Essays on unintended economic consequences of government interventions

Kurzfassung/Abstract

In this cumulative dissertation, I investigate unintended economic consequences of government interventions in three essays, each looking at a very specific question. The first essay examines how the introduction and enhancement of public pension systems affect demography, the second essay focuses on tax evasion via citizenship-by-investment programs, and the third essay evaluates the diversion of foreign financial assistance by powerful elites from recipient countries.

Despite the different research questions, all three essays evolve around the issue that actions of governments almost always create incentives causing unforeseen or unexpected behavioral responses. The first essay shows that increasing pension wealth creates incentives to save less for old-age in the form of own children, the second essay documents that policy instruments that increase the detection probability of tax evasion create incentives for evaders to find new ways to circumvent the law, and the third essay shows that foreign assistance creates rent-seeking incentives.

The results collected in the dissertation have implications for economic policy: Government interventions must be informed by an understanding of how well policies and programs produce (or contribute to) their desired outcomes. The results of all three essays presented in this thesis demonstrate that unforeseen or unexpected behavioral responses to government interventions can lead to economic outcomes or side effects that are divergent or contrary to the intentions of policymakers. These unintended economic consequences can significantly lessen the effectiveness of the policy or render it unsustainable. The first essay illustrates that the fertility effects of public pensions can erode the contribution base and, thus, the sustainability and political acceptance of a PAYG pension system in the long-run. The second essay shows that loopholes that have been found by evaders can lessen the deterrence effect of tax information exchange mechanisms, undermining their effectiveness to curb tax evasion. The third essay demonstrates that aid capture can prevent resources from being spent on their intended use, rendering foreign assistance less effective.