church and the state. Here the idea of secularization may refer to the process of the separation between the church and

the state. The social structure in the United States, however, was different from Europe. From the beginning, the state was “constitutionally separated” from the church, and “laissez-faire economics circumscribed the role of the state as far as other institutional sectors of the social system were concerned” (Swatos 1999, p. 213). Accordingly, secularization as the separation of the two institutions may not be applied to that country.

Another significant idea of secularization is found by Max Weber. For him, the key element in the phenomenon is the process of rationalization, which had been created by science. That process does not mean “an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under which one lives”, but that “principally there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation” (Weber 1946, p. 139). In other words, people’s way of understanding the world and their life has changed in a sense that they investigate them without recourse to some mysterious powers or superstitions. For Weber, this means that “the world is disenchanting” (Weber 1946, p. 139). Since the Renaissance throughout the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, we have witnessed the development of science, the power of reason, technology, and commerce. Weber characterizes the modern world as “the spirit of capitalism” in which “technical means and calculations perform” what the traditional methods had done in dealing with the world (Weber 1946, p. 139). That is what Weber’s idea of secularization is.

Weber’s idea of secularization as the process of rationalization has been dealt with in various ways among scholars. One of them is the “development of functional rationality” in every aspect (Dobbelaere 1999, p. 232). Karel Dobbelaere discusses the phenomenon of secularization in a few different levels: the macro, meso, and micro levels. At the macro or societal level, modern societies are “primarily differentiated along functional lines”, and “subsystems developed different functional domains” (Dobbelaere 1999, p. 230). Each subsystem became independent in terms of its own functions, separating from the traditional authority. By so doing, they were able to have their own medium of communication and their own value systems. In the long run, the traditional authority of the church has become weakened on the grounds that they claim “autonomy and reject religiously prescribed rules” (Dobbelaere 1999, p. 231). One of the effects of secularization is the decline of religious authority.

Along with such decline, there are a number of issues in relation to secularization: unbelief, individualization, pluralization in a religious market, cult of religion, privatization of religion, etc. Yet it should be noted that, for Weber, the modern world does not become completely irreligious, but is still fundamentally religious. Even though the world is enchanted, the old gods take “the form of impersonal forces”, which play the roles of values and orders (Weber 1946, p. 149). Despite the decline of religious authority, the values of the religion do not disappear. Interestingly enough, they can be found in secular institutions. In that sense, the phenomenon of secularization comes to be complicated in that “so-called secular institutions or beliefs perform religious functions, and religious beliefs or institutions perform secular functions” (Fenn 1969, p. 167). Thus, we can see the idea of secularization has multiple layers of meanings.

Another controversial issue is how to apply this phenomenon to each unique place and situation. Perhaps it is not feasible to discuss and analyze every place from the perspective of this generalized idea of secularization on the grounds that each place has its own unique contexts and situations. As mentioned above briefly, there are differences between Europe and America in terms of secularization. Accordingly, I will try to point out the phenomenon of secularization at Sogang University as what they are, rather than to generalize it. I entered the University of Sogang in 1990. Since then, I have been around on the campus and at the chaplaincy as a student, Jesuit, teacher, and chaplain for a long period of time: 1990–1996, 1998–2002, 2013–present. Based upon my personal experience, I would like to articulate a few characteristics of secularization at Sogang University.

When I began working as a chaplain in February 2019, one of the significant changes I had to cope with was the decline of the staff's authority and expansion of the students' self in the relationship between the students and the staff. In the past the students depended upon the staff's presence and opinions, taking them seriously. The staff were important partly because they represented a religious authority and senior members. However, such dynamics of their relationship appear to change now. The students are nearly in full control of the process of decision-making in a club. There are five clubs in the chaplaincy and various volunteer groups for social service, and the leaders of each group form a steering committee in which they make major decisions for the clubs. There is a staff who accompany the meetings, but they are not involved in the voting process. They are the observers at the meetings and provide some advice and information when necessary.

When the students depended upon the opinions of the staff in the past, the selection criteria tended to be based upon the teachings and values of Christianity, at least, in theory. They might have taken the religious faith and values in a serious manner when they made decisions. Yet, the decline of the staff's influence and the expansion of the students' selfhood has made the selection criteria shift from religious faith to rationality. They resort to the way of rationality on various occasions, and the essential content of the rationality is the sense of fairness. For example, one volunteer group went abroad for social service, and they made a timetable for cooking and washing-up for a couple of weeks. There were around 15 of them, and, inconveniently, a few of them had to sign up one time more than others. But there were no volunteers who were willing to work more than others. They seemed to have got stuck in the sense of equity and could not go beyond that kind of rationality. In a word, there was no idea of sacrifice in their room of equity. While the value of rationality is not contrary to that of Christianity, the idea of sacrifice is a crucial element in Christianity. Rationality without the concept of sacrifice may be a secular virtue, rather than a Christian one.

On top of that, their commitment to the activities of the chaplaincy seem to diminish in terms of quality and quantity. Many of them join more than two clubs, and it seems that the students spend less time on chaplaincy club activities than before. Some staff commented that, for some students, these chaplaincy clubs are not the major ones in that they seem to be more interested in other clubs. At the same time, they are active in

their clubs only for the first two years, which is one of the phenomena in university club activities nowadays. One of the reasons can be found in the social and economic structure of contemporary society. In Korea, getting a job after university has become an extremely difficult task. Job markets are highly competitive. In order to secure their place after graduation, they are expected to make a good plan for the four years of university life. And they spend their last two years at the library of the university, but not in the clubs of the university, preparing for jobs. For these reasons, their commitment to the areas of Christianity in their university life tends to have weakened.

When we see the attendance of the mass, we may find another aspect of secularization. There are a number of masses at Sogang: weekday mass during the semesters, two Sunday Korean masses and one Sunday English mass through the whole year, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Easter Vigil, Christmas Eve, and term-opening masses. In the last few years we have witnessed a considerable decline in mass attendance. In particular, both Sunday Masses and term-opening Masses represent a kind of frustrating reality. In the past, those masses were always crowded with a lot of students. But empty seats are not difficult to find. Given that the University recognizes the opening mass as an official event by cancelling the classes during the mass, it is quite discouraging to see the presence of the people be thinly spread in the pews. In addition, there are more middle-aged adults than students at the Sunday Masses, let alone the low attendance. These phenomena may be a direct example that reflects the people's understanding of, relationship with, or attitude towards, religion.

So far, we have looked at the idea of secularization in Western society and some characteristics of secularization at Sogang University. One of the most significant features of secularization is the decline of religious authority which can be seen in various areas. Particularly, it is noteworthy to be aware that such decline was replaced by the power of rationality. While the people appeal to equity based on rationality, the idea of equity appear to be different from Christian value in that it is a lack of the sense of sacrifice. At the same time, the power of economy or money has become another important factor in secularization. It has been just briefly mentioned that the students tend to commit themselves less to their clubs than before partly because of their preparation for jobs after university, which demonstrates a typical example of how the power of money has become the main concern for contemporary society. Within these contexts of secularization, now it will be discussed the way of how Sogang would become a Jesuit University in a secular age.

There are two main issues in establishing an identity: differentiation, and continuity and becoming. First of all, when we talk about identity, it always presupposes other identities. We may identify ourselves by differentiating ourselves from others. We can say we are Koreans, and this statement is valid only if there are other than Koreans. Second, identity has a dual-aspect, continuity and becoming. Identity should contain an element for continuity in that it needs to "give an account of the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time being the same person as a person identified at another" (Noonan 1991, p. 2). That kind of continuity is static and fundamental in a sense that it hardly changes over time. Yet, identity is becoming

because an identity cannot avoid interacting with others, through which it will be becoming. Accordingly, identity is dynamic as well as static.

Sogang as a Jesuit University has such elements in terms of identity. When we try to articulate the identity of Sogang University, the articulation is essentially based upon differentiation. Sogang may identify itself as a university which aims to pursue its own unique values which are different from others. A group of people from various countries, Jesuit and lay, gathered together in Rome in September 1980 to discuss some significant issues about Jesuit education. Father Pedro Arrupe, then Superior General of the Society, underlined the importance of the distinctive nature of Jesuit education at the end of the meeting by saying that a Jesuit school should be easily identifiable as such. "There are many ways in which it will resemble other schools but if it is an authentic Jesuit school (that is to say if our operation of the school flows out of the strengths drawn from our own specific charism, if we emphasize our essential characteristics and our basic options), then the education which our students receive should give them a certain Ignacianidad, if I can use such a term. I am not talking about arrogance or snobbery, still less about a superiority complex. I simply refer to the logical consequence of the fact that we live and operate out of our own charism. Our responsibility is to provide, through our schools, what we believe God and the church ask of us" (Arrupe 1986, p. 1).

As a follow-up to the gathering, it was decided that the International Commission on the Apostolate of Jesuit Education (ICAJE) would be formed. They had the first meeting in 1982, and they were able to produce the documents, 'The Characteristics of Jesuit Education', (1986) four years later. Referring to the roots of the Jesuit tradition, it tries to illustrate what it means to maintain the Ignatian identity. Later another work was published, 'Ignatian Pedagogy', in 1993. In his address in Georgetown, Fr. General Kolvenbach communicates the fundamental aim of Jesuit education by articulating #167 in detail from 'The Characteristics of Jesuit Education' (1986):

The pursuit of each student's intellectual development to the full measure of God-given talents rightly remains a prominent goal of Jesuit education. Its aim, however, has never been simply to amass a store of information or preparation for a profession, though these are important in themselves and useful to emerging Christian leaders. The ultimate aim of Jesuit education is, rather, that full growth of the person which leads to action – action, especially, that is suffused with the spirit and presence of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Man-for-Others. This goal of action, based on sound understanding and enlivened by contemplation, urges students to self-discipline and initiative, to integrity and accuracy. At the same time, it judges slipshod or superficial ways of thinking unworthy of the individual and, more important, dangerous to the world he or she is called to serve (Kolvenbach 1993, p. 5).

His comments can be divided into two categories, ends and means for Jesuit education. The ultimate goal is to help the students attain 'full growth of the person' rooted in 'the spirit and presence of Jesus Christ' In Fr. Arrupe's words, it means to form "men and women for others". Interestingly, when Father General Sosa visited Sogang University in July 2019, he echoed the sayings of Fr. Arrupe and Fr. Kolvenbach in his speech. Underlining the question of "what it means to be in the Jesuit tradition", he invites us to

reflect on for what purpose the high quality of education at Sogang needs to be maintained. For him, “the real measure of our Jesuit universities lies in who our students become”. Then he argues that “we seek to educate consistent individuals, who are responsible for themselves, for others and for the earth that we all inhabit”. In a nutshell, the crucial aim of Jesuit education, articulated by the three Father Generals, can be summarized as the formation of “men and women for others”, which is based upon evangelical values.

The means for the ends can be described as promoting an ‘excellence’. Even though the goal of Jesuit education is rooted in the values of the gospels, its means does not attempt to indoctrinate the students with them. Jesuit education helps the students achieve their potential by excelling in various ways, the intellectual, academic, and more. Yet it tries to achieve its goal in a bigger context, not a narrow one, in a sense that ‘the process of education takes place in a moral as well as an intellectual framework’. By so doing, we may build the students who are advanced intellectually, developed emotionally in a balanced way, and morally mature. Thus, we need to understand the idea of excellence in a broader way.

Apart from these fundamental unique values, the dynamic of identity is also involved in the process of becoming. While identity needs some unique and static elements for its own continuity as the same and consistent entity, it should be noted that the unique elements of identity have to interact with other identities. The process of such interaction will obviously influence each other in some ways, which can be considered as the idea of becoming. Even though Sogang is supposed to promote the fundamental characteristics of Jesuit education, it should be admitted that it cannot help but follow the values which are prevalent in contemporary Korean society. It seems to be irrational to ignore the rules and values which are set by Korean society, and to stick only to the values of Jesuit education. In other words, there are two value systems at Sogang, the values of Jesuit education and the values of contemporary Korean society.

Indeed, it is an enormous challenge to vision what kind of interaction or relationship the two value systems may develop. Can they be compatible with each other? Or will they contradict each other? Or will they be complementary with each other? One of the consoling ideas is that Vatican II describes the Church as a pilgrim in *Lumen Gentium*. The implication is that the Church on this earth is on her way to the eternal home. Accordingly, she may be exposed to the weakness and limitation of the world. As a pilgrim has to deal with various challenges, the Church as a pilgrim might face them. In that sense, *Lumen Gentium* rightly points out that we are “pilgrims in a strange land” “on earth” (*Lumen Gentium* 1964, p.7). St. Augustine refers to two different kinds of kingdoms, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world. Christians live in the world with dual citizenships of the two kingdoms. In other words, the co-existence of two value systems is unavoidable in which they should face the tensions and conflicts between them. Yet they may reach their final home through such dynamics. Likewise, Sogang University is struggling with two value systems, the values of Jesuit education and the values of contemporary Korean society, and the university is expected to attain its ultimate goal through the tensions and conflicts between them.

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Choi Yoon: A Fragment of a Victim: Restructuring the Life of a Child of an Alcoholic Family

I. Introduction

In modern society, the certainty of life is gradually disintegrating and people often experience “existential anxiety” in their daily lives. Korea has lost the social safety net that existed in traditional society and the transition from rapid economic development to neoliberalism has widened the gap between the rich and poor and exacerbated polarization. Indeed, the country has taken a journey of complex “compressive modernization”, shifting all responsibility to individuals and families without creating a proper system to build a social safety net and social welfare policy. As a result, the rich are able to maintain their stable lives through the social reproduction of class, status, and employment, while the poor face vicious cycles of scarcity, sickness, and suffering from the poverty. Such vicious cycles are passed from one generation to the next, ensuring that people rarely move between social classes.

Meanwhile, in modern society, destructive situations cause many people to experience traumas that cause psychological, mental, and physical shocks. In particular, negative traumas develop into post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), causing sufferers to experience psychological disorders or emotional pain. According to the 2016 National Epidemiological Survey on Mental Illness (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2016, 2017), the lifetime prevalence of PTSD in Korea was about 1.5 % for the entire population – 1.3 % for males and 1.8 % for females. Another 2015 study on PTSD found that approximately 97.3 % of the respondents had experienced intrinsically traumatic events more than once in their lifetimes.

Trauma is often experienced repeatedly and continuously or is deliberately and maliciously provoked by others; such experiences damage individuals’ lives and are accompanied by serious psychological disorders including psychological and emotional pain. In particular, it has been found that the traumatic experiences caused by those with whom sufferers are in close relationships such as parents are more likely to result in PTSD. Individuals’ developmental processes play very important roles in PTSD; thus, the cumulative dynamics in individuals’ lifetimes must be considered. Since traumatic experiences can influence individuals throughout their lives, it is important to examine them from comprehensive and macro perspective that encompasses both individuals and social cultures.

Negative traumatic experiences in the pre-adult stages have major impacts on mental health risks because they affect individuals' overall lives and often cause PTSD. In particular, traumatic events experienced during childhood or in youth have been identified as risk factors that predict drinking behavior and addiction in adulthood. Those who experience more than two negative traumas prior to adulthood have been shown to be 1.4 times more likely succumb to alcoholism than those with no traumatic experiences. In addition, research has shown that children who grow up in families with alcoholism are between four and five times more likely to become alcoholics in adulthood, while both parents and children suffer from addiction in more than 50 % of addicted families. This demonstrates that parents frequently pass their alcoholism on to their children.

In Korea, alcoholism is classified as a chronic mental disease that causes behavioral and psychological disorders and that has the highest lifetime prevalence of any such disease. Alcoholism is defined as "alcohol use disorder" in the DSM-V, the American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic criteria, implying mal-adaptive behavior and symptoms caused by excessive alcohol use. In Korea, alcohol consumption is legal for anyone over the age of 19, and is subject to no additional restrictions or constraints. It is also socially tolerated despite the danger of addiction. Alcoholism typically begins with habitual drinking; developing alcoholics eventually lose control of their drinking behavior, start drinking heavily, and ultimately become reliant on alcohol. Once alcoholism occurs, the addicted system is devastated and it becomes almost impossible to return to one's previous life.

Moreover, alcoholism very often develops into a disease that negatively affects not only alcoholics but also their family members, especially their spouses and children with whom they form close attachments. Therefore, alcoholism has been found to be a familial disease characterized by very close links between addicts and their family members. Previous studies have shown that parents suffering the negative consequences alcoholism cause their partners, children, and other family members to experience negative traumas resulting from various alcohol-related problems such as domestic violence. In addition, research has shown that addiction problems transfer from generation to generation, meaning the children of alcoholics are more likely to suffer from alcoholism.

A growing number of studies in Korea have demonstrated that the negative effects of alcoholism may be experienced as negative traumas by alcoholics, their families, and others close to them; likewise, more and more studies have highlighted the risk of the intergenerational transfer of alcoholism. However, alcoholism continues to be regarded as an individual problem that individuals must solve simply by quitting drinking or undergoing treatment; similarly, the generational inheritance of addiction is still viewed as a problem that family members must solve on their own. Society overlooks the fact that addiction, and especially problems with alcohol, can lead to serious crimes that require social intervention, such as violence, abuse, family breakups, or sexual problems. The 2018 Ministry of Health and Welfare's "Protection of Abused Children"

report noted that significantly meaningful risk predictors exist between alcoholism, violence, and child abuse.

Although alcoholism is a risk factor that exerts a serious negative effect on the lives of individuals and their families, no studies have yet analyzed children growing up in alcoholic families as “victims”. This study employed the narrative research method to examine the life of an alcoholic man who grew up in an alcoholic family. The major events in the life of the study participant, who has lived his entire life to this point as a victim of alcoholism, were chronologically reconstructed using three pillars – time, place, and interaction – to determine what conflicts and circumstances led him to succumb alcoholism. This study is significant because it deals with the experiences of a child victim in an alcoholic family – a subject that has received very little attention in mainstream research on alcoholism in Korea.

II. Literature Review

1. Another View of the “Addicted Family System”

These days, as globalization, inequality, and polarization increase at the global and community levels, the gaps between both socio-economic and labor market classes continue to widen. Those who experience “social exclusion” without being offered “opportunities” to meet the basic needs in their lives may commit crimes or deviate from traditional social norms.

Meanwhile, Bourdieu has shown that differences between economic classes can be passed on via the “symbolic violence” mechanism of unequal social exclusion across different education levels, cultures, and lifestyles. In short, the high-end entertainment cultures enjoyed by the upper economic classes tend to justify the “naturalization of taste”, which the lower classes struggle to keep up with. This is symbolic violence grounded in social exclusion via cultural symbols. However, Bourdieu also emphasized that *habitus*, as strategic mechanisms of social action, are simultaneously habits fixed in the bodies, consciousness, and practices of individuals from a young age, and assets for coping with the social *champ* as total life capacities inherited from the parents. Wealthy families can enjoy various entertainment cultures in daily life by forming *habitus*, and spend time and money engaged in horseback riding, golf, opera, and the like to relieve daily stress. In contrast, socially and economically lower-class families have very limited methods to relieve their burdens, leading to high risks of alcoholism, gambling, addiction, etc., which generate social problems. This shows how parents pass on their own social and cultural capital to their children, a process that can be analyzed as symptom of the social structure.

Based on Bourdieu’s view of class reproduction, the vicious cycle of poverty involves not only the absence of economic capital but also the lack of human, social, and cultural

capital including intelligence and emotion. When we break away from an atomic view that only focuses on the individual and approach the problem of deviation and addiction from a relational perspective, in accordance with the original meaning of human beings, we do not pass the problem on to the individual, but rather discover new responsibilities and identify the common responsibilities embedded in background situations and networks.

2. Trauma and Alcoholism

A number of previous studies have shown that negative traumatic experiences during child development stages are associated with alcoholism in adulthood. In addition, children who experience traumas, such as those associated with parental addiction problems and domestic violence in alcoholic families, have been shown to be more depressed and unstable than children in general households. Such children also tend to experience problems related to alcohol, delinquency, and school mal-adjustment. Studies have reported that when children who experience traumas become adults, they continue to experience addiction-related problems such as alcoholism, game addiction, and other addiction problems.

Research examining the relationship between periods of trauma and adult alcoholism has shown that children who experience negative traumas during childhood start drinking about two years earlier than those who do not experience trauma. Moreover, periods of heavy drinking appear to start earlier for children with such experiences. These results indicate that traumatic experiences significantly affect the age at which individuals start drinking and drinking heavily, implying that the earlier traumatic experiences occur, the sooner drinking problems occur. A study conducted on Korean college students found that experiences of abuse including domestic abuse and violence at a young age impact post-collegiate drinking and interpersonal relationships.

Many studies have shown that negative traumatic experiences during childhood continue to affect people's behaviors, psychology, and emotions throughout the stages of their development, resulting in low self-esteem, behavioral disorders, and addiction problems. These victims will very likely never recover from such problems, leading to other negative consequences. While negative traumatic experiences during the stages of development are significantly related to alcoholism, alcoholism is obviously a result of various factors including parental addiction, family dynamics, sibling relationships, support systems, personal resilience, and the like, rather than a single factor derived from trauma.

3. Alcoholism and Addiction Problems

An alcoholic family is a family with at least one person who is an alcoholic. The behavioral and psycho-emotional problems caused by the alcoholic family are not simple but intertwined with a mixture of family- and alcoholism-related problems. Since families are communities that live in interactive relationships, when one family member becomes an addict, it may adversely affect family relations in part or as a whole. In particular, when living with alcoholic parents, children are at an increased risk of family conflict, violence, abuse, and economic stress from a young age, and grow up without receiving enough attention and care from their parents. They frequently experience fear, anger, and guilt because of their wounds, which are much more frequent and severe than those of their peers.

These children initially express their anger at their parents because of the wounds and internalized problems that result from growing processes, but these feelings lead them to feel personally guilty and ultimately result in physical and psychological illnesses. While they want to escape from domestic violence due to the shame, they feel for their parents' drinking problems, they also feel fear of divorce or abandonment. The representative emotion they experience is "fear". However, they do not express their feelings appropriately to others; instead, they suppress their emotions. These suppressed feelings develop into unhealthy distorted selves, and afterwards they fall into a vicious cycles of psychological conflict characterized by masked "loosing-egos" and no positive relationship experiences even as adults. Moreover, most of these internal problems develop into problems that increase the likelihood that they will inherit their parents' alcoholism. Thus, they come to rely on alcohol, as their parents did.

The generational transfer of alcoholism to the children of alcoholic families is attributable to both genetic and environmental causes. Research regarding genetic factors has shown that children in alcoholic families are between four and five times more likely to become alcoholics than children and adolescents in non-alcoholic families. About 50 % of such children reportedly become alcoholics when they attain adulthood; meanwhile, 30 % marry alcoholic partners, and about 12 % experience mal-adjustment problems in their daily lives. When it comes to environmental causes, dysfunctional families are typical. Negative relationships between parents and children have negative psychological and emotional effects including depression and anxiety, which lead to drinking problems. Most children in alcoholic families do not have adequate parenting to complete developmental tasks, leading to internalized problems and making it difficult for them to grow into mature adults. This fuels unstable environments in which children model drinking behaviors learned from their parents. Individuals who lack the support systems necessary to deal with such environments or life problems risk becoming alcoholics through "the defense mechanism" of solving problems through alcohol.

III. Methodology

1. Understanding Narrative Research

Narrative research begins with the life stories of socially underprivileged individuals. Beyond recording individuals' daily lives, it is the most useful approach to explore and describe the specific experiences of minorities who are socially marginalized and excluded. In addition, such research captures how individuals constantly interact, react, and cope with the societies and environments that surround them, identifies the problems of particular societies, and seeks to identify policies and practices that will solve these problems. Narrative research begins with the narratives that individuals express about their lives and experiences. However, researchers do not simply record study participants' stories; rather, they reconstruct and analyze them in chronological order or by subject. They provide stories that are defined through reconstruction and analysis as a specific narrative type of qualitative research. Narrative research generally seeks to determine the meaning of unique experiences over the course of individuals' lives by focusing on a few stories of one or two people. A narrative can be defined as a phenomenon that encompasses all the actions a person takes in his or her interactions with society, or it can be defined as the research method itself. In other words, narrative research aims to explore and excavate the general meanings embedded in the sediment of meanings that individuals generate through symbolic interactions in social structures.

Not all stories are narrative studies. Narrative research goes beyond simple narratives to encompass specific lives in various contexts, taking into account factors such as the "time" that connects past, present, and future, the "place" that exposes the physical space, and the "interaction" that comprises the relationship between the individual and society. Narrative research emphasizes individuals' ① living, ② telling, ③ re-telling, and ④ re-living. Narrative protagonists tell researchers about their lives, and the researchers and narrative protagonists then apply the process of reflection and inquiry to each experience. Researchers then reconstruct narrative protagonists' experiences within the context of time, place, and interaction to render them into meaningful stories.

2. Participants and Procedures

The narrative protagonist was selected using the repetitive case selection method in which an expert with rich experience in a particular field introduces a protagonist to a researcher. The purpose of this study was explained to social workers who have been working for more than ten years in social welfare institutions for alcoholics, and appropriate research participants were introduced.

To select a suitable narrative protagonist for this study, the researchers applied the following criteria. First, the narrative protagonist had to be a recovering alcoholic who had been diagnosed with DSM-IV-based symptoms of alcoholism in the hospital, treated for addiction, trained to stop drinking, and sober for more than five years. Although different scholars tend to have varying concepts of recovery, the five-year criteria was selected in this study because most previous studies indicate that at least five years are required to recover physically, emotionally, and psychologically after quitting drinking.

The researchers conducted the study with the consent of the selected participant, who clearly stated his intention to participate and was aware of the study's purpose. The data were collected through in-depth interviews, which were conducted throughout the month of August 2018. Interviews lasted an average of about two hours and a total of three interviews took place near the narrative protagonist's workplace. All interviews were recorded with the explicit consent of the narrative protagonist, and the recorded content was transcribed and used as the main source in this research. The interviews consisted of semi-structured open-ended questions that prompted the narrative protagonist to narrate his life story from a subjective perspective, and the questions were asked chronologically with the aim of revealing the whole life cycle phase context in chronological order. The interviews continued until no new data were found and the qualitative data reached the saturation point. In addition, the characteristics of the in-depth interviews were included in the data analysis, as were the narrative protagonist's verbal expressions and non-verbal expressions such as facial expressions, hand gestures, and other gestures.

Table 1: Narrative Protagonist’s Basic Information

Narrative protagonist	Gender	Age	Educational background	Marital status	Children	Subjective social status	Religion	Addiction years (treatment·recovery)	Current job
A	Male	42	Bachelor’s Degree in Social Welfare	Married	one son	Middle	Catholic	ten years (17 years)	Social worker
Addiction recovery resources				Alcohol addiction issues			Family relationship		
Religious life, Addiction rehabilitation facility				Hospitalization due to alcoholism, rants and assaults, theft			Alcoholic father, depressed mother, alcoholic elder brother, delinquent younger sister		

3. Data Analysis

The collected data were analyzed using the narrative research stages proposed by Clandinin and Connelly (2000). The detailed procedures and methods of this approach are as follows. The first stage involves “entering into the field”. Researchers examine protagonists’ stories in an effort to identify details about their life stories and life experiences, ask whether they are suitable for narrative research, and decide how to conduct the research. The second stage is the transition from the field to the “field text”. At the center of the place where the protagonist’s story unfolds, the story is viewed from various angles, and various types of data are collected and recorded. The third stage involves “constructing field text”. The researchers collect and organize contextual information related to the material collected and recorded from the protagonist in various forms. This includes his or her unique experiences, family history, culture, special places, and historical time. The fourth stage is the transition from field text to “study text”. The narrative protagonist’s collected and recorded stories are analyzed and structured based on main elements with specific meanings such as time, place, structure, and scene. The fifth stage involves “constructing research text”. The structured meanings are analyzed again using three axes: “time”, which connects the past, present, and future; “place”, which reveals the physical space; and “interaction”, which concerns the relationship between the individual and society. These meanings are then restructured into the story of the narrative protagonist’s life.

4. Ethical Considerations and Credibility

Since narrative research is based on the subjective stories of research participants, the factual and narrative authenticity of the data must be substantiated. This study was conducted based on the following guidelines, which account for the characteristics of narrative research as well as confidentiality and ethical considerations related to the narrative protagonist. Before the research was conducted, the researchers explained the study's purpose to the protagonist and informed him of his right to withdraw from the study at any time during the research process. Study consent was obtained to start. All interview data were recorded with the consent of the participant, and personal information was anonymized in all of the copied materials out of consideration of the participant's confidentiality and privacy.

Considering the sensitivity of the study, the researchers continuously implemented empirical suspension and return during the interview process to minimize prejudice or bias. Empirical suspension and return involve withholding judgment regarding the occurrence of prejudice and accepting the experiences of participants as they are related. In addition, all personal information related to the narrative protagonist that was collected during the research process was anonymized and kept confidential. The researchers made it clear that they would be responsible for any negligence or intentional disclosure.

The rigor of research refers to the reliability of research outcomes. The researchers took the time to build a sufficient rapport with the narrative protagonist before conducting in-depth interviews to ensure the rigor of the study. The researchers aimed to increase the validity of this study by receiving support and advice from two social workers and one social welfare professor who were experienced with narrative research methodologies and one sociologist who has conducted qualitative research. Although this study had one specific subject, the researchers tried to ensure the validity of their interpretations through cooperation and the application of the triangulation method. In addition, when interpretation-related issues were raised during the study, "in-depth" questions were asked to reconfirm the content.

IV. Findings

1. Life Story of the Narrative Protagonist

A is the main character in this narrative life story. *A* is a 41-year-old man who works as a social worker in the comprehensive social welfare center. *A* was born as the second child of parents who worked in floor and wall covering. *A*'s parents were both from rural areas, and his father earned money by working as a labor-worker after graduating from an elementary school. His mother made money working around the clock at a textile factory in Seoul to pay for her younger brothers' educations. Both of them met in difficult circumstances and said that they became a family without romance. *A* has a brother who is one year older and a sister who is two years younger. *A* remembered that his brother, the first child, always got new clothes, shoes, etc., and that because his sister was a girl, his parents had no choice but to buy her new items during hardship. As a result, *A* inherited his brother's old belongings. *A* said that his parents often had to leave their home to go on local business trips and that he had more memories of his sister than of his older brother. *A* went to the same elementary and middle school and tutoring classes as his younger sister, and in the middle of his second year of middle school, he drank for the first time because of his girlfriend, who he got to know through his sister.

A first started drinking in the middle of his second year of middle school, and after that, the frequency of his drinking and periods of drunkenness increased. Drinking after school became a daily routine. The family knew that *A* was drinking, but nobody was concerned, and *A* eventually started drinking every day, which made his school life increasingly messy. *A* barely went to vocational high school, but his high school life was followed by drinking every day. After graduation from high school, *A* entered a local college in the region. As an adult, he was able to drink freely, and from then on, he developed a new problem of "alcohol-related violence". As a result of repeated verbal abuse and violence, his interpersonal relationships became increasingly problematic and he developed a victim mentality, causing him to avoid social interaction. *A* felt himself changing and chose alcohol as an alternative to passively regaining confidence and eventually came to rely on alcohol.

A experienced alcohol withdrawal symptoms unintentionally when he was 21 years old because he had to fulfill the military service requirement. His abnormal behavior led him to be reassigned within the military, but he was eventually diagnosed as being unable to live a normal life. After his discharge, *A*'s alcohol dependence worsened. At this point, *A*'s family started taking his drinking problem seriously. Family intervention, which had not occurred before, began, and *A* spent four years entering and leaving the alcohol hospital (psychiatric hospital) for alcohol treatment. Although the repeated hospitalizations dulled his hope that he could receive effective treatment and recover, *A* eventually placed his faith in the hospital where he was admitted and managed to begin

his life as a recovering addict. During the recovery process, he had the opportunity to enter college again, where he pursued his dream of becoming a social worker so that he could help other alcoholics and alcoholic families. A has now started graduate school and is growing academically. A few years ago, he became independent from his family, became a father, and started his own family.

Table 2: The Narrative Protagonist’s Life Story Reconstructed Around the Experience of Violence

Reconstructed Research Text	Time (continuity)	Place (physical space)	Interaction
Shadow of despair and fear: a wounded child	Childhood	home	– Family (parents, siblings)
A boy who wanted to be loved and leaned: a delinquent child	Childhood, adolescent period	home, school	– Family (parents, siblings) – Friend of opposite sex
The self that wanted to hide: a kidult hiding behind alcohol	College student, military service	school, army, social society	– Friends, society, family
The reflection in the mirror: a kidult facing himself	hospital admission, discharge	home, hospital	– Family (parents) – Society (doctor, nurse, police officer, social worker)
Parents’ shadows that won’t disappear: a kidult carrying the burden of life	present	Home (family of origin)	– Parents, siblings
The deep-rooted tree: a wounded healer	present	– home (after marriage) – work, school, religious life	– Family (wife, child) – Colleagues, friends, society

Source: Analysis framework: Clandinin & Connelly 2000.

2. The Narrative Protagonist's Life Story Reconstructed Around Violence

A. Shadow of Despair and Fear: A Wounded Child

A's childhood was economically difficult. Since *A* was young, his father earned a living through hard physical labor, over a long period of time and without proper training. His father coped with this hardship by drinking every day and lamented his family. As he sought to alleviate the physical exhaustion resulting from heavy physical labor by drinking alcohol, he committed violent acts against his family members and acted as he wished. In addition, as *A*'s father's drunkenness and violence continued, his mother also broke things and became verbally violent.

After six o'clock, I didn't really want to be home if my father didn't come home. When he came in after drinking, he would wake us up, swearing and throwing things. It was just the beginning. After an hour or so, our mother's lines of defense would break and we all had to get up. He would make us take off all our clothes and hit us with a belt. We couldn't sleep again until he hit us with the belt and released his anger.

When my dad was drunk at night and became violent, my mother would start from the morning. My father said he couldn't remember anything because of the alcohol, but my mother would get angry with anyone who said they didn't remember. What would you do if I talked about the past? Even if she got angry in the morning, this did not relieve her temper and eventually she threw everything and tore my clothes.

My mother nagged my father and asked him why he had been drunk. I should have been angry at my father who beat me the night before, but I got angry at my mother and thought, "Why is mom saying that to dad?", "What she is doing doesn't help and will only lead to more beatings, so why does she do it?"

Between an alcoholic father and a mother who could not control her feelings due to depression, *A*'s life involved constant anxiety. Evenings and nights, especially after his parents had returned home from work, were a time of torture in which he had to endure his father's violence, verbal abuse, and parental conflict. While *A* tried to understand that his father had been struggling all his life and was suffering from loneliness because of his hard life, he greatly feared his father when he had been drinking. Although these events occurred a long time ago, *A* could still remember times in his childhood when his father had been drinking and returned with rods, which happened repeatedly and was a living hell.

B. A Boy Who Wanted to Be Loved and Leaned: A Delinquent Child

This examination of the development of the narrative protagonist revealed no conversations or experiences that made *A* feel loved or recognized by parents at home. *A* recalled that his parents had no interest in his school life, friendships, grades, or future hopes. In *A*'s memory, his father only drank and his mother was dissatisfied with life and tired of work. *A* wanted his parents' attention, but their reactions were always lukewarm. Even when *A* made mistakes, he was never scolded. *A* longed for his parents' love, but no one responded.

When I was in the first grade of elementary school, I just wanted to be praised by my mom. I went to the same tutoring class as my sister, but she got a red belt first and received a trophy. So I worked very hard. The next month I won a trophy; on the day I got the trophy, I just ran with it and boasted to my mom. I wanted to be praised. But my mom told me to go away. Maybe she was busy at work. I was heartbroken.

I had a girlfriend for the first time in the second year of middle school. I was so excited to have a girlfriend one year older than me. I thought I could talk to someone about everything for the first time. So I did everything as she said. That led to my first drink. I didn't even think that she was bad at the time.

A was neglected by his parents, but in school he was a cheerful child who impersonated celebrities from popular TV shows in front of his friends. *A* acquired his first girlfriend through the introduction of his younger sister in his second year of middle school. He said that he felt loved for the first time in his life. *A* began drinking with this girlfriend and continued doing so that year, eventually getting to the point where he drank alcohol every day. However, nobody scolded *A*, and he naturally became accustomed to the habit of drinking as an adolescent. Although he was a young boy who needed love and attention, he became increasingly addicted to alcohol without being aware of himself.

C. The Self Who Wanted to Hide: A Kidult Hiding Behind Alcohol

Once he entered college, *A* could drink alcohol as he wished; he became increasingly anxious about meeting people and developed the strange habit of being excessively aware of others. In addition, drinking alcohol often led him to engage in violent behavior and verbal abuse, which had not been the case before, so he increasingly drank alone.

I don't remember anything at all, but when I drink alcohol, I swear, pick fights, and punch people. I still don't remember any of those incidents. It's because people say it is. When I think I have done so, I get more and more anxious meeting people. So

later, I went out drinking before even going out to meet people. Just drink a bottle of soju and go out. That eased my nerves. I once had an evening drink with my friends, but I drank before going. So my friends smelled the alcohol me and said, "Hey! Were you already drinking before you came out to drink?" I was so surprised that I lied saying my cousin had died and I had drinks at his funeral.

I was so worried that I could not live without alcohol. My hands trembled a lot. I was really nervous, so everyone could see it. If I wanted to shake hands when I was outside with my friends, I went to the bathroom, drank, and went out again. So I always ripped the inside of the clothes and carried around a milder alcohol because the strong ones smell too strong. When I didn't drink alcohol at home, I was so nervous that I couldn't even watch TV, so I always kept it hidden.

For A, alcohol was a tool for overcoming anxiety. However, A did not face and accept the reality of becoming an alcoholic who lives only when he relies on alcohol. As such, A became a person who concealed himself and cheated. At age 21, the symptoms of A's alcoholism began to fully surface. When he began his military service, A, who at that point was drinking alcohol every day, underwent withdrawal symptoms because he had to abruptly stop drinking. The military simply reassigned him, thinking that A could not adapt to the environment. He was reassigned to the PX (군대), which is the only place in the military that handles ingredients, and he began to drink again after a few months. A then finished his military life due to his hardship.

A also drank alcohol on the day of his illness discharge. All of A's memories are associated with alcohol: his family and parents, his first love, his friends, his school days (middle and high school, university life), and his military life are all closely linked with alcohol in his mind. After he was discharged from the military, A's life stagnated because he was unable to move forward. As a result of his discharge, A's family members realized that A had alcohol problems. Thereafter, he was hospitalized more than 30 times for alcohol-related problems; for example, he was forcibly hospitalized after binge drinking and becoming completely incapacitated. Although he vowed not to drink alcohol again, he went in and out of the hospital repeatedly for four years. While his repeated admissions to and discharges from the hospital made him more aware of his alcohol problem, he simultaneously became increasingly resentful and angry toward his family.

D. The Reflection in the Mirror: A Kidult Facing Himself

A ultimately became a believer in the final hospital he was admitted to and there he managed to fully commit to quitting drinking. He was admitted to countless hospitals across the country and went through various addiction treatment programs, but the more he was treated, the more he thought about drinking outside the hospital. Through social workers, he found out about a social rehabilitation facility for alcoholics that allowed them to be hospitalized at home instead of receiving inpatient treatment. After

he was discharged, he went to the social rehabilitation facility and began the alcoholism recovery program.

I was told by a social worker that alcoholics could do things like home treatment programs. So before I was discharged, I went to the office and asked my social worker to give me the phone number there. Then, as soon as I was discharged, I called. I was discharged there for a year. I went there and quit drinking.

There was a treatment program in which you think back to your childhood and relive those experiences from your parents' perspectives. You recall those days through meditation. When I went back, I realized that my father had an alcohol problem. I didn't like beatings back then, and now I learned that it was because my father was an alcoholic.

A did not face and acknowledge his inner issues in a state of forced hospitalization. As he began his outpatient treatment in a flexible environment, he walked the path of recovery by confronting his inner wounds and family problems. The addiction treatment program helped him to recognize that he was an alcoholic and bolstered his commitment to break and recover from the vicious cycle of alcoholism. He came to acknowledge that his alcoholic father, whom he always denied and resented, was part of him. A sought to free himself from his younger heart, which was stagnant and undeveloped due to the wounds he suffered growing up in an alcoholic family. At the same time, during his recovery from alcoholism, he was desperate to recover from the wounds his family had caused him. As a result, he sought to let go of his resentment toward his parents and cultivated the hope that they would care for themselves as victims. Now he is trying to take care of himself, shake off his pain, and recover.

E. Parents' Shadows that Won't Disappear: A Kidult Carrying the Burden of Life

Psychological injuries and attachment issues often accompany addiction problems. As with physical wounds, if left untreated, they will rot or swell. However, despite such similarities, the pain caused by psychological wounds and the time and responses required to recover from them differ because psychological wounds are relative. A walked the path of recovery in an addiction recovery program at a social rehabilitation facility for one year. While he believed that he had been unloved since his childhood, he realized that he was actually experiencing love. Thus, acknowledging and confronting his wounds and problems helped him become increasingly free from alcoholism.

Other patients' families visited once a month, but my family never came. At that time, I thought that my family had abandoned me altogether. (Omitted) Later, I went to the hospital during my recovery phase. It's a private hospital, so the staff

stayed there for years. There was a kiosk, and when the family members put their money in, the patients bought snacks or whatever they needed. I told a staff member that my family never visited. Then he said that I knew nothing about it. My mom came here once every few weeks, put some money in, and sneaked around. Once, my mom was secretly looking at me and he asked why she didn't meet in person. Then she said, "When he sees me, he can't handle it. He'll run out to drink again. So don't tell him I'm here". But if you think about it now, I was able to buy snacks because somebody came in and put money in. Back then, however, I didn't think about it.

My mom always tells me that a child is the price she made in her previous life, and she always accepted me as her fate and told me that because I am her child, she has no choice but to accept me. But how could her heart be so torn? Actually, my brother hasn't married yet and has started showing alcohol problems. Both her husband and son went through the same alcohol problem, so she must be distressed. But she keeps telling me that she was just born that way and can't help it.

Most alcoholics experience unhealthy interactions in their parent-child or family relationships that follow them throughout their lives like shadows, leading them to develop certain needs and project resentment. Although *A* thought he was useless to the world, unloved, and a loser who had been broken by alcohol, his parents and family were always there waiting to give him support. His family proved to be instrumental to his recovery from addiction, remaining by *A*'s throughout this crisis. Nevertheless, *A* also harbored resentment because he believed his family had caused him to become an alcoholic. *A* recognized that he loved his family and that his family loved him, but at the same time he decried his parents for neglecting and hurting him and passing on alcoholism. Still, he never disowned them or separated from his family, and they continue to rely on each other to this day.

F. The Deep-Rooted Tree: A Wounded Healer

A repeatedly entered and left the hospital and unconsciously envied nurses and social workers who were the same age as him. He denied the reality of his alcoholism and tried to identify with them, but in reality he was an alcoholic. Once he started college, the past became meaningless and alcohol ruined his life. Through the addiction recovery process, *A* grew up buried with a victim mentality as a victim in an alcoholic family and resumed his life suspended as a young self. In search of the dreams and hopes he gave up when he was little, he chose a new life and sought to broaden his horizons. With the support of those surrounding him, he made every effort to go back to college and began pursuing a career in social work after graduation.

I told a nun that I really wanted to study and become a social worker. At that time, I had been going to the recovery program for a year and therapy during the day, and I worked in a convenience store at night to overcome my alcohol cravings. There weren't many people in the convenience store at night, so I studied at that time. I just told them that I would continue to be a social worker. Even though the program is over, I am still talking like that, so the sister recommended me and I eventually entered a small college in the province.

Addicts have something called an addiction tendency. Even though I can do things independently, I rely on others habitually to solve my problems. I think that's what's missing in my mind, and this leads to addiction. For me, it was someone of the opposite sex, like my mom or girlfriend. I still believe that the Holy Mother hugged me. And I believe that she still loves me so much. I can't say it, but I can be sure I believe it.

A embraces his wounds completely and has taken up the life of a healer to try to help those who, like him, suffer from alcoholism replace their dependence or addiction with new and greater self-realization. *A* is a wounded healer who has not yet closed his wounds. Rather, he sublimates his deepest pains and wounds to foster dynamic relationships through which he commits to the healing and recovery of others.

A person's character is formed cumulatively through the family and societal relationships he or she experiences throughout his or her entire life. In addition, people grow and develop through constant interactions with others in the social structures and environments that embrace them. Growing up as a child in an alcoholic family, *A* suffered wounds from neglect and a lack of care and love, which eventually caused his father's alcoholism to pass on to him. And now, like a tree whose roots have been hardened by wounds, he extends the branches of his vital relationships and lives the life of a recovering addict

V. Discussion and Social Work Implications

This study reconstructed the life of a male recovering alcoholic who grew up in an alcoholic family as a victim of intergenerational inheritance of alcoholism. Although the nature of qualitative research and the limitations of single-participant studies make generalizations from this study's results difficult, this research highlights the typical characteristics of alcoholism that are transmitted from one generation to the next. This study is significant because it provides an in-depth view of the dynamics embedded in alcoholic families. Using the narrative research method, this study analyzed the narrative protagonist's story and investigated his experience as a victim of an alcoholic family. It also applied the constructs of "time", "space", and "interaction" to reconstruct the life of the victim. This study ultimately analyzed the narrative protagonist's life in a chronological sequence based on the following themes: "the shadow of loneliness and

fear”, “the boy who wanted to be loved and to rely”, “the self who wanted to hide”, “the reflection in the mirror”, “parents’ shadows that won’t disappear”, and “the deep-rooted tree”.

This study’s findings have implications for social welfare practices and social policies focused on victims of alcoholism. First, intervention is necessary for alcoholic families. The narrative protagonist’s alcoholism had roots in his father’s alcoholism and his mother’s depression. In fact, parents in alcoholic families often do not provide adequate care and emotional support for their children, and adolescents who are supported by their parents rarely develop drinking problems. However, drinking behaviors increase when parents provide inadequate emotional support. Research has shown that parental discipline and care affect children’s drinking behaviors. Intervention in familial alcoholism is not easy, but to the extent possible it needs to be based on the formation of safety nets that encompass official and unofficial support systems centering on sensitive mental health and addiction social workers; such safety nets can help alcohol-addicted families cultivate their intended functions.

Second, there is a need for various support systems at the community level to support child victims of alcoholic households. The unfulfilled internal desire to be loved and recognized by others and the problem of deep-rooted emptiness can cause individuals to develop strong attachments to and over dependence on substances that are easily at hand in reality. This psychological mechanism can initiate alcohol addiction because alcohol is an easily depended-on substance. A closer examination of addiction reveals a phenomenon deeply related to attachment. In addition, when wounds or desires are unstable in childhood attachment figures, they constantly seek for something that they can depend on and cling to, and try to replace their unfilled emptiness with substances. Children with unmet physiological needs who lack the safety, sense of belonging, friendship, and intimacy necessary to enjoy life will experience an emptiness that will remain unfulfilled for the rest of their lives. This happens when they are exposed to indifference, violence, or neglect due to their parents’ addiction problems at times when they need protection and care. Various forms of supportive interventions that can be implemented at the community level should be considered to help children in alcoholic families escape the traps created by their parents, grow into healthy adults, and avoid developing addictions.

Third, public sector involvement in alcohol consumption is required. In Korea, because alcohol use is relatively unrestricted, the problems it causes at the macro level such as addiction, violence, abuse, family breakup, and sexual problems are often overlooked. Therefore, societal intervention is needed; public policy, as manifested in social policies and legal systems, needs to be publicly discussed, and appropriate social safety nets and protection systems need to be established. However, such systems are not yet available in Korea. In the United States, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) plan was implemented from 2011 to 2014, establishing addiction and mental health services for individuals, families, communities, and the nation as a whole. These national programs in the public sector have increased opportunities to promote the health of those who are politically excluded or

economically vulnerable, and have provided opportunities for them to integrate into society. Korea also needs to take a different approach. Instead of forcing alcoholics to be treated in alcohol hospitals (psychiatric hospitals) and criminalizing them for their issues with violence, appropriate public policy interventions that enable them to return to society and lead healthy lives need to be established.

Fourth, social awareness about alcoholism needs to be bolstered. Alcoholism can cause alcoholics, their families, and the people around them to experience negative traumas. This is a societal problem and there is a high likelihood that it will pass on to subsequent generations. As a result, it requires caution on the parts of families. However, alcoholism in Korea is simply regarded as an individual problem that needs to be solved by quitting drinking or through treatment. Furthermore, the inheritance of alcoholism is widely considered a problem that family members must solve. Examinations of the dynamics of alcoholic families have revealed that parents and children are both victims and that they both have two sides: carrying a yoke and shared sorrow and pain. In alcoholic families, children grow up as victims due to the abuse they suffer at the hands of their addicted parents. However, they also often inherit their parents' addictions and eventually become abusers as adults. Ultimately, a transfer of roles occurs. In this respect, although alcoholism is a risk factor with severe negative impacts on the lives of individuals and families, the children of alcoholic families are rarely viewed as victims. Society sees them simply as alcoholics, violent abusers, and perpetrators. Now is the time to regard them with sensitivity as victims in society and to lead them to heal their wounds and overcome their addictions.

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Socialization, Society, and Identity

Klaus Brummer: Institutions, Socialization, and Identity The Operational Code of Javier Solana as NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative

Abstract

This chapter seeks to establish whether the transition of Javier Solana from Secretary General of NATO to the post of High Representative for Common and Security Policy of the European Union (EU) led to changes in his identity (operationalized through his political beliefs), as could be expected based on a reading of the literature on agent socialization in international institutions. Employing Operational Code Analysis (OCA), which is a well-established tool from the field of Foreign Policy Analysis, to discern the political beliefs of decision makers, a total of 60 of Solana's speeches are analyzed. Contrary to what is expected in the socialization literature, the empirical analysis shows that Solana's political beliefs remained virtually identical despite his transition from the world's premier military alliance, NATO, to the 'normative power' EU. This finding suggests that the process of socialization in top-level international bureaucrats might be limited to the behavioral domain rather than affecting who they essentially are.

I. Introduction

In 1999, after four years as Secretary General of NATO (1995–1999), Javier Solana took over the newly established post of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) (1999–2009). Thus, after serving as the top civil servant of the world's premier military alliance, Solana became the main representative of an organization that is commonly labelled as a 'normative power' (Manners 2002; Whitman 2011), 'civilian power' (Duchêne 1973), or 'ethical power' (Aggestam 2008). Thus, this chapter asks whether the transition from NATO to the EU influenced Solana's identity, understood as "who a person is, or the qualities of a person or group that make them different from others" (Cambridge Dictionary 2020).

There can be no doubt that NATO and the EU are markedly different institutions, which in turn should have implications for the bureaucrats working for them and 'who

they are' (i.e. their identity). More specifically, the literature on agent socialization by international institutions assumes that agents internalize the norms and rules of their institution, which should lead not only to adaptations in their behavior but possibly also in their identities and beliefs. By extension, this means that agents working for one institution and then for another should exhibit changes in their identity as a result of being socialized into a second discreet environment. Hence, in Solana's case the expectation would be that his beliefs had changed following his transition from NATO to the EU. This chapter seeks to establish whether such changes actually occurred and, if so, how far-reaching they actually were.

Against this background, this chapter uses the example of Javier Solana's transition from the military alliance NATO to the 'civilian power' EU to explore two interrelated questions: First, whether Solana experienced identity change after moving from one institutional environment to a markedly different institutional environment; and second, how deep any such changes actually ran in terms of adaptation, superficial socialization, or fundamental socialization (Checkel 2005; He and Feng 2015). The case of Solana could be considered a "most-likely case" (George and Bennett 2005, p. 123) for identity change to occur given the stark differences that exist in terms of norms, values, etc. between a military alliance on the one hand and a civilian power on the other.

To operationalize 'who a person is', thus, a person's identity and possible changes therein, this chapter employs Operational Code Analysis (OCA), which is a frequently used analytical approach for profiling leaders in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (George 1969; Walker et al. 1998; Brummer 2016; Brummer 2021). This 'at-a-distance' technique relies on verbal statements by the persons under examination (Schafer 2000) to ascertain their political beliefs, hence 'who they are' in terms of their diagnosis of the political universe as well as their approach to action. Accordingly, the empirical analysis presented in this chapter is based on a total of 60 statements (comprising some 100 000 words) by Javier Solana, which have been drawn from the websites of NATO and the EU respectively. Those statements are analyzed by employing the OCA coding scheme as contained in the automated content analysis program *Profiler Plus*. In so doing, it follows a study of He and Feng (2015), who have also traced socialization processes based on actors' political beliefs, i.e. their operational codes. However, rather than looking at the socialization of state leaders (i.e. three Chinese presidents) into multilateral institutions, this chapter explores this connection with respect to transition processes between international institutions.

Contrary to what might be expected, the empirical analysis shows that Solana's political beliefs remained virtually identical despite his transition from NATO to the EU. This finding suggests that socialization processes of agents by international institutions might not be 'all the way down'. While such processes might affect the agents' behavior through the internalization of, and subsequent compliance with, the institution's norms and rules, such processes might not affect 'who the agents are', hence their identity.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, it engages with the literature on agent socialization by international organizations. Next, the chapter introduces core assumptions of OCA. The chapter then establishes key differences

between NATO and the EU and develops propositions for how Solana's operational code should have changed following his transition from NATO to the EU, resulting from those differences. The subsequent section discusses the method and data employed in this chapter, followed by the presentation and discussion of the empirical results. The concluding section briefly summarizes the argument and points to avenues for future research.

II. Socialization through institutions

In the literature on international relations, socialization processes have been studied from different angles. On the macro level, pertaining to state socialization, studies have examined, for instance, how states are socialized into the international system or regional sub-systems (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2000; Flockhart 2006; Thies 2013) or how international norms are socialized into domestic practices (e.g. Risse et al. 1999, 2013; Kelley 2004). On the micro level, pertaining to individual agent socialization, studies have discussed how international institutions socialize individual policymakers. For instance, Gheciu (2005) examines NATO's efforts, after the end of the Cold War, to socialize the Czech Republic and Romania, and argues that the organization successfully taught liberal-democratic norms to the national elites of those newly independent countries, which affected not only the agents' behavior but at times even their identities. In a similar vein, Freyburg (2015) discussed the socialization of Moroccan officials into democratic governance, particularly through the EU twinning program.

The question of the socialization of individual agents has been pursued most prominently in the literature on the European Union (for a critical assessment see Beyers 2010). For instance, Hooghe (1999, 2005, 2012) discovers only limited evidence for socialization processes to occur within the European Commission, especially among the most senior officials. On the other hand, Suvarierol (2011) as well as Murdoch et al. (2019) find more support for the latter as a result of the continued daily exposure of Commission officials, from the lower as well as the higher levels of the institution, to its norms and rules. Studies by Beyers (2005) and Lewis (2005) focus on the member-state side of the EU, namely on Council working groups and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Both argue that socialization processes of member-state representatives occur in those intergovernmental institutional settings which, however, complement rather than replace the official's national identity. Focusing on Czech civil servants dealing with the country's accession to the EU, Drulák et al. (2003) argue that particularly those officials with more exposure to the organization were socialized into the European system of governance.

A study by Trondal et al. (2008) links the Commission and the member states of the EU by examining the socializing power of the former on seconded officials from among national civil servants (see also Murdoch and Geys 2012). The authors find only limited support, most notably for longer-lasting effects of socialization on this particular type of

official. Recently, scholars have started to ask whether an esprit de corps is developing within the nascent European External Action Service (EEAS), whose officials come from different units of origin (i.e. the Commission, the Council, and the member states), but found little evidence for this to happen (Juncos and Pomorska 2014). Finally, Scully's (2005) study of socialization processes in the European Parliament shows that while such processes do occur in this institution they do not – as usually expected – lead to a more pro-integration stance on part of the parliamentarians. Therefore, he cautions against ascribing too much importance to the institutional socialization of decision makers (see also Scully et al. 2012).

This chapter also focuses on the micro level by examining the effects that international institutions have on individual agents. The focus is on top international bureaucrats and thus on the institutions' 'own' agents. More precisely, the chapter asks how deep agent socialization processes actually run. That is, whether the internalization of norms and rules of an international institution by an agent affects not only the behavioral dimension – typically perceived as being the main effect of socialization – but extends beyond that by altering an agent's political beliefs as well.

The underlying assumption of the socialization literature is that international institutions have the ability to socialize individual agents into their norms and rules. In the process, agents 'develop a sense of belonging within a group' and, thus, become "member(s) of collectivities" (Beyers 2010, p. 909). What is more, by internalizing the norms and rules of an institution, agents will start acting in accordance with them. Importantly, such behavior is not based on rational calculation but rather on the agent's belief in the appropriateness of adhering to the norms and rules of the organization. Checkel (2005, p. 804) summarizes socialization processes and their effects as follows:

"(I)t is defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions".

More specifically, Checkel (2005, pp. 804–5) distinguishes between two different types of socialization processes. While both types are based on a 'logic of appropriateness' (March and Olsen 1998), they differ in the reasons agents behave appropriately. On the one hand, type I socialization (or internalization) refers to agents complying with the norms and rules of an institution without necessarily buying into them. Having acquired knowledge of the kind of behavior that is expected, agents simply play along by engaging in the given type of behavior. On the other hand, in type II socialization (or internalization) agents believe that the institution's norms and rules are right and, therefore, should be followed. What is important to note here is that the effects of type II socialization processes are not necessarily limited to the behavioral domain. Whilst the literature is not really specific as to which more fundamental aspects

of an agent might be affected, it is being suggested that internalization processes could run as deep as transforming an agent's identity, values, world view, and/or beliefs (Checkel 2005, pp. 802, 808; Beyer 2010, p. 913; Saurugger 2013, p. 894).

Building on as well as extending Checkel's work, He and Feng (2015) have developed a 'three-stage model' of socialization. Studying the extent to which recent Chinese presidents have taken on the norms and values that are associated with multilateral institutions and cooperation, they label the three stages 'adaptation', 'superficial socialization', and 'fundamental socialization'. Adaptation is based on actors' strategic calculations. It suggests that while actors indeed adhere to certain norms, values, etc., they do so temporarily and situation-specific on the basis of cost-benefit calculations, following a 'logic of consequentialism' (March and Olsen 1998). As a result, actors' interests and preferences remain the same. In turn, superficial socialization (similar to Checkel's type I) follows a logic of appropriateness. While actors' interests and preferences remain unchanged as well (like with 'adaptation'), they now do "engage in conscious role-playing to meet the social expectations of a given setting or community" (He and Feng 2015, p. 405), and they do so for extended periods of time. Finally, fundamental socialization (similar to Checkel's type II) definitely leads to change in the preferences and interests of actors as well as their identities.

Overall, whilst the socialization literature places emphasis on the internalization of an institution's norms and rules by individual agents, and on subsequent compliance by the agents with them, it does allow for even more fundamental changes that affect who the agents in fact are. This leaves us with the analytical challenge as to how to ascertain whether an actor's identity or beliefs have actually changed as a result of socialization/internationalization processes. In this sense, Beyers (2010, p. 913) argues that "Socialization is difficult to operationalize, but the most complex part is without any doubt 'internalization', as it is tremendously hard to identify tangible observational implications as valid indicators of internalization". Like He and Feng (2015) this chapter addresses the challenge of operationalizing and 'measuring' changes in actors' interests and identities by drawing on Operational Code Analysis (OCA), to which the discussion now turns.³

³ To be clear: The analytical goal of this chapter is not to establish whether Solana acted in compliance with the norms and rules of NATO during his stint as Secretary General and later of the EU when serving as the High Representative for CFSP. Nor does the chapter seek to establish what specific mechanisms of socialization (Johnston 2001, pp. 496-506; Checkel 2005, p. 808-816) might have occurred in Solana's case. Rather, what is being examined is whether Solana's identity has changed after his transition to the EU and how deep any such changes possibly ran.

III. Operational Code Analysis

OCA starts from the assumption that “beliefs matter” (Walker 2003, p. 275) for the analysis of foreign policy. The beliefs of decision makers strongly influence their policy preferences, and, thus, affect a country’s foreign policy decisions and actions. Accordingly, Walker and Schafer refer to beliefs “as causal mechanisms with steering effects (...) (T)he decision maker is *steered* by his/her system of beliefs in the identification of options, ends/means calculations, and choice of action” (Walker and Schafer 2006, pp. 5–6; emphasis in the original).

OCA originated in the 1950s, when Leites (1951) tried to discern the political beliefs of Soviet decision makers and the implications that they had for Soviet foreign policy. In the late 1960s George (1969) narrowed the concept’s focus by targeting exclusively on the cognitive elements of Leites’s original work. George (1969, p. 191) defined operational codes as:

“a set of general beliefs about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the problem of action (...) They serve (...) as a prism that influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his definitions and estimates of particular situations. These beliefs also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action”.

More specifically, George grouped the political beliefs of decision makers into two categories (table 1). On the one hand, philosophical beliefs refer to decision makers’ assumptions on the fundamental nature of politics. They are, thus, crucial for the definition of a given situation. On the other hand, instrumental beliefs relate to decision makers’ beliefs about ends-means relationships when it comes to action in the political realm. Hence, they are crucial for the selection of the appropriate responses or instruments for the situation at hand.

Table 1: Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

Philosophical Beliefs	
P-1	What is the 'essential' nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?
P-2	What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P-3	Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4	How much 'control' or 'mastery' can one have over historical development? What is one's role in 'moving' and 'shaping' history in the desired direction?
P-5	What is the role of 'chance' in human affairs and in historical development?
Instrumental Beliefs	
I-1	What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2	How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3	How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4	What is the best 'timing' of action to advance one's interest?
I-5	What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Source: Own depiction based on George (1969).

For the purpose of this chapter, the following two conceptual questions pertaining to operational code analyses are the most pertinent (for more details see Walker et al. 1998, 2005; Walker and Schafer 2006). First, are operational codes stable or do they change over time? Second, what are the best sources for identifying the operational codes of decision makers?

As regards the issue of stability or change, a shift within the operational code literature is discernible. Earlier work assumed that the political beliefs of decision makers, and, thus, their operational codes were largely stable and might even take on "a doctrinal character" (George 1969, p. 217). Even at that time, though, George assumed that beliefs could change under certain conditions, such as major historical events (George 1969, pp. 218–220).

More recently, the assumption that operational codes are amenable to change – in the presence of new knowledge, for instance – has become the dominant point of view in the operational code literature. In this sense, Walker et al. (1998, p. 176) now refer to operational codes as a decision maker's 'set of alternative 'states of mind''. This claim has been substantiated in empirical studies. For instance, Walker and Schafer (2000) analyzed the operational code of US President Lyndon B. Johnson in the course of the escalation of the Vietnam War between November 1964 and July 1965, and showed that his operational code exhibited statistically significant changes in more than half of the

dimensions (e.g. P-3, P-4, and I-3). In a similar vein, Renshon (2008) divided US President George W. Bush's tenure in several stages and also established statistically significant changes in his operational code, especially pertaining to Bush's philosophical beliefs. In short, the operational codes, and, thus, the political beliefs, of decision makers can change, and they can do so even within a rather short period of time.

With an eye to the issue of source material, there is an ongoing discussion in the operational code literature as to which types of verbal statement are best suited to discern a leader's political beliefs. There seems to be agreement that private as well as spontaneous statements (e.g. confidential exchanges with advisors) contain the most genuine representations of a political leader's beliefs and are, thus, to be preferred (Schafer 2000, pp. 514–516). However, in many instances statements of this type are not (or not yet) available, particularly if one is examining leaders that are still in office or have left office only recently. In such cases, there is little alternative but to draw on public statements which, more often than not, have been prepared in advance (such as speeches before parliament, etc.).

Yet, for at least three reasons, public as well as prepared verbal statements can be considered viable sources for identifying the operational codes of decision makers. First, operational code studies that deliberately compared leaders' beliefs based on both public and private statements found no significant differences. Both Marfleet (2000) and Renshon (2009) examined the public and private beliefs of US President John F. Kennedy. While Marfleet found some differences during the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy's public and private beliefs, nonetheless, pointed in the same general direction. Renshon's study also established that the president's public and private beliefs had been virtually identical in the months prior to the crisis. In line with Renshon's (2009, p. 654) suggestion that, particularly in non-crisis situations, public and private beliefs are likely to be more or less identical, the present study is confident of the validity of generating Solana's operational code using public statements since most of them were made in non-crisis contexts.

A second justification for using public speeches would be that 'a leader's public behavior is constrained by his public image and that, over time, his public actions will consistently match his public beliefs' (Walker et al. 2005, p. 223). Hence, although a leader's public speeches might not at first mirror his genuine beliefs, being rather part of such objectives as 'impression management' (Tetlock and Manstead 1985), the assumption is that public statements and public action will eventually match, not least due to the expectation of the public that leaders practice what they preach.

Finally, on the issue of spontaneous versus prepared speeches, one could argue that speechwriters are being paid for no other purpose than to put into words the thoughts of their 'bosses'. Further, the latter go over their speeches more often than not before delivery and make them their own by changing the texts as they see fit. Against this background, Crichlow (1998, p. 690) argues that "a leader's basic propensities should still be apparent in the general patterns that run through the text of policy statements regardless of whether the leader actually writes it". In short, then, while spontaneous as

well as private speech acts would be preferred, it seems acceptable to use prepared as well as public speech acts to discern a decision maker's operational code.

IV. Transitioning from NATO to the EU: possible effects on actors' identity

As mentioned at the outset, this chapter explores two interrelated questions: First, whether Solana experienced identity change after moving from NATO to the EU; and second, how deep any such changes actually ran. Building on differences between those two organizations, this section will develop propositions for both questions which will subsequently be tested in the empirical part of the paper.

1. NATO and EU as markedly different institutional environments

To address the first question, it must be shown that NATO and the EU indeed represent markedly different institutional environments so that moving from one organization to the other should leave a mark on bureaucrats' identities. For the purpose of this chapter, it is neither possible nor necessary to engage in a comprehensive discussion of NATO (e.g. Thies, 2009; Aybet and Moore, 2010) and the EU or, more precisely, the latter's foreign, security, and military dimensions (e.g. Howorth 2007; Hofmann 2013; Meijer and Wyss 2018). Rather, what needs to be established is that the two institutions were different from one another in fundamental respects during the periods when Solana worked within them.

This, in turn, should have implications for the identity (here: beliefs) of an actor (like Solana) who moved from NATO to the EU. That is, a transition from one institution to another should lead to changes in the beliefs of the agents, with the direction of changes corresponding to the different characters of the respective institutions, given that agents take on the norms, values, etc. of their institutions. OCA, as introduced in the previous section, should be capable of picking up such differences in the political beliefs of agents – in the present case of Solana, following his transition from NATO to the EU.

NATO is a military alliance whose primary purpose is to hedge against present and future security risks incurred by its member states. In the words of NATO's strategic concept of April 1999 (when Solana was still Secretary General): "NATO's essential and enduring purpose...is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means" (NATO 1999). The institution's fundamental principle is Article 5 of the NATO treaty pertaining to collective defense. In this context, both conventional and nuclear weapons are perceived as indispensable "(t)o protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion" (NATO 1999). Moreover, in the 1990s NATO

became engaged in wars and military crisis management missions in the Balkans and thus 'out of area'. Finally, the issue of enlargement, which entails both the transfer of NATO's norms and values and the expansion of its security umbrella, came onto the agenda, with the first enlargement being accomplished in 1999. Overall, NATO in the second half of the 1990s was a military power whose main function was to provide 'hard security' for its member states, either through deterrence or by engaging militarily in conflicts in the vicinity of NATO's European member states.

In comparison, the EU's engagements in foreign, security and defense policy are much broader in scope and extend well beyond the security and defense realm that constitutes NATO's primary focus. It includes not only the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, as it was called during Solana's period in office, European Security Defense Policy (ESDP; today: Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP) but also foreign economic and trade policy, international climate policy, development policy, and neighborhood policy, among other things (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014). What is more, even in the realm of security and defense policy there are glaring differences between the EU and NATO. Indeed, the majority of ESDP operations are 'civilian' in nature (e.g. police missions, rule-of-law missions, or border protection missions) rather than entailing the deployment of the military. On a more general level, the EU is frequently referred to as a 'normative power', which depicts the EU "as being different to pre-existing political forms, and (...) this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way" (Manners 2002, p. 242). Focusing less on what the EU is and more on what it does, other scholars have called the EU an 'ethical power' that "proactively work(s) to change the world in the direction of its vision of the 'global common good'" (Aggestam 2008, p. 1). Those are hardly labels commonly ascribed to NATO.

2. Substance and direction of belief change

Even this brief comparison of the scope and main instruments of NATO and the EU during 'Solana's times' (though not much has changed since then) should have made clear that the two institutions were quite distinct. The implication should be that agents encountered (and still encounter) very different institutional environments within NATO and the EU respectively. By extension, if agents actually do take on the norms, values, etc. of the institutions that they are working for, moving from NATO to the EU should effect 'who' the agents are, which in turn should manifest itself in differences in at least some of the elements depicted in OCA.

In terms of the substance and direction of change, one might expect to see for instance that agents of the NATO military alliance would perceive the world as a much more conflictual place than agents of the intrinsically cooperation-oriented EU (i.e. change towards higher P-1 score when moving from NATO to the EU). Another expectation is that NATO agents would be much more optimistic concerning the realization of their goals in the light of their 'success' during the Cold War than EU agents, given the

organization's fledgling experiences and nascent capabilities in the realm of foreign and security policy (i.e. change towards lower P-2 score when moving from NATO to the EU). Further, in line with the institution's normative or ethical orientation, EU agents would place stronger emphasis on finding collaborative solutions than NATO agents (i.e. change towards higher I-1 score when moving from NATO to the EU). Finally, as regards the utility and role of different means, NATO agents would place much more emphasis on conflictual instruments ('oppose', 'threaten', and 'punish') than EU agents, who would focus more on cooperative instruments ('reward', 'promise', and 'appeal') (i.e. change towards lower scores for conflictual instruments and higher scores for cooperative instruments when moving from NATO to the EU).

This is not to say that differences must necessarily exist in all dimensions of an operational code following a transition from one organization to another. Bearing this in mind, it would be highly surprising if there were no differences whatsoever given the expectations in the literature that agents take on norms, values, etc. of their, on the one hand, and the considerable differences between the institutional environments represented respectively by NATO and the EU, on the other.

Therefore, given the markedly different institutional environments, at least some of Solana's political beliefs should have changed after his transition from the military alliance NATO to the 'civilian power' European Union (*proposition 1*). As mentioned above, consider the three-stage model of socialization proposed by He and Feng (2015), if Solana's beliefs remained essentially stable after his transition from NATO to the EU, this would count as evidence for 'adaptation'. Conversely, if his beliefs did experience changes, this should be considered as support for 'socialization' processes being at play.

3. Depth of belief change

While the preceding discussion suggests that Solana's belief should have changed after his transition from NATO to the EU given the marked differences in the respective institutional environments, a related question is how 'deep' any such changes actually ran. Since internalization/socialization processes are assumed to take time to unfold, we might see a gradual evolution of Solana's beliefs during his time at the EU away from those he had held at NATO as result of an ever-deeper internationalization of the EU's norms over time. In accordance with this temporal logic, Solana's beliefs during his second term as EU High Representative (2004–2009) should be even further removed from the beliefs he had held while at NATO (1995–1999) than those he exhibited during his first term as EU High Representative (1999–2004) (*proposition 2*). Relatedly, as a result of an ever-deeper internalization of the norms of the new institutional environment, we might see that Solana has moved from 'superficial socialization' to 'fundamental socialization' during his time at the EU (*proposition 3*). This would be the case if we were to detect at first (here understood as during his first term) only changes

in either his philosophical or his instrumental beliefs and later (i.e. during his second term) in both sets of beliefs (He and Feng 2015).

V. Method and data

In order to construct Javier Solana's operational code, the automated content analysis system *Profiler Plus* was used, which contains a coding scheme for OCA based on the Verbs in Context System (VICS) (Walker et al. 1998). VICS is a system of content analysis that has been developed for the purpose of identifying the political beliefs of decision makers 'at a distance' (Schafer 2000; Brummer et al. 2020). The underlying assumption is that the beliefs of decision makers can be discerned by their verbal statements: "(W)e can infer psychological characteristics based upon the subject's verbal behavior: what an individual says and how he or she says it can tell us important things about his or her 'state of mind'" (Schafer and Walker 2006, p. 26).

Accordingly, VICS uses verbal statements of decision makers as its retrieval unit. More specifically, it extracts from verbal statements values for six different attributes for each verb, as the recording unit. They include: whether the speaker refers to himself/herself ('Self') or to another actor ('Other'); whether verbs are 'positive' (appeal, promise, or reward) or 'negative' (oppose, threaten, or punish); and in case of transitive verbs also whether it represents a 'conflictual' or a 'cooperative' behavior (for details see Walker et al. 1998). Based on this information, operational code indices of decision makers can be constructed (Table 2).

Table 2: The Construction of Operational Code Indices

	Elements of an Operational Code	Index	Interpretation
P-1	Nature of the Political Universe	%Positive minus %Negative Other Attributions	+1.0 (friendly) to -1.0 (hostile)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+ 1.0 optimistic to -1.0 pessimistic
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4	Control over Historical Development	Self or Other Attributions divided by [Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low control
P-5	Role of Chance	1 minus [Political Future x Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	%Positive minus %Negative Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to -1.0 high conflict
I-3	Risk Orientation	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation of Self Attributions	1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4	Timing of Action	1 minus Absolute Value [%X minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
a.	Cooperation/Conflict	Where X = Coop and Y = Conf	
b.	Words/Deeds	Where X = Word and Y = Deed	
I-5	Utility of Means	Percentage for Exercise of Power Categories a through f	1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
a.	Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
b.	Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
c.	Appeal	c's frequency divided by total	
d.	Oppose	d's frequency divided by total	
e.	Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
f.	Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Source: Schafer and Walker (2006), p. 569.

Solana’s statements were retrieved from the websites of NATO and the EU. Following the convention used in OCA, only texts with at least 1,500 words in length were used. Operational codes are conceived as domain specific. However, since this chapter is interested with Solana’s general operational code, all of his statements could have used for profiling him in principle. More specifically, a total of 60 statements by Solana comprising almost 100 000 words were randomly selected. More precisely, 20 of those statements were made during Solana’s stint as Secretary General of NATO (1995–1999), 20 statements were made during his first period in office as the EU High Representative for CFSP (1999–2004), and 20 statements were made during his second period in office (2004–2009).

VI. Results and discussion

Table 3 shows the operational code scores for Javier Solana during his periods in office as Secretary General of NATO and High Representative of the EU respectively, with the latter period being divided into his first and second term. The scores for each belief were calculated by applying the OCA coding scheme contained in *Profiler Plus* to 20 randomly selected speech acts of at least 1,500 words in length for each of the three periods (totaling some 100 000 words).

Table 3: Operational Code Scores of Javier Solana

		Solana at NATO (1995–1999)	Solana at EU I (1999–2004)	Solana at EU II (2004–2009)
		(n=20)	(n=20)	(n=20)
P-1	Nature of Political Universe	.60	.47 (+2.23**)	.55 (-1.70*)
P-2	Realization of Political Values	.36	.28 (+1.79*)	.34 (-1.47)
P-3	Predictability of Political Future	.18	.13 (+2.57**)	.18 (-3.25***)
P-4	Control over Historical Development	.23	.26 (-1.04)	
P-5	Role of Chance	.95	.97 (-1.35)	.96 (2.07**)
I-1	Strategic Approach to Goals	.65	.63 (.17)	.68 (-.70)
I-2	Tactical Pursuit of Goals	.34	.32 (.44)	.36 (-.71)
I-3	Risk Orientation	.31	.30 (.16)	.32 (-.40)

I-4	Timing of Action			
a.	Cooperation/Conflict	.36	.37 (-.17)	.32 (.70)
b.	Words/Deeds	.58	.51 (0.91)	.63 (-1.63)
I-5	Utility of Means			
a.	Reward	.24	.21 (.64)	.25 (-1.14)
b.	Promise	.07	.06 (.58)	.04 (1.01)
c.	Appeal	.52	.55 (-.67)	.56 (-.02)
d.	Oppose	.09	.10 (-.78)	.08 (1.23)
e.	Threaten	.03	.02 (.63)	.01 (1.00)
f.	Punish	.07	.06 (.21)	.07 (-.48)

Source: Own depiction.

Note: Data in bold denote significant results. Values in parentheses are *t*-statistics for change from previous phase. * $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$.

On a general level, the results point to at least as much stability as change. More specifically, the results provide only limited support for the three propositions advanced above. The first proposition held that due to the markedly different institutional environments, at least some of Solana's political beliefs should have changed after his transition from the military alliance NATO to the 'civilian power' European Union (*proposition 1*). At first glance, comparing Solana's belief scores at NATO with those held during his first term as EU High Representative, the empirical results offer some support for this proposition. Three out of the five elements subsumed under the category of philosophical beliefs did indeed experience significant changes. However, not all those changes are in the expected direction. That is, one could have indeed expected to see Solana's belief in his ability to realize his political values go down as a result of transitioning from arguably the world's premier military alliance to a newcomer to the field of security and defense policy (P-2). A similar argument could be made with respect to a lower predictability of the political universe (P-3). On the other hand, the considerably more negative diagnosis of the political universe (P-1) runs counter to the expectation developed above.

More troublesome still, during his second term as EU High Representative Solana's scores for P-1, P-2, and P-3 essentially return to the same level he had exhibited whilst being at NATO. In addition, there is not a single statistically significant change with

respect to Solana's instrumental beliefs. While not remaining static, they remain essentially stable throughout the entire period covered in the analysis. Overall, then, the empirical results offer at best only partial support of the first proposition in that at least some of Solana's beliefs did change after his move to the EU, at least initially. However, that fact that his philosophical beliefs during his second term as EU High Representative essentially returned to the level of the NATO period is quite surprising when considered through the lenses of socialization to new institutional environments, as is the stability of Solana's instrumental beliefs throughout the entire period.

This assessment is also the bridge to the other propositions. The second proposition stipulated that, as a result of an increasingly deeper internalization of the norms, values, etc. of his new institution, Solana's beliefs during his second term as EU High Representative (2004–2009) should be even further removed from the beliefs he had held while at NATO (1995–1999) than those he exhibited during his first term as EU High Representative (1999–2004). As already mentioned, there is no empirical support for this proposition. Instead, his instrumental beliefs did not change at all, and during his second term as EU High Representative the manifestations of his philosophical beliefs essentially returned to the levels he had exhibited whilst being at NATO.

This return to the 'NATO level' is also puzzling from the vantage point of the third proposition. It held that Solana could possibly move from 'superficial socialization' to 'fundamental socialization' during his time at the EU, as a result of an ever-deeper internalization of the norms of the new institutional environment. Granted, the differences between the NATO period and the first term as EU High Representative do lend support to superficial socialization since, as expected, one set of Solana's belief (i.e. the philosophical beliefs) did indeed experience considerable change from one period to the next. However, rather than experiencing additional belief change as result of the further internationalization of the EU's norms – hence fundamental socialization that would also entail changes to his instrumental beliefs –or, at the very least, maintaining the belief changes of the first period, Solana's beliefs during his second term very closely resembled those that he had held during his time at NATO.

How to account for those rather unexpected results which lend only very limited support to the idea that actors internalize the norms, values, etc. of their respective organizations, thus, become socialized into the respective institutional environments over time? One explanation is to dismiss OCA as flawed. Yet this seems rather implausible, given the fact that it has been employed in a multitude of empirical analyses that have been published in leading journals in the fields of international relations and political science. Thus, simply repudiating the validity of OCA would require a bit of a stretch.

Another explanation would be that OCA aims at issues that are different from those targeted by the literature on agent socialization by international organizations. This is certainly true to the extent that the approach is ill-suited to grasp the behavioral implications of socialization processes, that is, the internalization of norms and rules by agents and their subsequent compliance with them. However, whilst being imprecise as to what, exactly, socialization processes should affect beyond agents' behavior, the

literature on socialization clearly allows for ‘deeper effects’, in the sense of individual agents adapting their identities, their world view, or their political beliefs, as a result of being socialized into an institution. As far as the identification of agents’ beliefs and possible changes in them is concerned – the lead question of this chapter – OCA is definitely a viable analytical tool. He and Feng’s article in which they, too, connect socialization processes and OCA supports this claim (He and Feng 2015).

Another explanation for the lack of change in Solana’s political beliefs could be that the period under scrutiny was simply too short for such changes to materialize. Indeed, some authors emphasize, in the context of socialization processes, the importance of time for new ideas to take root, meaning “that socialization is a gradual process that needs a long-time exposure or duration” (Beyers 2010, p. 914). For instance, Zürn and Checkel (2005, p. 1066) suggest that a period of three or four years might be too short for internalization processes to occur. And Juncos and Pomorska (2013, p. 1343) contended with respect to the back then nascent EEAS that socialization processes are not very likely to have occurred since ‘the organization is so young’. Further, Oshri et al. (2016) have shown that the support for democratic values is higher among citizens of EU member states with more membership years. Other authors, though, argue that internalization processes occur “much faster than often assumed” and, just as importantly, that early experiences with a new institution are more formative than later ones anyway (Beyers 2010, p. 915).

This chapter covers almost one-and-a-half decades, including an episode of ten years at one institution. Such a long period should suffice for socialization processes to occur and to affect not only the agent’s behavior but also his/her political beliefs. What is more, several studies using OCA have shown that the political beliefs of decision makers can even change within short time spans (e.g. Walker and Schafer 2000; Renshon 2008). This is not only to say that there is empirical evidence for belief changes to occur but also that the antennae, as it were, of OCA are sufficiently sensitive to identify such changes.

What is more, Beyers (2010, p. 914) argues that not only the number of years but also the “quality and intensity of an experience” could have an impact on socialization processes. This suggests, for instance, that national officials that are only occasionally exposed to an international institution are less likely to socialize into them. Yet in the case under scrutiny, the question of exposure should not be an issue since Solana experienced both NATO and the EU for almost 15 years on a daily basis.

Another explanation might be found in a selective recruitment process on the part of the European Council in conjunction with the state of the CFSP at that time. That is, the EU member states might have deliberately appointed a top-level NATO official to move their organization’s foreign, security and defense policy along. What is more, the fledgling state of the CFSP might have granted Solana special leeway in shaping the institution so that he was able to impose his own political beliefs on the institution rather than the other way round. While those arguments cannot be dismissed out of hand, it would be misleading to contend that it was primarily, let alone exclusively, Solana who shaped the evolution of CFSP from 1999 on (e.g. Hofmann 2013). Given the

strong influence of the EU's member states with their anything but homogenous preferences in shaping the norms and rules of CFSP, the absence of any meaningful changes in Solana's operational code, as a result of adapting to those rules, would be surprising if socialization processes extended beyond the behavioral dimension.

This is exactly where the final explanation of the stability in Solana's operational code from 1995 to 2009, notwithstanding his transition from NATO to the EU, comes in. It holds that the effects that socialization processes by international institutions have on their agents might be limited to the behavioral domain. That is, while socialization processes might indeed lead to adaptations in the behavior of agents, as a result of the internalization of an institution's norms and rules, they might be limited to behavior rather than triggering changes in the agents' underlying political beliefs. To be clear, this is not to suggest that type II socialization (Checkel 2005) does not exist but rather that it might fall short of extending beyond the behavioral dimension of agents. This could be particularly true of top-level bureaucrats who, more often than not, had a political career in their home country prior to joining an international institution. With their beliefs already molded and firmed up in the course of years, if not decades of political activity in the domestic realm, those high-level bureaucrats might be less likely to alter their beliefs, being socialized into a new institutional environment.

In this sense, this chapter's empirical results – in the sense of finding only limited support for socialization processes to occur on the *top-level* of institutions – can be neatly linked to a broader trend discernible in the literature on agent socialization by the EU, where many studies observe 'a rather limited socialization potential to European Union (EU) institutions' (Beyers 2010, p. 910). For instance, Hooghe (1999, 2005) finds little evidence of socialization in top-level Commission officials. More recently, Van Esch and De Jong (2019) found little evidence for socialization processes for the members of the Governing Board of the European Central Bank during the euro crisis.

VII. Conclusion

This chapter tried to discern how deep the effects of agent socialization by international institutions are. The case, or rather agent, under scrutiny is Javier Solana, who was Secretary General of NATO between 1995 and 1999 and High Representative for CFSP of the EU between 1999 and 2009. To establish whether Solana's beliefs changed following his transition from NATO to the EU, this chapter used Operational Code Analysis (OCA), which is a well-established tool in the field of Foreign Policy Analysis for identifying the political beliefs of decision makers and possible changes in those beliefs. More specifically, the Verbs in Context System (VICS) were employed to identify Solana's operational code, alongside the automated content analysis program *Profiler Plus*. A total of 60 of Solana's speeches were analyzed. The empirical analysis shows that Solana's political beliefs did not experience much change despite his transition from the military alliance NATO to the 'normative power' or 'ethical power' EU. That is, while his

philosophical beliefs, which focus on the diagnosis of the political environment, changed during his first term as EU High Representative, they returned to the 'NATO level' during his second term. Further, Solana's instrumental beliefs, which relate to ends-means-relationships, remained not identical but highly stable throughout the entire period under examination. This finding suggests that while the internalization of an institution's norms and rules by its agents might very well affect their behavior, such processes might be skin deep rather than profound – that is, they might not trigger changes in 'who agents are', hence their identity.

Turning to possible avenues for future research, this chapter's empirical findings call into question the extent to which agent socialization by international institutions goes beyond the behavioral domain to affect the political beliefs of agents. Using OCA, future studies could identify other cases in which the political beliefs of individual agents did or did not change and, building on that, examine the conditions under which belief changes have or have not occurred. For instance, such studies could zoom in on other high-level bureaucrats who moved from one major international organization to another, such as Jean Monnet who was Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations and later President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community or Christine Lagarde who was Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and currently serves as President of the European Central Bank.

Besides, in accordance with previous studies, this chapter lends support to the assumption that socialization processes might be more likely to occur on the middle or lower levels of international bureaucracies rather than on the top level. Younger bureaucrats with little, if any, political and prior professional experience appear to be generally more amenable – not only to being socialized into their new institution but also to experience more far-reaching internalization processes than are officials from the top layer of the same institution. The likely reason for this is that many political appointees at the apex of institutions have decades of political experience in their home country under their belt prior to joining an international institution, as was the case with Solana. With their political beliefs already forged and tested, they are less amenable to changes in the course of being socialized into a new institutional environment. It will be up to large-N studies to ascertain whether this assumption carries empirical validity.

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Lars Schäfers:

Personal identity in media society: Approaches from a socio-psychological and Christian social-ethical perspective

I. Introduction

According to the well-known dictum of the sociologist Niklas Luhmann “Whatever *we know* about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, *we know* through the *mass media*” (Luhmann 2000, p. 1⁴). Medialization is acknowledged to be a central development of current social modernization processes, even a “total social phenomenon” (Saxer 2012, p. 839). In sociology, therefore, there has been much talk of media society as a basic theory. Personal, individual identity and formation of this identity in such a society is induced by the media to a large extent. And it is certainly true that both Germany and South Korea, can be classified as such media societies.

This paper, therefore, begins with a brief outline of the characteristics of media society as a hermeneutic framework theory based on the comprehensive sociological social theory of communication by the communication scientist Ulrich Saxer (1). When it comes to methodological preliminary considerations as to identity against the background of media society, the question then is how the category of identity can be connected to the principle of personality as the basic principle of Christian social ethics. It is assumed that the principle of personality is also of fundamental importance for questions of media ethics from a Christian-social ethical perspective, which are of interest here. In close alignment with the theological ethicist and psychologist Jochen Sautermeister the thesis is presented that a social-psychologically informed concept of identity is able to define the abstract principle of personality in more detail in order to be able to empirically deal with questions of media ethics as applied ethical questions (2). It follows on the basis of this empirical understanding of the subject, the reflections on how identity formation takes place under the social, structural and institutional conditions of media society and how people can shape their personal identity with and through the media (3). In a final step, the theoretical considerations in the practical field of computer games will be briefly outlined as examples, since these media are ultimately enjoying great and growing popularity in Germany and in South Korea (4).

⁴ Translation by the author of the article.

II. Characteristics of a media society

The Media as “transporters of content of meaning” (Bohrmann 2018, p. 305) guarantee public communication in systems-theoretical terms in the form of the mass media subsystem (Scholl 2010). Journalists from radio, television, newspapers and the Internet have the main functional responsibility. The mass media constitute a media public. Medialization as deep structural infection of society and all its subsystems with the logic of the mass media (Ziemann 2018, p. 65) identifies such society as media society (Bohrmann 2018, p. 309). Media-based communication as well as the media’s own logic and functions are therefore structurally indispensable for media society (Ziemann 2018, p. 57). The concept of media society is, however, more like a heuristic one that serves to reduce the complexity of medialized modern, highly functionally differentiated societies.

Accordingly, the search of a clear definition does not necessarily lead to a precise definition, but some of its characteristics can be noted: In media society, the mass media are ‘the central nervous system’, because of their omnipresence (Bergsdorf 2005, p. 9). According to Ulrich Saxer, complexity management is a central function of medialization processes in society (Saxer 2012, p. 831). It can be both functional and dysfunctional, when complexity is reduced in a distorting way for example (Saxer 2012, p. 842). Medialization operates “on the micro, meso, macro and global level, it interacts with systems of interaction, organization and function, the institutional structure as well as the world in which we live, and dissolves and mixes previously defined social spheres and constellations” (Saxer 2012, p. 833). With regard to the Internet and the digital media, Saxer ultimately speaks of an almost “unleashed mediality” (Saxer 2012, p. 157).

III. Information and entertainment media

Nevertheless, the increasing medialization goes hand in hand with the paradox, which the political scientist Wolfgang Bergsdorf summarizes as follows: “Never before have the possibilities for citizens in industrialized countries to obtain good information on political, economic and cultural issues been as comprehensive as they are today; at the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to find orientation, to gain an overview, to form their own opinion” (Bergsdorf 2005, p. 9). In this sense, the journalist Wolf Schneider put it aptly as early as 1984: “The news agencies do not report most of what happens in the world. Most of what the agencies report is not printed and not broadcast. Most of what is printed and broadcast is not heard and not read. And most of what is heard and read is not understood” (Schneider 1984, pp. 11–12). How much more has this become the case in the age of the Internet?

Media society is not only shaped by the journalistic information media, but the entertainment media also have a high relevance for many people’s lifestyle. This also applies increasingly to computer games as an entertainment medium. In fact, what most

media offer is entertainment. Both the information and the entertainment media, with their influence that should not be underestimated, offer a broad field of ethical research (see for instance Funiok 2011, pp. 141–143). When it comes to media society, the question of the influence of media on the identity of society and its members is also of interest. Here, the concept of identity is understood as a hermeneutical meta norm, which must be defined more precisely to apply it in the light of Christian social ethics and related personalism. Therefore, we will now move on to present a specific identity-theoretical approach towards an empirically based research on normative aspects of media use in the context of media society.

IV. Identity and the principle of personality

The theoretical starting point for the following considerations is the theological-ethical basic principle of personality (see for example Filipović 2010). It is also the central social principle of the Catholic social doctrine (Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, pp. 96–139). The classical formulation of this personal approach in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (*Gaudium et spes* 25), is as follows: “For the beginning, the subject and the goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person”.

The concept of person also goes hand in hand with a special emphasis on personal responsibility. In the Christian-theological horizon of interpretation such personal action in responsibility corresponds to the image of God and dignity of man. The basic normative orientations corresponding to the Christian personality principle, however, remain rather general. The person principle remains too abstract as a principle to deal with concrete questions of media ethics “as applied ethical questions in a practice-oriented way” (Sautermeister 2014, p. 172; Filipović 2015). Therefore, the argumentation with the person principle requires an ethical foundation theory based on the current state of empirically founded social and human science theory (Sautermeister 2014, p. 172).

This is where the identity category will be introduced. But the meanings and definitions of the concept of identity are so diverse that there can be no question of a clarified concept. Following on from the theological ethicist and psychologist Jochen Sautermeister as well as from the social psychologist Heiner Keupp, a social-psychologically determined understanding of personal identity will be presented here.

According to Keupp identity unfolds through a subjective construction process in which individuals seek a “fit between the subjective ‘inside’ and the social ‘outside’” (Keupp 2017, p. 201). This understanding of process-based identity can be regarded as “fitting work” (Keupp 2017, p. 201) since in the course of a person’s various phases of life, it contributes to the shaping of identity by the respective complex conditions and contextual preconditions and even limitations. In interactions with other people, an attempt is usually made unconsciously to maintain a balance of identity (Krappmann

2005, p. 9). On the one hand, the person tries to keep up with other people's socially mediated expectations and demands, but, on the other hand, they also want to bring out their own singularity as a person (Sautermeister 2007, pp. 17–18). Identity is, thus, formed dynamically in social interactions and socialization processes (Sautermeister 2007, p. 17). It is dependent on social recognition. Identity formation is, therefore, a significant and conflictive mental integration achievement (Bohleber 1996, p. 298).

If the person succeeds in this procedural act of balance and integration, the deformity of an uncertain, fragile, diffuse identity as well as that of a rigid, supposedly unchangeable identity is equally avoided (Sautermeister 2017, p. 51). As a personal identity that is updated in communication and action, it is, nevertheless, also often precarious and permanently fragmentary (Luther 1992). Each personal identity is also transformed to varying degrees by a social identity depending on the context of interaction. According to Erving Goffman stigma management is needed on account of this distinction between social and personal identity of the individual. By this kind of self-management of personal identity as the respective concrete singularity of the person can duly unfold despite all the attributions, categorizations and expectations that are usually considered natural and can have a stigmatizing effect (Goffman 1975, p. 160; see also recently Fukuyama 2019, p. 26: "Identity arises above all from a distinction between the true inner self and an outer world with social rules and norms that do not adequately recognize the value or dignity of the inner self"). Therefore, "identity formation and identity work aimed at maturity and responsibility, thus, become a complex and lifelong task that affects both the individual and society. Identity formation is indispensable not only for individual life, but also for social interaction, community and, last not least, for democracy" (Sautermeister 2017, p. 48).

In the end, prefabricated identity concepts and patterns can no longer be taken for granted in the individualized and pluralized social world of post-modern media society. What is needed, especially from the perspective of Christian ethics, is a normative understanding of personal identity that promotes responsibility. This also applies to the subject of media action. The social-psychologically specified category of identity, thus, offers a reference concept with which the human person comes into view as such a concrete and responsible subject of action. This is accompanied by an increased "sensitivity for individuality, social interdependence and biography" (Sautermeister 2013, p. 103) of that person. Particularly in rule-ethical approaches, however, the individual remains a generalized and thus largely stenciled subject (Sautermeister 2013, p. 103). The social-psychological category of identity refers to the mediation of internal and external perspectives that is necessary for the ethical appreciation of moral subjectivity and self-awareness (Sautermeister 2014, pp. 176–177). But Sautermeister also emphasizes, against the possible suspicion of a relativist-subjectivist understanding of ethics, that the theologically received identity category can also be linked to the tradition of natural law approaches (Sautermeister 2014, p. 181). Natural law is characterized by the fact that it cultivates the central idea of the universalization of the moral claim (Anzenbacher 2002, p. 24). It, thus, refers to the ineluctably objective preconditions and limitations of free formation and development of identity and its

social-structural condition factors. Accordingly, natural law in this context can be more aptly described as personal law (Schallenberg 2013).

A structural approach to media ethics can be connected to this concept. It takes media recipients, distributors and producers into account as subjects of action and actors of responsibility in the context of the systemic framework conditions. This approach is a context-sensitive and complex “tightrope walk between subject and structure” (Heimbach-Steins 2002, p. 50; see also Heimbach-Steins 2011). In this sense, the concept of identity represented here closely intertwines social and individual ethical perspectives. This also applies to questions of media ethics against the background of media society.

V. Identity formation with and through media

On the basis of the outlined understanding of identity, the task of Christian social ethics is to take into account the contextual and structural conditions (Heimbach-Steins 2002) in a person-oriented way in order to give orientation for action in social challenges as well as in the respective questions of justice. In this respect, theological media ethics is concerned with the promotion of people’s ability to work responsibly on identity within the sphere of influence of and in dealing with the media (Schäfers & Sautermeister 2018, p. 12).

For identity formation to succeed, a person needs psychological, social, cultural and religious resources. In today’s media society, the media are among the most important mediators of a not insignificant part of these resources. In this respect, the media function as a significant space of experience and orientation for identity constructions (Bonfadelli & Bucher 2008, p. 27). But, with regard to the information media, it should be noted that, especially in the mediatized multi-option society with its massive oversupply of information up to the consequences of a new disinformation economy in times of fake news and alternative facts (Ruß-Mohl 2017), conflicts of values, orientation and identity can intensify. This makes it considerably more difficult to deal responsibly with the media. The immense wealth of information often leads the recipient of the media to a fade-out effect, to cognitive dissonance (Hunold 1994, p. 38), which leads to the “moral devaluation of the mediated reality and the knowledge associated with it” (Hunold 1994, p. 38). On the one hand, recipients switch off inwardly and consciously receive only what corresponds to their own convictions and, thus, strengthens their identity. There is a tendency towards the conviction ‘I only listen to my inner being, to my feelings when judging things’, which is often also conveyed by the media. On the other hand, the phenomenon of the transition “from internally to externally guided sociality” (Hunold 1994, p. 44), which characterizes media society, is rather contrary to the personal identity balance: One’s own actions and also the development of one’s own identity are increasingly influenced and determined by actions from outside, by public opinion and the views of others, and thus to the detriment of the intimate, inner

experience of man (Hunold 1994, p. 44). The starting point is initially the fact that, thanks to the Internet and social media, the roles of the media producer and the media consumer coincide to form the 'prosumer': everyone can long since be their own 'program director' (Bergsdorf 2006, p. 354). From the point of view of media ethics, we are looking for identities that cultivate a responsible approach to the media. "It is, therefore, a matter of a normative understanding of identity as a model for educational and empowerment processes" (Sautermeister 2017, p. 49).

In view of the rapid development and transformation processes, it is all the more important that media ethics not only appears reactively, but that it is attentively observed and prospectively considered as to which media society we would like to live in and how responsibility can be promoted by people (Schäfers & Sautermeister 2018, pp. 12–14). The challenge for the subject of action as well as for the design of just structures and framework conditions is big, especially in the face of a polarized and polarizing conflict culture that is pointedly aimed at unification and tends to eliminate ambivalences and ambiguities for the sake of a clear, unambiguous message. Successful identity formation also always means being able to live with openness, incompleteness and ambiguities in social coexistence. Tolerance of ambiguity (Bauer 2018) and self-criticism, thus, become values and virtues of media ethics.

Ulrich Saxer draws the following conclusions from his socio-communication theory of the media society, with regard to the relationship between identity and the media: "Identity establishment thanks to medialization or at least assistance can only succeed (...) on a case-by-case basis: temporarily, situation-, person- and system-specifically. In general, media functionality operates subsidiarily, and although the identity-constitutive significance of mediality grows with the development of media society, it is regularly combined with other factors. The highly ideologized debate about the impairment of continental, national or group-specific cultural identity by external media overpowering is often based more on media-political problem projection than on the issue itself. After all, to a considerable extent, media communication helps young people establish temporary personal identities, and habitual media use has long since become an integral part of the biographies of members of modernized societies" (Saxer 2012, p. 850). More than ever before, people are developing, using and changing the media, but the media are also shaping and changing their human users (Ziemann 2018, p. 58).

In view of the increasing unease about the destructive effects of a consciously as well as unintentionally short-sighted or irresponsible handling of the media and the dissemination of media 'information', calls for a strengthening of media competence and personality development from various professions such as communication scientists, therapists and others are becoming increasingly louder. In addition to the controversially discussed question of the possibilities of reasonable and legally compliant regulations, it has become clear that media practice and media ethics must not underestimate the importance of the acting subjects in media society if the positive possibilities of media development are to be used fruitfully and meaningfully.

Ultimately, because of the intention of the journalistic media professionals to direct attention for commercial reasons, which is based on the supposed needs of the audience

(Meyen 2015), the question of orientation and perspectives of meaning for a conscious handling of the media also arises from the perspective of the media user. However, according to Dolf Zillmann, starting from a hedonistic basic premise, mood management (Zillmann 1988) is initially dominated by a mostly unconscious and significant factor: positive feelings should be maximized and negative feelings minimized by the correspondingly consciously selective use of media (Batinic 2008, p. 117). This applies in particular to all types of entertainment media according to their function, but even beyond them.

However, if we remain stuck with this mere management of emotions, this means a reduced understanding of the potential of media, because “in media practice, too, the question of their meaningful objectives cannot be suppressed or excluded in the long run by those who have to achieve them” (Pfürtner 2004, p. 101). For journalists and media recipients alike, the basic question ‘to what end?’ (Pfürtner 2004, p. 102) arises.

Ultimately, the perspective of theological media ethics can contribute fundamentally to the discussion of the meaningfulness of communicative action (Kos 1997, pp. 252–253). The Christian horizon of meaning and hope is the foundation of this. The latter seeks to convey that the fragmentary and perishable identity of man “always from God as a uniquely affirmed identity will finally eschatologically complete itself in the presence of God” (Sautermeister 2018, p. 28).

VI. Application example: the medium ‘games’

To illustrate in brief, a possible application of the social-psych on logical category of identity presented here. This paper ends by focusing on the world of computer games, i.e. entertainment media that are becoming increasingly popular worldwide, not only among young people. And in South Korea gaming is a branch of entertainment that appeals not only to players but to millions of viewers. For example, e-sports are already as accepted and established as football or tennis there.

In games, media users can slip into their very own leading role. They can try out quite different identities and turn special game experiences into identity fragments. Basically, an identity building process influenced by games is also related to the gamer’s socio-structural embedding and impact on the social dimension of their identity. Computer games can, thus, even become an ethical fitness and reflection center that playfully enables identity formation based on responsibility. This training effect is particularly evident in those games in which players repeatedly find themselves in moral dilemmas (for details see Wimmer 2014) for example in the games “The Witcher 3”, “Mass Effect” or “Dragon Age Origins”. No matter how players decide in such a situation, they will always violate an ethical principle. Games also have their disadvantages: There is potential for addiction, there is explicit violence in games. One particularly striking example is the “Grand Theft Auto” series: in this game players can move freely in a virtual big city. What is more, players can use a lot of violence and massacre innocent

people. Games can also have a damaging effect on the identity formation of adolescents. But this depends above all on how immersive gamers get into their game and how intensively they actually ‘identify’ with their violent character and how intensively they ‘slips into’ their identity. This example only briefly touched on here shows the necessity of a normative understanding of identity that implies responsible and ethically reflected media action, not only but especially in the way violent games are used for entertainment purposes. A gamer’s identity also demands responsible action, and, thus, require a certain degree of integrity, not least, with regard to the personal and social identity of the media subject of action. The focus can, thus, be put on the question of the specific gamer identity of individuals and their integration into social playing cultures. The offer of strong social inclusion, for example in e-sports and massively multiplayer online role-playing games, can be an important part of identity formation. Games, thus, become contexts of social recognition (Keupp 2017, p. 209). They are ultimately reflecting society to a certain extent (Jöckel 2018, pp. 45–76). All in all, social and individual (media-)ethical perspectives are closely intertwined based on identity theory.

Computer games turn out to have long since arrived at the heart of media society. With this medium, however, there is still a great need for ethical reflection. Here, the socio-psychological identity category can also be meaningfully worked with and researched. However, the increasing “dissolution of traditional dividing lines between mass and individual communication, and even their multimedia and interactivity” (Wimmer 2013, p. 44) distinguish computer games not only as a theoretical object of identity and media ethics, but also as a multi-perspective interesting research object “that enables a look into the future of media society” (Wimmer 2013, p. 44).

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Yong Chul Park: Identity of Multi-Cultural Children reflected in Korean Law & Policy

I. Introduction

In recent years the composition of South Korea's demographics has been changing quite dramatically. As of November 1st 2018, according to the government official record, the South Korean population was 51.63 million people. The number of foreign nationals amounted to 1,65 million people, i.e. 3.2 % of the total population. The large majority of foreigners is Korean-Chinese (32.2 %) and Chinese-Chinese (13.0 %). Compared to the year of 2017, the figure rose by 170 000 people. Among the total number of 20.50 million households, 330 000 households (Statistics Korea 2018) are considered to be multicultural families and the number of 330 000 households amount to 1.7 % of general households. In addition, demographically speaking, young foreigners, age from 20 to 34 years, amount to almost half of them, which is 43.3 percent. There is no doubt that South Korea has become more diverse than ever in terms of origins of people. At the same time, the country is in the midst of major change, when it comes to accepting the new composition of people, thereby embracing the idea of difference in colors, religions, etc.

The change sounds easy and inevitable since the country has been aging at a high rate, ranking first in the world (UN ESCAP 2012), it needs new population influx from abroad in order to prevent its aging population from perishing. However, coming from homogeneous tradition, the people in South Korea has had the identity of one people and one nation (Lee 2010 p. 114) – even slight differences among the people had not been allowed when it came to inner thoughts and outer appearance. Thus, it is extremely difficult for any newcomer to be recognized and embraced as part of society. Making matters more difficult, as one put it, South Korean society is one big highly networked place with immense peer pressure (Kang 2015, p. 22). Therefore, when it comes to academic pressure being put on teenagers, South Korea tops the chart (Park 2019). Such great pressure is proved by the fact that suicide is the leading cause of death among teenagers, and 11- to 15-year-olds report the highest amount of stress in 30 developed nations (Hu 2015).

For the reasons stated above, it is not too difficult to picture that the pressure of getting accepted for multicultural children in South Korea is a lot heavier than normally imagined for grown-ups with multicultural backgrounds. They, multicultural children, have become acknowledged to be the most vulnerable class of people in South Korea.

The need for laws and policies for multicultural families, including multicultural children, have long been emphasized.

In this short essay I suggest an array of preliminary ideas and thoughts on the title of this writing. That would be the core of identity issues as regards the multicultural families dealt with in law and policy in South Korea. Putting it with more detailed discussion, first, identity of a person provided in the laws of South Korea will be discussed to lay a foundation of further in-depth overview. Second, I would like to take a closer look at South Korean laws related to multicultural families. Third, the Korean government's policies concerning multicultural-family-related laws will be discussed. And, at last, this essay concludes with small notes that the laws and policies for multicultural families in South Korea need fundamental change because of the ultimate goals of laws and policies for multicultural families and children.

II. Identity of multicultural children in South Korea

1. Definition of identity

Identity is a word or an expression covering a wide range as regards a unique aspect of personhood or things. Despite vastly increased research and enormous scholarly interest in identity, the concept remains some sort of a mystery (Fearon 1999, p. 1). One reason for that is in case the word is attached to a human, it differs depending on who defines or owns it. Seemingly common identity for some individuals or groups might be the one with a unique notion because each individual or group with such identity may come up with a completely different meaning thanks to the one's own perspective or environment.

Identity can be attached to anything identifying or distinguishing one from another. Identity of a person or a thing is not easy to ascertain because it relates to who or what they are and what they have become. Certain parts of their origins become the first building blocks, however any outer influence affecting the growth or regression of such existence affects the build-up or tear-down of their identities. Therefore, there could be all kinds of identities. For example, when it comes to ethnic identity, it is the belief that individuals with the same ethnic backgrounds have similar needs, interests and perceptions just because they share certain traditions and heritages (Kennedy et al. 2006, p. 123). Identity is also argued to be meaningful in two senses, social identity and personal identity. In the social sense, identity could refer to a social category, a set of persons marked by a label and differentiated by rules deciding membership and alleged characteristic features and attributes. In the personal sense, an identity is some unique characteristic or characteristics (Fearon 1999, p. 2).

The aspect of identity I try to focus on in this article is the social one. Identity in a multicultural society is a lot more complicated to digest than the one in a homogeneous

society because the multicultural society itself must have so many layers to form an identity. People in a multicultural society or with a multicultural background start to form their own identities in unique ways. In case that a person is a first-generation immigrant, he or she must have their own identity formed in their society of origin. And such original identity goes through a process of acculturation and becomes a totally distinguished one compared he or she might have ended up having in his or her original country. In addition, the children of first-generation immigrants must have vastly different stories of forming their own social identities. The bases of their social identities are firmly rooted in their countries of birth. However, since their ethnicities must be different from the majority of the society they were born in, their final outcome of identities are distinct from the majority of the societies they belong to.

One very important issue here is whether any society is opened wide enough to be called a multicultural society. If not, people with unique identities in any society may not be mixed in and would be left out. Thus, they will have a hard time adjusting to society as a confident member. A society itself may not be inclusive due to its conservative culture and tradition. The concept of identity in a multicultural society may be to distinguish oneself from others, but it should not function as isolating oneself from society. Structuring a just multicultural society is never easy to be made happen.

2. Multiple Challenges for Identity of Multicultural Children in South Korea

Multicultural children in South Korea are the ones below the age of 18 and they were either born in foreign states before migrating to South Korea or were born in this country to immigrant families. What is more, as noted later, multicultural children should be documented legal residents according to the Multicultural Family Support Act, contrary to the legal common sense of the general public. Therefore, ironically, multicultural children in this country are not the ones who have to deal with unstable legal status. With the legal status of residence, multicultural children must face different hardships. Then what should be the real challenges that the government help multicultural children overcome in this country? The most damaging and fundamental challenge would be discrimination based on the difference in races, skin colors and cultures.

How is a government able to solve such problems? What are the main solutions to tackle the problems? Should a country put forward more comprehensive measures to solve the issue of discrimination? Many questions remain without any effective answers.

Even with a comprehensive policy to deal with discrimination issues, a country will go through a hard time solving the problem. Moreover, a country's culture will not change overnight to be more open to the differences. In addition, as it is admitted, multiculturalism is about recognizing the co-existence of multiple cultures within the same social space, including policy readjustment, protecting and fostering inferior or

minority cultures rather than denying cultural superiority, and aims to strategically prevent them from being ignored or discriminated against by cultural gaps and heterogeneity and to resolve social, political and economic conflicts based on culture (Koo 2003, p. 30). South Korean society has a very low degree of social approval for other people's cultural rights or a low level of achieving cultural diversity. Maybe the discourse itself, which puts multiculturalism first is less persuasive. Such distrust does not easily disappear, even in the case of foreign countries adopting multiculturalism as their cultural policy line. In the United States, for example, multiculturalism has been the principle of its own cultural policy since the 1990s, but racial problems in the United States remain a problem, making it quite difficult for multiculturalism to succeed. After all, multiculturalism should promote cultural diversity, but it is problematic that it has been used as a strategy of cultural domination to manage disparate beings and others in the country after making cultural discrimination exist.

Is there any way to help at the legal and policy levels to solve the issue of discrimination ruining multicultural family members? What should be the most basic and innovative ways to expand the cultural acceptability of society? The answers to these questions would never be easy to come up with.

If there is one unifying force to tie a society, what should that be? Same language or inclusive attitude toward outsiders regardless of the difference in languages? Communicating with others using the same language definitely helps to unite society members with completely different backgrounds. However, helping outsiders to equip with the common tongue has some delicate issue of indispensably forcing them to learn the national language. Even despite the fact that there are multiple challenges that multicultural family members will face, the pertinent law and policy in South Korea tend to simplify the challenge of discrimination to the one originating from the deficiency in language acquisition. Helping multicultural family members to have fluency in the Korean language should be only one side of a spectrum of the government's policies dealing with them. However, as noted later, the government policy in getting them as part of society only goes as far as to provide barely enough language education service.

III. Multicultural family & laws in South Korea

1. Multicultural children & laws

Article 31 of the Constitution stipulates the right of education of the people in the country. The country is obligated to provide a certain degree of education to the people. Although the Article emphasizes the importance of lifelong education, indispensably the first beneficiaries of the country's educational obligation are children. Therefore, children from multicultural families should receive the same benefits as they are citizens. One crucial but often neglected point here is that every single member of

multicultural families in South Korea should acquire nationality to be recognized as 'multicultural families' (Kim 2019, p. 92). The nation state has the supreme authority in deciding access to citizenship or creating categories allowing temporary residence with no legal protections and rights going with citizenship (Anleu 2009, p. 183). It is observed that multiculturalism in South Korea has a wide range of different people such as North Korean refugees, foreign workers.

2. Multicultural Family Support Act

A. Normative structure of the Act

In 2008, after one year of discussion period at the National Assembly, the Multicultural Family Support Act was first promulgated. Since then, as of August 2020, the Act has gone through eleven times of amendments. As noted above, the Act makes sure that all the support the Act provides is limited to multicultural family members with Korean citizenship.

i. Relationship with Legislative Purposes

Per legislative purpose, Article 1 of the Act provides the following:

The purpose of this Act is to help multicultural family members enjoy a stable family life and fulfill roles and responsibilities as members of society, and, therefore, contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of multicultural family members and their integration into society. (Amended by Act no. 13604, Dec. 22, 2015)

As it turns out self-evidently in the Article 1, the relationship between two legislative purposes, "contributing to the improvement of the quality of life of multicultural family members" and "their integration into society" is not clear whether the two purposes are either mutually independent on each other or one purpose contributing to another (Choi 2015, p. 26). That said, although certain degrees of quality of life may help the multicultural family members adapt to society, keeping a certain standard of living is not a necessary condition to help social integration. Obviously, the Act does not specify what things are needed to improve societal unity when society has to deal with the integration issues of multicultural families.

ii. Support & Possibility of Limiting Basic Human Rights

Article 4(1) provides the duty of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family “to conduct a fact-finding survey on multicultural families every three years and announce the results thereof to ascertain the current status and actual conditions of multicultural families”. Upon Article 4(4) of the Act, the specific details of the survey are to be determined by the Ministry solely for the purpose of implementing the policy. The process of the survey lacks any security measures that would prevent any unnecessary invasion of privacy. In a way the Act has declared that it has the nature of being a source of information to continuously observe and establish new policies for multicultural families but overlooked the fact that privacy violations could occur in the process.

B. Process of support provided and current situation

i. Stages of support

The Act furnishes four different stages of support with variations of support contents. The first stage is provision of pre-entry education for human right protection. The education or training consists of the first day of the basic course and the second day of the advanced course. Those who complete education may obtain information in all areas, including life, law, culture and welfare in South Korea. The basic course takes place for eight hours, including the current status of Korean immigrants, the multicultural society, the overview of Korean life information and the introduction of Korean life information regarding pregnancy, healthcare, gender equality, marriage and migrant women’s support institutions and welfare systems and measures to deal with violence against women. The advanced course for two days is a sixteen-hour class sharing the more detailed information stated above plus marriage-related family laws. The pre-entry education is left with regret because one or two days of training could never be enough time. It has been pointed out that it is impossible for marriage immigrants with different language and cultural backgrounds to learn information that can be used in Korean life. Even so, language barriers are found to be one major obstacle for learning, as it was stated in the *Kukinews* (13 May 2020) that the second stage is one where more comprehensive support services after entering the country such as Korean language education, employment links and education support of multicultural families and individual and family counseling is provided by multicultural family support centers set up in each local government to provide early adaptation to marriage immigrants. In addition, crisis intervention services including prevention, counseling and protection from damage such as domestic violence is provided as well. The third stage is focused on the creation of a bilingual family environment in order to improve parents’ ability to raise children with support of multicultural families. The 4th and the last stage is defined

as a capacity-building period, and it provides employment-linked and basic education for multicultural families, focusing on supporting economic and social independence of multicultural families. In particular, the education contents include the development of occupations suitable for marriage immigrants, vocational education and training, self-help meetings, and the operation of volunteer groups.

ii. Key Services Currently Available

Based upon the Act, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family operates a web-portal called *Danuri* in order “to provide basic information about Korean life and latest multicultural community news in thirteen languages” (*Danuri* 2019). As noted earlier, among the services the web-portal furnishes, the ‘Multicultural Family Support Center’ is one of the main functions. In Seoul, for example, the capital city of the country, 24 out of 25 *gu* (boroughs) have off-site centers. The centers offer free services of Korean language education, interpretation & translation, counseling and case management, social training & occupational training for marriage immigrants, family education, multicultural children language development, visiting education for children’s life, and bilingual environments for multicultural families. *Danuri* web-portal service serves as a kind of database by aggregating a large number of information provided by the Act (*Danuri* 2019) For example, with the note of ‘*Danuri* App’, the website provides a welcome book and guidebook for living in Korea.

Danuri functions as the information center for any multicultural family members who hope to reside in and adapt to Korea, since it also gives introduction to ‘Multicultural Family Support Center’ located in almost every region in the country via noting the call number and other various methods to contact the center. In addition, it notes about counseling centers, namely ‘*Danuri* Helpline’, ‘Guide to International Marriage Scam Prevention’ and ‘Online Counseling’. Despite active efforts through the website, it is questionable how much practical information online can be meaningful itself.

iii. Provision or provisions for multicultural children

The Act provides insufficient support for multicultural children. Article 10(1) of the Act provides the following.

Neither the state nor local governments shall discriminate against children and juveniles of any multicultural family in providing care and education services for children and juveniles. (Amended by Act no. 13536, Dec. 1, 2015)

As the article above shows, the care and education services for multicultural children is focused on banning discrimination. The lack of more specific details on the ban against

discrimination appears to have failed to provide more realistic help to multicultural children. Moreover, support of multicultural children, as stipulated by law, is heavily focused on kindergarten and elementary school students, so middle school or higher students are not as much included (Kim 2014, p. 98). In the same vein, Article 10(3) also provides the following duties to the state and local governments.

The state and local governments shall endeavor to support preschool care and education services for members of multicultural families below 18 years of age, and to help such members develop language skills, may provide assistance necessary for improving their language proficiency, such as teaching materials and learning support in teaching the Korean language and the mother tongue of their father or mother who is an immigrant by family. (Amended by Act no. 11675, Mar. 22, 2013; Act no. 13536, Dec. 1, 2015)

As shown above, the Article does not mention the detailed educational support that should be given to multicultural children. Rather, it only limits letting them learn the Korean language to be integrated into the Society. With immense pressure being put on teenagers in the country, the educational support noted in the pertinent article is not enough.

IV. Multicultural Family & Policy in South Korea

1. Language Acquisition

Not only the central government but also local governments are putting a lot of effort into teaching Korean language for multicultural families. For example, the capital city, Seoul, provides an online Korean lecture guide, introducing various websites, namely National Korean Language Institute, EBS Durian, MNTV Migrant's Network TV, King *Sejong* Institute's *Nuri* and the Cyber University of Korea. Ironically, the more detailed information on educating Korean is only offered in Korean. As noted above, there are not many supporting policies for multicultural families and children in South Korea. The only one visible policy is teaching Korean to them. However, even the policy of teaching Korean for multicultural family members does not seem enough.

2. (Lack of) Fostering Multicultural Libraries

The government is not directly involved in establishing multicultural libraries. Rather, a private enterprise called STX has been instrumental in building the libraries around the

Country. As of August 2020, seven libraries have been built and operated. In terms of support and management of these libraries, the private sector without any governmental help or support is fully committed.

3. (Lack of) Medical Support

With an inclusive attitude toward multicultural families not high, it is necessary to approach their health problems with a more active and inclusive perspective. The subject's understanding of the target and the scope of the support are difficult for the medical staff to obtain detailed information about the eligibility or nationality of them and, therefore, it is not easy to determine the scope of the support. In the end, the government needs to come up with countermeasures in light of insufficient support for medical expenses and securing equal health rights for multicultural families is also essential.

V. Conclusion

Multicultural families may exist in any form in any society. That is, even undocumented families need to be treated equally as documented ones. However, in South Korea with the existence of reliable support using laws and regulations, they need to be naturalized in order to be treated as members of multicultural families. Without any document of citizenship, they do not get any extra legal support to include them as true members of society.

The first necessary step should be acknowledging them in their own right. Requiring citizenship has only worked as an easy step for the country to accept them, however it should not work as an obstacle to provide effective support. I am not trying to argue that the country needs to accept undocumented immigrants. Rather my point is that accepting immigrants as multicultural families should not hinge on the fact that they have already ascertained citizenship. It is natural for any state to protect its people. However, the state has a duty not only to protect its people but also to protect its socially disadvantaged class internationally. Putting nationality first in fulfilling its obligations is an expression of the fact that it does not think of multicultural family members as a class to protect. In many aspects, multicultural families and multicultural children who are members of the family are socially the weakest, and the state is obligated to protect the socially weak regardless of nationality.

At the same time, they are not the ones who need to be pitied. They have to be proud members of the country and society. Although there has been research praising the governmental effort in terms of providing any necessary support, so far the governmental policies toward providing support for multicultural families and the children members of them have been very superficial and only limited to language help.

Moreover, the Korean language plays a great role in the government's provision of support.

Does it force people to learn the language to be recognized as a multicultural family in Korean society on top of getting a citizenship? And does it really embrace the culture of other countries? Or are you only talking about absorption into Korean culture and society? The question circulates back to the original question. What is true multiculturalism and openness to difference – different people and culture? After all, multiculturalism is to accept a completely different culture as it is and to support such a different culture to play a role independently.

Even laws and policies for the children in multicultural families should be made with more multifaceted and diverse considerations. Instead of simply granting them qualifications to become part of society by acquiring nationality and the language, comprehensive work is needed on how to make them function properly as members of the society and how to reflect such efforts in laws and policies.

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Hana Choi-Kim: Perspectives and role identities of the specialized counselors dealing with sexual violence cases in university campuses: Around ‘feminism re-boot’ and #MeToo movement in South Korea

I. Introduction

In recent years South Korean society has experienced a new wave of feminism which is distinguished from before. While this new trend of feminism wave is discussed in various ways, some scholars like Son (2015) call this phenomenon ‘feminism reboot’. In this spectacular wave of feminism, the #MeToo movement which has been spread worldwide has also been a huge issue in South Korea. As the #MeToo movement exposes sexual violence issues based on power relationships, the university has been a significant sphere related to sexual violence matters. Not only in the #MeToo movement flow have university campuses been remarkable places for the issue of sexual violence in South Korean society. Statistically, most of Korean universities have their own regulation dealing with preventing and responding to sexual violence cases and have also set up a body in charge of handling it and assigned personnel in charge.

Against this background, this paper aims to understand how the issue of ‘sexual violence’ is dealt with in Korean ‘university’ space, focusing on the perspectives and role identities of counselors working at human rights centers at universities. For the aim, first, I will explore the new trend of the feminist movement over the recent five years, termed ‘feminism reboot’. In conjunction with this, I will briefly introduce Korea’s #MeToo movement, which began with the accusation of sexual violence in the prosecution in January 2018. Based on these two social contexts, I will examine the meaning of the space of university in relation to the issue of sexual violence as gender violence, and then explain why this paper focuses on the views and role identities of those people in charge of dealing with sexual violence on university campuses, using qualitative research through interview data from eight specialized counselors dealing with sexual violence cases in universities.

II. What is 'feminism reboot'?

In Korean society, gender discourse including feminism itself has been a hotter issue than ever in the last five years even though there are some disagreements. And the term 'feminism reboot' emerged to express this phenomenon (Son 2015). 'Feminism reboot' is a new concept to explain the recent feminism movement, which is linked to the existing feminism movement but different. For instance, the novel 'Kim Ji-young, Born 1982' (Cho 2016), which depicts the life of an ordinary woman in her 30s, is considered as a must-read book, on the one hand. On the other hand, a celebrity gets stigmatized, being called 'Megal', which is an abbreviation of 'Megalia', when she showed that she had read the book. The recent series of hate crimes or speeches against women have made Korean women angry and awakened. It also includes these kinds of actions or events; '#I'm a feminist' online hashtag movement in Feb 2015, The mirroring speech in the web community 'MERS gallery' in 2015 summer, the huge wave of mourning for the victim of murder at the public restroom near exit ten of Gangnam station in May 2016, etc. In those situations, women began to criticize the structural problems of patriarchal societies, and many feminist researchers called this phenomenon 'feminism reboot'. The new form of cultural movement, expressed as 'feminist reboot', is not just a short-term phenomenon, but it continues. At the site of a massive candlelight demonstration that led to President Park Geun-hye's impeachment in the winter of 2016, a lot of women criticized the culture of demonstrating democracy that presumes male citizens as holders of first-class citizenship. According to a report by the Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) about 40 % of petitions recommended by more than 200 000 people was related to gender issues in the National Petition to Blue House bulletin over the past two years (Choi 2019).

III. #MeToo movement in South Korea

With this new gender sensitivity stimulating society as a whole, in January 2018, after prosecutor Suh Ji Hyun had disclosed her experience of being sexually harassed in the prosecution, Korean society encountered a huge wave of #MeToo. Soon afterwards, voices began to become louder, revealing the reality of sexual violence committed by countless social celebrities to countless victims over the years. Sexual assault by people who had authority in various fields of Korean society, such as theater, film, literature, entertainment, politics, religion, and physical education, became known to society through the voices of victims. As you may know, the #MeToo movement was sparked by so many sexual harassment victims of the famous film maker Harvey Weinstein in the US in late 2017, and the catch phrase #MeToo has been spread extensively to express one victim's experience and support all the victims. It has caused a worldwide ripple effect beyond the United States. In the meantime, Korea's #MeToo movement is often

referred as a case where the social wave is significantly huge in comparison to any other country.

The #MeToo movement in Korea was based on the various cases of sexual violence in Korean society and on the typical cases of sexual violence that victims could not raise under the power relations for a long time. In particular, there are many cases of sexual violence committed by celebrities who have a high social reputation, and I believe that these factors are more important than ever before to attract social attention to sexual violence. There was also a 'school #MeToo', which was different from the #MeToo which was raised in terms of the way in which victims revealed their experience being sexually harassed by celebrities with power. This is an example of how conventional and customary sexual assault was committed by a male teacher in a secondary school.

IV. Sexual violence and university in South Korea

With regard to sexual violence issues in South Korean society, 'universities' are actually a significant sphere in various meanings. It is the scene where the case occurred that the concept of 'sexual harassment' is known to Korean society for the first time (Prof. Shin Case in Seoul National University). It is also one of the spheres where the anti-sexual violence movement is most active. At the same time, it is the place where various types of power in relationships exist – such as student-and-professor relationships, senior-and-junior relationships, and age hierarchy even in peer groups.

Within the #MeToo movement flow, university campuses have been controversial places, still. Most of all, there are endless news about sexual violence cases on the campus. And recently, there has been the urging of dismissal of professors who commit sexual violence in the #MeToo movement flow, too. Around those situations, several protests against the passive response of university authorities have been staged. Furthermore, claims of secondary victimization from the university's gender equality center have also appeared.

V. Institutionalization of sexual violence and universities

When it comes to gender equality centers or sexual violence relief centers at universities, first of all, we need to understand the institutionalization of sexual violence matters in Korean society.

In fact, even before the #MeToo movement, there had been voices for a long time to publicize sexual violence in Korean society. There are different points of view depending on scholars but there is wide agreement that the Korean anti-sexual violence movement emerged within the flow of social democratization in the mid- and late 1980s, criticizing

patriarchy in the progressive camp (Jung 2003; Jung 2014; Chung 2006). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, several representative cases of sexual violence in which the women's movements jointly supported and responded to the victims became widely known in South Korean society. Supporting victim-survivors of several sexual violence cases, feminist movement groups recognized the need of legal/institutional devices concerning sexual violence issues. Through their legislation movement, Act on the Punishment of Sexual Crimes and Protection of Victims Thereof (1994 Act) in 1994 could be established, which treats rape as 'crimes that infringe the sexual self-determination of others (mostly women)' not as 'an invasion of chastity'. The 1994 Act made it possible to punish sexual violence acts and also imposed the statutory duties on government such as to set plans supporting sexual violence victim-survivors and preventing sexual violence crimes (Kim 2000).

VI. Regulations and institutions regarding sexual harassment at universities

Meanwhile, in 1993, the Seoul National University, a representative university in Korea, had a so-called 'Professor Shin incident' where an academic supervisor harassed a graduate student. The creation of a Joint Action Committee to support the victim of this incident brought the seriousness of the issue of sexual harassment at work to the surface, and the concept of 'sexual harassment' spread to society. Sexual harassment is not included in the scope of sexual violence covered by criminal law, but it has been raised as a social issue that raises employment insecurity by violating workers' labor rights. After that, in 1995, The Employment Equality Act was enacted, which imposed employers' responsibility for the prevention and treatment of sexual harassment at work. Furthermore, the Framework Act on Gender Equality established in 1999 imposed responsibility to take necessary measures including education to prevent sexual harassment on the head of the public institution (Kim 2006; Lee 2007; Shin 2008; Kim & Kim 2011). Additionally, the Ministry of Gender Equality (MoGEF) launched in 2001, made it mandatory for public institutions to provide a counseling service for sexual harassment victims (Kim 2005).

VII. Institutional responses to sexual violence on the campus

Against those backgrounds, under the law, universities shall also establish their own regulations on sexual violence and have organizations and personnel in charge of the prevention and handling of sexual violence cases. In the early 2000s, Korean universities started establishing regulations concerning sexual harassment and sexual violence and

institutions for counseling and handling cases (KwonKim 2018). According to the 2018 statistics by the Ministry of Education, 99.4 % of universities had their own regulation, an official counter and designated staff for counseling and handling grievances related to sexual harassment (Lee et al. 2018). It means that universities have had an institutional basis for preventing and responding to sexual harassment and sexual violence for a long time. According to the draft Standards on Prevention of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Violence proposed by the MoGEF, the heads of each organization should establish and operate a grievance consultation and appoint grievance counselors to provide necessary measures in the prevention and occurrence of sexual harassment and sexual violence. Consultation on sexual harassment and sexual violence cases, handling of such cases, and investigations, and the establishment of measures to prevent recurrence are undertaken. Grievance counselors should be designated including one male and one female at least among the internal members, and they are required to complete professional training at an educational institution under the MoGEF. Therefore, in many workplaces and institutions, labor union officials often act as sexual harassment grievance counselors as a part of labor-related grievances, or human resources managers are often designated as sexual harassment grievance counselors. In this situation, problems often arise during the process of dealing with sexual harassment cases because of low gender sensitivity or insufficient training in activities such as counseling and investigation. Most colleges have also dealt with sexual violence by giving students support staff additional handling of sexual violence cases or by imposing counseling on educational and psychological counseling agencies such as general counseling and career counseling.

VIII. The role of Gender Equality Centers at universities

This official counter is usually named 'Counseling center for sexual violence' or 'Gender Equality Center'. Main jobs of a Gender Equality Center are counseling and handling of sexual harassment cases, gender-based violence (GBV), prevention education, and culture-creating projects for gender equality on the campus. Some of the professional sexual violence counselors working at a university established a network and some of them are main members of the 'Korean University Gender Equality Counseling Center Association' that has 200 university members today. These Gender Equality Centers, which hired the specialized counselors from the early phase respectively, do not only deal with cases but also conduct various projects aiming to create a gender equal campus culture and a safe environment from sexual violence, and take charge of prevention education against gender-based violence as well. Their counseling services can be used by in person, calling or e-mail. Through counseling service, they mainly support sexual violence victims/survivors, providing psychological, legal and medical support associating with professional groups. Once someone reports a case, the center

takes charge of handling the case as well. It includes investigation, victim/reporter support, managing a deliberation committee, and mediation if only victims/survivors want. Not only dealing with actual cases, as the MoGEF manage the completion rate of compulsory GBV prevention education, they also take charge of providing GBV prevention education to all university members such as sexual harassment, sexual violence, prostitution, and domestic violence. In addition, they organize supporters' group for gender equality, anti-sexual violence campaign on the campus, and even research activities such as publishing annual reports, etc.

IX. Understanding sexual violence at universities through the specialized counselors' view

As reported sexual violence cases at universities have increased, including the impact of the #MeToo movement, however, complaints have also soared up against universities, the sexual violence counseling centers and specialized counselors dealing with sexual violence cases at universities. Despite the importance of the specialized counselors' role, it is hard to find research on sexual violence at universities from their angle. In this context, I try to understand the current issues of sexual violence at universities by examining perspectives and role identities of the specialized counselors especially around recent 'feminism reboot' and #MeToo movement situation. To collect data, I conducted interviews with eight specialized counselors handling sexual violence cases at universities for at least more than a year. For recruit interviewees, 'snowball sampling' was used, considering the various conditions of interviewees. The region of universities is limited in Seoul only. Through this qualitative analysis of the data from the interviews, I found several key points to capture the scene related to sexual violence in South Korean universities.

Table 1: Basic Information of the Interviewees

Name	Working at	Length of service	Academic Background	Age	Related experience
A	Gender Equality Center, A university	15 years	MA, Educational counseling	Mid-50s	NGO – Counseling center for women
B	Gender Equality Center, B university	four years	MA, Gender studies	Late 30s	NGO – Sexual violence relief center
C	Human Rights Center, C university	two years	Graduated Law school	Mid-30s	GO – special investigation commission
D	Counseling Center for Gender Equality	13 years (18 years)	PhD, Nursing science	Late 50s	NGO – Sexual education and counseling
E	Human Rights Center, E university	one year	PhD, Criminal Psychology	Mid30s	None
F	Human Rights Center, C university	ten years	MA, Educational counseling	Late 40s	Psychological Group Counseling at university
G	Counseling Center for Gender Equality	five years	PhD, Criminal Psychology M.A.	Late 40s	NGO – Counseling center for women GO – An investigator
H	Human Rights Center, H university	two years	MA, Educational counseling	Early 30s	Psychological Counseling at university

1. Role identity of the specialized counselors no. 1

The first point is about who they are and how they identified with their role. Their role identities differ in various ways as counselor, investigator, or case handler, etc. It mostly depends on what kind of background they have and, it is also affecting which task they think to be most important.

“I’m a counselor who works at the University Gender Equality Center. But I think there are three categories of my role. First of all, there is consultation. **I started this work because of counseling, because I majored in counseling. I started this job because I wanted to meet a client in need, share my concerns, and help him or her get through the challenge. So, for the identification, my identity is a counselor.** (...) Anyway, there are three major roles I should play, giving a lecture for gender-based violence prevention, counseling, and handling incidents. Of course, the university asks me to be administrator as well, but it is hard to accept as my identity. But if you ask me to talk about my identity with all my heart, I am a counselor. I think so (there’s counseling about talking to both the victim and the perpetrator?) Yes.” [Interviewee A]

2. Role identity of the specialized counselors no. 2

The specialized counselors perform multiple roles, and those roles are not fully integrated into each other sometimes. For example, they are expected to support victims while they should take a neutral position during investigation of reported cases.

“But when you are asking for some kind of realistic damages or relief, you have no choice but to be a case handler in this person’s psychological support. Then when I worked alone, there was some conflict in this role. My client was in a psychologically supported position at the first step, the counseling. And when I started conducting the investigation of the case, she expected me to be on her side, because I already played psychological support role to her before the investigation started. Victims usually think that I have to side with them as always in sexual violence cases. But as a case handler, I couldn’t actually be 100 percent neutral. **To be honest, I’m inclined to the victim who was the client in my psychological counseling, I can’t help it. But I have to stand neutral as a case handler.** Psychologically, I’m on the victim’s side, but I have to be neutral. At that time, my client really was hard on me. She felt very disappointed. At the same time, the accused one knows I’m on the victim’s side. Even if it’s not, he believes and thinks so, so I’m always biased. So, **I always get pointed out and complained about something. Moreover, I want to do well as a case handler, I’m not happy to have both roles.** The victim is so frustrated and disappointed towards me, and the accused one complains to me that I’m on the reporting person’s side. I think I

should act as a case handler but it's too hard to identify as a handler of sexual violence cases for those reasons. It's something like that." [Interviewee F]

3. The special counselors' perspectives around #MeToo movement and 'feminism reboot'

The third key finding is the changed tendency of victims. Concerning the #MeToo movement, it is easy to anticipate the rising of reported case numbers. However, most of the participants said that there have been no big differences on the number of reported cases or counseling cases at the university between, before and after the #Metoo movement. For the background of that reality, the interviewees pointed out the fact that the universities where they're working have already had quite robust system to handle sexual violence case. However, under the phase of 'feminism reboot', most of them catch the changed tendency of counseling from victims, which features improvement in the recognition level in the university system such as regulation, specific and various kind of requirements as 'a sexual violence victim', and a demanding attitude.

"(Recently) victims have very specific requirements, and I often faced the situation that some victims strongly blame the center right after they felt a bit difficult to be satisfied with the way of response from the center during the process. That has gradually been getting worse time to time since 2 to 3 years ago. It wasn't like that before. Before that, it's a little bit like this, 'I'm very troubled because this thing happened to me, what can this university do for me?' However, now they express what they want in detail and demand it. If some requirements are hard to accept by the university, then they start to change their position against the center and the university. (...)

(Do your requirements feel very diverse and specific lately?) Yes, it is. (...) I think everyone has become aware of the fact that a university has clear roles and obligations in supporting and protecting victims. So, in the past, in the era of 'Does the university do these kind of things as well?', there were not that many people who knew whether those roles were the part of the university, whether the victim has the right to ask to be protected, and whether there are certain rules and a kind of standard to deal with cases. But now people know those things. (...) So, before they check how the institution of the university works for their case, they already decide and come to the center with how they want their case to be dealt with. 'The university has this duty, right? And should the victim be protected? And it is right that the case should go where the victim wants to go. So, this is what I want.' Victims visit the center with their decision like that." [Interviewee A]

4. The ultimate purpose of dealing with sexual violence cases on the campus

The last key finding is that the specialized counselors share the view concerning the purpose of dealing with sexual violence cases on the campus. For the ultimate purpose of the intervention in sexual violence cases by universities the specialized counselors point out 'restoration of community' and 'educational effect on the perpetrators' as much as recovery of victims.

When sexual violence situations happen, a countermeasure can be divided into three types: personal solution, group resolution, and using justice system (Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center 2011). Among them, the space called 'university' is characterized by the fact that educational institutions solve their own cases of sexual violence. This has the intermediate characteristics of personal resolution and the use of the judicial system. For the victims of sexual violence, the range of sexual violence dealing with the judicial system is limited, or the limitations that arise in daily life immediately after the victims of sexual violence are resolved. In this context, it is important to solve the problems within its organization, in order to recover sexual violence victims' daily lives as soon as possible.

However, the operation of this system is again enforced by legal grounds. For this reason, some universities have just remained at the minimum proposed by the law rather than seeking a more active role in the resolution of sexual violence. As a result, the passive response of university authorities and agencies dealing with sexual violence has caused a number of complaints, amid the recent social atmosphere that has become more sensitive to sexual violence. One of the major issues raised is the protest of low disciplinary actions against incidents of sexual violence and secondary damage from neglect of victim protection measures. In this situation, the specialized counselors are confronted with concerns about the ultimate meaning and orientation of dealing with sexual violence in universities.

"But I think it shouldn't be the purpose of judging whether or not discipline is done in an educational institution. If so, there is a court and there are a lot of such institutions. If there is a police station in accordance with the current law in society, the police station that collects people who do not comply with the regulations in school. This is the only educational purpose. To decide whether or not to discipline like this, ultimately the committee's role is to decide whether or not to discipline. For educational purposes, I don't think there is much to be gained by the respondent. In fact, if you are dealing with a case and it is a serious violation of the current law and does not lead to criminal activity, it is important that the educational purpose of realizing this student's mistake is to prevent recurrence. To do so, we need consensus arbitration. But that's a lot harder to deal with. And the counselor is so tired. And you get a lot of attacks in the process. Isn't it fair to see who's on the side? So, if I do well, I think it's a good case if the respondent realizes what's wrong with it. Oh, you shouldn't do this, and something that prevents you

from doing it again in your future life. I think that's a well-processed case. Disciplinary, responsibly and leaving school? As long as this institution is an educational institution, it must be the best one. (...) Now, when you think about the role of schools as an educational institution, you don't really discipline him, but at least graduate and send it as a member of society. It's also the school's role to teach them not to go out into society and do such acts of sexual harassment. But it's not easy to do the two together." [Interviewee D]

"It is clear that I feel rewarded by helping a person, a sexual violence victim, who's in a tough situation to report and ask for treatment. And about the offenders, even I didn't know at the beginning, a lot of people thought they would evade their situation, but most of them didn't. I'm not sure if they're telling the truth, but I can help them when they reflect on themselves and want to be better. And I feel also rewarded with that." [Interviewer B]

"For example, the sexual violence relief centers, the NGOs, they only need to support the victim, and GOs worked on the investigation, as I worked at as an investigator, I only had to do some investigative work to determine if this person's statement is true or not. But here, I have to examine the truth as well as taking care of the members of our university. Because victims and the perpetrators are all our members. And usually they are still students, too. And it's also a matter of connecting with the university community. So, it's our role to deal with cases strictly but at the same time, in terms of the victims as victims, the perpetrators as the perpetrators, and even the community as community, we should also play our role which help them be recovered from their case, which is very different from NGO or GOs." [Interviewee G]

"What's nice about being a school, this is what lawyer friends say, but it has the advantage of being able to intervene before the case grows and before the conflict grows. So, there is a clear advantage that the first person who intervenes well and the parties have a certain degree of willingness to work together in the community before the work gets big if the involvement and intentionality are well matched. But that's great when it's good. So, you have the advantage of being able to fight things and not to end up punching and going to court. I'm connected, but most of the people who come to the school counselor are new to the statement. So, there's some early response that you can do, with no conflict. And another advantage, except for professors and faculty, there are some advantages to being students. It's a time when kids are more acceptable, change through education, stabilize, or the environment of students keeps changing. It's time to study abroad, change boyfriends, graduate, get a job. Go to the army. It is good to see if we can recover well if we can give the right educational opportunities and the right direction to the children who continue to develop at such changing times." [Interviewee C]

X. Conclusion with suggestions

In the 'feminism reboot' and #MeToo movement phase, sexual violence matters in the university space have been shown to be expanding and deepening. The specialized counselors who deal with sexual violence cases at universities have confronted all those untangled issues related to sexual violence. They play their role at multiple positions like counselor, investigator, or a case handler, etc. However, when they perform those various roles, it is not always integrated. Around the #MeToo movement, most of the specialized counselors do not agree with the claims that sexual violence cases at universities have increased since the #MeToo movement, but they were all aware of the changed attitudes of the victim/survivors. Finally, most of them think that the ultimate purpose of dealing with sexual violence cases in the university is 'restoration of community' and 'educational effect on the perpetrators' as much as recovery of victims. For the purpose of offering better systems and solutions for sexual violence in the university, from those findings, I would like to conclude with some suggestions.

First, the role of the specialized counselors needs more strictly analyzing and standardizing.

Second, the professional training course program for specialized counselors should be developed based on the analysis of their specific and unique role.

Third, the government and university should set stable labor environments for specialized counselors to offer campuses safe from sexual violence.

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How does “identity” influence not only the individual, but also society, modern statehood and international policy making? During the 12th German-Korean Colloquium, 15 scientists from Germany and Korea analyzed and discussed the key category of “identity” from different perspectives. The interdisciplinary conference was hosted by Klaus Stüwe and continued the longtime cooperation between the Sogang University Seoul and the Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. In this conference volume, central results of the conference are presented.

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